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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters on the elicitation of individual discount
rates and on the estimation of gambling prevalence in Denmark.
The first chapter, “Discount Rate Sensitivity to Background Consumption and Con-
sumption Smoothing,” studies the sensitivity of individual discount rates with respect to
background consumption and consumption smoothing. I use simulated choice data from
standard decision tasks in time preference experiments and show that individual discount
rates are sensitive to assumptions with respect to background consumption and consumption
smoothing if the utility function is non-linear and exogenous. However, if discount rates
and the utility function are elicited jointly, discount rates are robust to assumptions on
time-invariant background consumption and consumption smoothing. The analysis clarifies
mixed conclusions from previous studies and indicates which elicitation methods provide
robust estimates of individual discount rates.
The second chapter, “Financial Wealth, Liquidity Constraints, and Discounting Behav-
ior,” analyzes to what extent discounting behavior in experiments is correlated with financial
wealth. Life cycle models of consumption and saving behavior associate higher discount rates
with lower financial wealth and present bias with lower financial liquidity. We combine
data from a field experiment in Denmark with administrative data on financial wealth and
estimate exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. We find significantly lower
discount rates for wealthy subjects than for poor subjects, but do not find any evidence of
present bias and no significant association between present bias and liquidity constraints.
The third chapter, “Gambling Problems in the General Danish Population: Survey
Evidence,” compares several survey instruments of gambling behavior and estimates
the prevalence of problem gambling in Denmark. We administer surveys on gambling
behavior together with standard survey instruments for alcohol use, anxiety, depression and
impulsivity to 8,405 subjects. We estimate that 95% of the population has no detectable
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gambling risk, 2.9% has an early risk, 0.8% has an intermediate risk, 0.7% has an advanced
risk, and only 0.2% can be classified as problem gamblers. Moreover, we find that gambling
risk is positively correlated with alcohol use, anxiety, depression, and impulsivity.
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Resumé
Afhandlingen består af tre uafhængige kapitler, som handler om afsløring af tidspræferencer
og udbredelsen af ludomani i Danmark.
Det første kapitel, “Discount Rate Sensitivity to Background Consumption and Con-
sumption Smoothing” analyserer følsomheden af individuelle diskonteringsrater med hensyn
til forskellige antagelser om baggrundsforbrug og forbrugsudjævning. Jeg evaluerer
beslutninger i typiske økonomiske eksperimenter og viser, at de estimerede diskonteringsrater
er følsomme overfor forskellige antagelser om baggrundsforbrug og forbrugsudjævning, hvis
nyttefunktionen er ikke-lineær og eksogent givet. Jeg opnår derimod robuste estimater,
hvis nyttefunktionen er estimeret sammen med individuelle diskonteringsrater. Analysen
forklarer de forskellige resultater fra tidligere studier med hensyn til vigtigheden af forskellige
antagelser om baggrundsforbrug og forbrugsudjævning og giver en indikation af, hvilke
metoder til afsløring af individuelle diskonteringsrater, som fører til robuste estimater.
Det andet kapitel, “Financial Wealth, Liquidity Constraints, and Discounting Behavior”
analyserer sammenhængen mellem individuelle diskonteringsrater og privat opsparing. Den
teoretiske litteratur vedrørende livstidsforbrug foreslår, at højere individuelle diskonter-
ingsrater fører til lavere opsparing og, at inkonsistente tidspræferencer (present bias)
medfører lavere beholdninger af likvide aktiver. Vi kombinerer data fra felteksperimenter i
Denmark med administrative data vedrørende personlig indkomst og formue fra Denmark
Statistik. Vi estimerer individuelle nyttefunktioner og diskonteringsrater simultant og
finder, at diskonteringsrater er signifikant lavere blandt rigere deltagere end blandt fattigere
deltagere. Vi finder derimod ingen signifikant sammenhæng mellem såkaldt “present bias”
og beholdninger af likvide aktiver.
Det tredje kapitel, “Gambling Problems in the General Danish Population: Survey
Evidence” afdækker omfanget af ludomani i Danmark. Vi anvender forskellige populære
instrumenter til at afsløre omfanget af problematisk spilleadfærd samtidig med, at vi bruger
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instrumenter til at afsløre forbrug af alkohol, angst, depression og impulsivitet hos 8.405
deltagere i spørgeskemaundersøgelsen. Resultaterne viser, at 95% af befolkningen ikke har
en problematisk spilleadfærd, 2,9% har en lav risiko, 0,8% har en mellemstor risiko, 0,7%
har en høj risiko og kun 0,2% klassificeres som ludomaner. Analysen viser også en signifikant
sammenhæng mellem ludomani og forbrug af alkohol, angst, depression og impulsivitet.
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Introduction
The thesis consists of three chapters on the elicitation of individual discount rates and on
the estimation of gambling prevalence rates in Denmark. Each chapter is self-contained and
can be read independently. However, the three chapters are related to a common theme:
they discuss experimental methods for the identification and elicitation of time preferences,
and the prevalence of addictive behavior such as problem gambling.
The first two chapters discuss the elicitation of individual discount rates from choice data
in economic experiments: Chapter 1 analyzes methods for eliciting time preferences and
studies the robustness of individual discount rates with respect to background consumption
and consumption smoothing. Chapter 2 uses choice data from a Danish field experiment to
study the association between discounting behavior and financial wealth, and the association
between present bias and liquidity. The third chapter estimates the prevalence of problem
gambling in the general Danish population using survey instruments. Gambling related
problems may be viewed as time inconsistent behavior and have been linked to discounting
models that posit a passion for the present.
Many decisions in life involve tradeoffs between costs and benefits that occur at different
points in time, and theories on time preferences describe how these intertemporal costs and
benefits are evaluated. Two popular theories on intertemporal choice are the exponential
discounting model (Samuelson, 1937) and the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Phelps
and Pollack, 1968; Laibson, 1997). According to the exponential discounting model future
costs and benefits are discounted by a constant rate per time period, and the decision model
thus implies time consistent behavior. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model incorporates
the idea of present bias and captures dynamically inconsistent preferences in the sense that
one may deviate from long term plans and consume more now than planned in the past
(Strotz, 1955). These types of preference reversals over time have been associated with
addictive behavior such as problem gambling (Dixon et al., 2003), smoking (Harrison, Lau,
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and Rutström, 2010) and drugs (Kirby et al., 1999).
The empirical identification and measurement of time preferences has received consider-
able attention in experimental economics. Frederick et al. (2002) and Andersen, Harrison,
Lau, and Rutström (2014) review the extensive literature and discuss the methodological
developments. The typical experimental design asks subjects to make binary choices between
time delayed monetary rewards. These intertemporal choices allow one to identify the
parameters of exponential and hyperbolic discounting models under assumptions on how and
when these monetary rewards generate utility. An important contribution to the literature
is the study by Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2008), which shows that controlling
for non-linearity in the utility function has significant effects on estimated discount rates
from choices between time delayed monetary rewards.
The first chapter, “Discount Rate Sensitivity to Background Consumption and Consump-
tion Smoothing,” analyzes the sensitivity of estimated individual discount rates with respect
to alternative assumptions on the integration of experimental income with other income
(background consumption) and the expenditure profile (consumption smoothing). Andersen
et al. (2008) find that individual discount rates are robust to the level of background
consumption but sensitive to the degree of consumption smoothing. However, Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012) and Holden and Quiggin (2015) find that individual discount rates
are sensitive with respect to the level of background consumption. These mixed results
motivate the analysis in the first chapter. I use simulated choices from standard decision
tasks in time preference experiments and show that individual discount rates are robust
to background consumption and consumption smoothing if the utility function is elicited
jointly. The analysis contributes to the literature on time preferences by clarifying the mixed
results and conclusions from previous studies.
The second chapter, “Financial Wealth, Liquidity Constraints, and Discounting Behav-
ior,” joint with Morten I. Lau, analyzes to what extent discounting behavior in experiments
is correlated with financial wealth. Life cycle models of consumption and saving behavior
associate higher discount rates with lower financial wealth and present bias with small
deposits of liquid assets. However, despite these clear associations between time preferences
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and saving behavior, and despite the policy relevance of understanding private saving
and investment behavior, the empirical literature on this topic is scarce. The challenge
is to obtain reliable information on both individual discount rates and financial wealth
and liquidity, and this combination of data is rarely available. A few studies from
developing countries (Pender, 1996; Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2008; Kirby et al., 2002) have
analyzed the association between individual discounting behavior and private wealth using
experimental data on time preferences, and only one study (Meier and Sprenger, 2010)
has analyzed the association between present bias and financial liquidity. The second
chapter combines experimental data with detailed administrative data on private financial
wealth for a representative sample of the Danish population and estimates exponential
and quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. We find that wealthy subjects have significantly
lower exponential discount rates than poor subjects, which is consistent with theoretical
predictions from life cycle models of saving and investment behavior that assume exponential
discounting (e.g. Krusell and Smith, 1998; Hendricks, 2007). However, we do not find any
evidence of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and there is no significant association between
present bias and financial liquidity, which is not consistent with theoretical predictions from
life cycle models with quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Angeletos et al., 2001).
The third chapter, “Gambling Problems in the General Danish Population: Survey
Evidence,” joint with Glenn W. Harrison, Morten I. Lau, and Don Ross, compares several
survey instruments of gambling behavior and estimates the prevalence of problem gambling
in Denmark. Problem gambling is often identified using clinically-based instruments such as
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV), which measures the
effects and consequences of problem gambling. We administer the Focal Adult Gambling
Screen (FLAGS), which was developed by Schellinck et al. (2015), and it is a broader measure
of problem gambling that seeks to detect both the presence and effects of the latent disorder.
The sample consists of 8,405 adult Danes and we find that 95% of the population has no
detectable risk, 2.9% has an early risk, 0.8% has an intermediate risk, 0.7% has an advanced
risk, and 0.2% can be classified as problem gamblers. We also find a significant correlation
with scores of other gambling risk instruments, such as the DSM IV screen, and instruments
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measuring alcohol use, anxiety, depression and impulsivity.
The three chapters contribute to our understanding of intertemporal decisions and
provide new insights on the empirical identification of time preferences and problem
gambling. The thesis concludes with a short summary and discussion of the main results in
each chapter, and I provide an outlook for further research.
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Discount Rate Sensitivity to Background
Consumption and Consumption Smoothing
Lasse J. Jessen∗
Abstract
The experimental literature to date suggests that individual discount rates are sensitive
to assumptions regarding integration of income with background consumption and consump-
tion smoothing, i.e., the spending period and pattern of monetary rewards in incentivized
decision tasks. I analyze the sensitivity of individual discount rates elicited from choices in
experiments and highlight important simulation results: If the utility function is exogenous,
then discount rates are sensitive to assumptions regarding background consumption and con-
sumption smoothing. However, if the utility function is elicited jointly with time preferences,
then discount rates are robust to time-invariant background consumption and consumption
smoothing. These results hold for various elicitation methods and utility specifications that
are common in the experimental literature, they clarify seemingly contradictory conclusions
from previous studies, and highlight the importance of joint elicitation of the utility function
and discount rates.
∗lj.eco@cbs.dk, Copenhagen Business School
1 Introduction
The experimental identification of time preferences in the economics literature is, to a large
extent, based on choices over time-dated monetary rewards. Indifference between smaller,
sooner income and larger, later income indicates the monetary premium that respondents
require to be compensated for delaying the receipt of income. However, standard models
of time preferences, such as the exponential discounting model (Samuelson, 1937) and the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997), do not describe how future income is
discounted; instead, they specify how future utility is discounted. It is therefore necessary to
specify how monetary income translates into utility by considering the shape of the utility
function, how monetary rewards are integrated with background consumption, and whether
income generates utility over one or several periods.
A common assumption in the literature suggests that experimental income is spent at
the time it is received and not over several time periods (Cubitt and Read, 2007). Moreover,
if utility is linear then discount rates can be elicited without concern for background
consumption. Most of the early literature builds on this approach (see Frederick et al., 2002,
for a review), but it carries the risk of potential confounds in the elicitation of individual
discount rates. In particular, variation in responses between subjects may be interpreted as
differences in individual discount rates when it actually stems from differences in utility of
income, background consumption or consumption smoothing.
Andersen et al. (2008b) address these caveats. Rather than relying on specific assump-
tions with respect to the utility function, they elicit it from choices over lotteries and find
significant concavity that reduces the estimated level of individual discount rates, a result
that follows from Jensen’s Inequality. Identifying the utility function jointly with discount
rates (Andersen et al., 2014; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012) has since become an important
element of experimental studies on time preferences.
Although the utility function can be identified, at least two other issues remain, namely
the degree to which rewards are integrated with other arguments in the utility function and
the consumption pattern by which rewards generate utility. Subjects in experiments may
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integrate their rewards with other income or consumption flows, which often differ between
individuals. Recent studies have found that discount rates are sensitive to the level of back-
ground consumption (Holden and Quiggin, 2015; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012), whereas
others report that discount rates are not sensitive (Andersen et al., 2008b). Moreover, some
subjects may plan to spend their rewards over several days, whereas others may plan to
spend them immediately. Both Andersen et al. (2008b) and Duquette et al. (2014) find that
discount rates are sensitive to the extent of consumption smoothing.
I analyze the sensitivity of elicited discount rates with respect to background con-
sumption and consumption smoothing. My contribution to the literature is three-fold:
First, I highlight the seemingly contradictory conclusions in the recent literature addressing
background consumption and consumption smoothing. Section 2 presents the different
studies that have come to different conclusions on the relevance of background consumption
and consumption smoothing on estimation of individual discount rates under non-linear
utility.
Second, I identify the drivers underlying these mixed results via a sensitivity analysis that
is based on simulations from indifference points between delayed rewards and between lot-
teries. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework and presents the intertemporal utility
functions. The analysis in Section 4 reveals that the previous results are driven by variations
in assumptions with respect to the utility function: If the utility function is exogenous, then
discount rates are sensitive to both background consumption and consumption smoothing.
However, if the atemporal utility function is elicited under the same assumptions as the
intertemporal utility function, individual discount rates are robust and are not affected by
the level of background consumption or the extent of consumption smoothing.
Third, and finally, I show that although estimates of discount rates are more robust
than previously reported in the literature, some important caveats remain. I analyze
in Section 5 how time-variant background consumption and consumption smoothing are
possible confounds for discount rate estimation. These can to some extent be addressed
by adjustments to existing experimental designs, and I make some suggestions for future
research.
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2 Literature on Discount Rate Sensitivity
The sensitivity of individual discount rates to assumptions on the amount of background
consumption and the extent of consumption smoothing has attracted attention since the
publication by Andersen et al. (2008b), who experimentally control for non-linearity in the
utility function. They show that background consumption has no effect on discount rates
when utility is assumed to be linear, which explains the lack of interest in background
consumption in previous studies (see reviews by Frederick et al., 2002; Andersen et al.,
2014). Andersen et al. (2008b) also deviate from the standard assumption that rewards are
consumed immediately after they are received. Since then, other studies have addressed
these assumptions and a number of contributions have emerged that are in stark contrast
to each other.
2.1 Sensitivity to Background Consumption
Andersen et al. (2008b) jointly elicit the utility function from binary choices between lotteries
and individual discount rates from binary choices between time-dated rewards using a
representative sample of the Danish population. In their baseline specification, experimental
income is integrated with a time-invariant amount of background consumption, which is set
equal to the average daily consumption level of non-durable assets in Denmark. They find
that the amount of background consumption does not have a significant effect on individual
discount rates. When background consumption is set to 50 kroner per day, the estimated
annual discount rate is 10.2%, and when background consumption is set to 200 kroner per
day, the estimated annual discount rate is marginally lower and equal to 9.8%. However,
the curvature of the utility function measured by the coefficient of constant relative risk
aversion increases from 0.67 to 0.82.
Later studies contradict these findings. Holden and Quiggin (2015) consider a model
of bounded rationality where the level of background consumption depends on the time
delay between the sooner and later rewards. Their estimates are based on an elicitation
method that is similar to Andersen et al. (2008b), but they assume that the utility function
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is exogenous and not affected by variation in background consumption. Holden and Quiggin
(2015) assume that the sooner reward and the later reward are both integrated with higher
levels of background consumption when the time delay between the rewards is long compared
to when the time delay between the rewards is short. They find that higher levels of
background consumption increase estimated discount rates.
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) also find that estimated discount rates are sensitive to
the level of background consumption. They develop an alternative method to jointly elicit
discount rates and the utility function based on intertemporal allocations of income along
a budget set. They allow for the integration of rewards with background consumption
and discuss the sensitivity of discount rates with respect to this exogenous variable in
detail. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) find that elicited discount rates are sensitive to
the amount of daily background consumption. The results from nonlinear least square
estimations show that as daily background consumption increases discount rates decrease
significantly (from 36% when background consumption is 1 dollar down to 15% when
background consumption is 25 dollars). They also find that the estimated utility curvature
increases as daily background consumption increases. However, these results are sensitive to
the underlying estimation technique, and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) find less sensitivity
of discount rates when they use a two-limit tobit specification instead of the nonlinear least
squares specification.
A final related study is that of Laury et al. (2012). They develop an identification
strategy that avoids any impact of background consumption. They elicit individual discount
rates by asking subjects to make choices over time-dated lotteries, where the sooner and later
rewards are equal and constant, but the probability of the outcome varies over time. The
authors show analytically that, in their design, discount rates are independent of utility
curvature, background consumption, and consumption smoothing, which they highlight
as an advantage of their method over alternatives. However, the choice data reveal that
subjects appear to be sensitive to small variations in probabilities between the sooner and
later lotteries. The sooner option is always a 50-50 chance of receiving 0 dollar or 200
dollars, and the later option offers increasing probabilities of receiving 200 dollars. They
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observe a significant shift in preferences when the probability of the later reward increases
from 50% to 50.1%, which indicates that not all subjects evaluate the choice tasks entirely
according to the underlying discounting theory, and they may instead focus on probabilities
in the time-dated lotteries without considering the time delay.
Overall, the conclusions regarding the sensitivity of individual discount rates to variation
in background consumption are mixed. Andersen et al. (2008b) find no effect of the amount
of background consumption on discount rates but some effect on the utility function when
all rewards (from both the lottery and discounting tasks) are integrated with background
consumption. In contrast, Holden and Quiggin (2015) find that individual discount rates
are sensitive when the utility function is exogenous, and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) find
that discount rates and the utility function are both sensitive to variation in background
consumption.
2.2 Sensitivity to Consumption Smoothing
Andersen et al. (2008b) also deviate from the standard assumption with respect to con-
sumption smoothing, namely that rewards are spent immediately after they are paid out.
Focusing on the simple case of uniform and time-invariant consumption smoothing over
time periods following the receipt of income, they find a significant effect of consumption
smoothing on individual discount rates. As consumption smoothing increases, the estimated
discount rate tends toward the level that is obtained under linear utility, i.e. risk neutrality.
However, Andersen et al. (2008b) conclude that the most appropriate assumption based on
log likelihood values of the statistical models is immediate, and not delayed, consumption
of rewards.
Duquette et al. (2014) follow Andersen et al. (2008b) and allow for uniform, time-
invariant consumption smoothing over several time periods following the receipt of a reward.
They show that utility maximization may lead to consumption smoothing over longer
periods of time and up to 234 days in their analysis.1 Like Andersen et al. (2008b),
1For the rewards used in their analysis, optimal consumption smoothing over 234 days means splitting
405 dollars into daily spending of 1.73 dollars. While this may be the optimal extent of consumption
smoothing according to theory, Duquette et al. (2014) acknowledge that it may not be the most realistic
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they find that consumption smoothing leads to higher individual discount rates, and that
individual discount rates for a utility maximizing consumer are close to the level obtained
under linear utility. Hence, estimated discount rates under the assumption of intertemporal
utility maximization are not sensitive to the degree of utility curvature because consumption
is spread across relatively long periods of time.
These are the only two studies to date that discuss the possible effects of allowing for
consumption smoothing on discount rates. Interestingly, they both find that discount rate
estimates are sensitive to the extent of consumption smoothing. However, neither study
allows for consumption smoothing in the evaluation of lottery rewards, and I return to this
issue later.
3 Theoretical Framework
3.1 Identification of Discount Rates
In most experiments on time preference, individual discount rates are identified from indif-
ference points between smaller, sooner and larger, later monetary rewards.2 Like Andersen
et al. (2008b), I allow rewards to be integrated with background consumption and smoothed
uniformly over several time periods after the payment date. I further assume that the
intertemporal utility function is additively separable3 and time preferences are represented
by exponential discounting.4
Under these assumptions, the present value of utility from a sooner, smaller reward xS
assumption.
2Different experimental designs exist for eliciting discount rates. Some rely on ”fill in the blank” tasks,
where participants state or reveal a sooner amount X that makes them indifferent to a later amount Y (e.g.,
Thaler, 1981; Benhabib et al., 2010). Others rely on ordered sets of binary choices in decision tasks (e.g.,
Coller and Williams, 1999; Harrison et al., 2002; Andersen et al., 2008b). Both elicitation methods have
the same aim: to identify (approximate) indifference between smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards.
3The assumption of additive separability is standard in the experimental literature on time preferences.
To date, few studies have attempted to identify non-additive intertemporal utility specifications from
experimental choice data. One exception is the identification of correlation aversion over income in Andersen
et al. (2011). In this paper, I focus on the standard utility framework that has been applied in most time
preference experiments.
4The theory of exponential discounting has been challenged by non-standard discounting theories, such
as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which capture a possible bias toward present consumption. I discuss to
what extent present bias is sensitive to background consumption and consumption smoothing in Section 4.3.
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received at time t = S is specified as
DUS =
S−1∑
t=0
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· u(ωt)
+
S+λS−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· u
(
ωt +
xS
λS
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from background consumption
plus experimental reward xS
+
T∑
t=S+λS
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· u(ωt), (1)
where δ is the annual exponential discount rate, u defines the atemporal utility function, λS
is the number of time periods over which consumption is smoothed, ωt is daily background
consumption, and T is the planning horizon.
Equation (1) initially appears complicated, but it is analogous to the framework applied
in Andersen et al. (2008b) and Duquette et al. (2014). Without any income from the
experiment, a subject would consume her background consumption ωt in every period. If
she receives a reward xS at time t = S, she will increase her consumption uniformly over λS
days, allowing her to increase consumption from ωt to ωt +
xS
λS
on those days. On all other
days, she will continue to consume ωt.
5
The discounted utility from receiving a larger, later reward xL is
DUL =
L−1∑
t=0
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· u(ωt)
+
L+λL−1∑
t=L
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· u
(
ωt +
xL
λL
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Utility from background consumption
plus experimental reward xL
+
T∑
t=L+λL
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· u(ωt), (2)
where λL indicates the number of periods over which the later reward is consumed. The
planning horizon T is longer than reward-based consumption, which means that T > S+λS
and T > L+ λL.
6
The indifference point between a smaller, sooner reward and a larger, later reward is
5Uniform consumption smoothing is a simplifying assumption that is different from the optimal
consumption path under intertemporal utility maximization when individual discount rates deviate from
the growth adjusted market interest rate (e.g., the Euler equation in neoclassical growth models). However,
this assumption simplifies the analysis significantly.
6It is not necessary to assume that consumption from the sooner reward ends before consumption from
the later reward begins, i.e. S + λS < L is not a necessary restriction.
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given by
S+λS−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
[
u
(
ωt +
xS
λS
)
− u(ωt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xS over λS days
=
L+λL−1∑
t=L
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
[
u
(
ωt +
xL
λL
)
− u(ωt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xL over λL days
. (3)
The additional utility from consuming the sooner, smaller reward is equal to the additional
utility from consuming the larger, later reward. To identify the discount rate δ from the
indifference point between two rewards xS and xL, one needs to know: (1) the functional
form of the utility function u, (2) the level of background consumption ωt in each period,
and (3) the extent of consumption smoothing λS and λL for the sooner and later rewards,
respectively.
Equation (3) is a general specification of discount rate identification found in the experi-
mental literature. Assuming linear utility and excluding consumption smoothing by setting
λS = λL = 1, equation (3) is simplified and the discount rate δ is given by
δ =
(
xL
xS
) 360
L−S
− 1. (4)
Before the contribution by Andersen et al. (2008b), many studies on individual discount
rates based their identification on equation (4) (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Coller and Williams,
1999; Frederick et al., 2002, for a review). Under linear utility, integration of rewards with
background consumption does not affect estimated discount rates, and neither does time-
invariant consumption smoothing.
Allowing for non-linear utility, integration with constant background consumption ω and
time-invariant uniform consumption smoothing λ gives the specification used by Andersen
et al. (2008b).7 The exponential discount rate is then identified by
δ =
[
u(ω + xL
λ
)− u(ω)
u(ω + xS
λ
)− u(ω)
] 360
L−S
− 1. (5)
7Using a different identification method, as discussed in Appendix D, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) also
allow for the integration of rewards with background consumption ω. They do not allow for consumption
smoothing over several time periods and keep λ = 1. Holden and Quiggin (2015) allow only for variation in
background consumption in their model of bounded rationality applied to time preference experiments.
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In Section 4, I analyze the sensitivity of individual discount rates to time-invariant levels
of background consumption and to time-invariant degrees of consumption smoothing, and
I use Equation (5) in the analysis for different specifications of the utility function.
3.2 Identification of the Utility Function
The sensitivity of individual discount rates with respect to consumption smoothing and
background consumption depends on the specification of the atemporal utility function and
how it is identified. Duquette et al. (2014) take the utility function as given and assume
constant relative risk aversion over consumption.8 The same approach is followed by Holden
and Quiggin (2015). Andersen et al. (2008b) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) jointly elicit
the utility function and individual discount rates based on choice data but use different
methods to identify the utility function.
Andersen et al. (2008b) use seperate decision tasks to elicit the utility function. Binary
choices between lotteries, as in Holt and Laury (2002), identify a utility function with
constant relative risk aversion under the assumption of expected utility theory.9
Allowing for integration of lottery rewards with background consumption and con-
sumption smoothing, the indifference point between a safe lottery paying xA1 or xA2 with
probabilities p and (1 − p), respectively, and a riskier lottery paying xB1 or xB2 with
probabilities p and (1− p), respectively, is specified as
p · u
(
ωRA +
xA1
λRA
)
+ (1− p) · u
(
ωRA +
xA2
λRA
)
= p · u
(
ωRA +
xB1
λRA
)
+ (1 − p) · u
(
ωRA +
xB2
λRA
)
. (6)
Lottery A is safer than lottery B because the payouts xA1 and xA2 have lower variance than
xB1 and xB2. Each lottery reward is integrated with background consumption ωRA and
8Although Duquette et al. (2014) state that their elicitation of the utility function is based on data from
lottery choices, they do not discuss the identification strategy and underlying assumptions.
9Alternative specifications such as rank-dependent utility theory, as in Quiggin (1982), could also be
applied if the experimental design allows. Only the component related to utility curvature would then
affect individual discount rates, and the component related to probability weighting would not have a direct
influence.
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smoothed over λRA periods.
10
In all studies to date that elicit individual discount rates and allow for nonlinear utility,
the utility function u(c) is represented by a constant relative risk aversion specification. I
use the specification u(c) = (c)
1−r−1
1−r , where the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion
with respect to consumption (r) describes the utility curvature. Linear utility is nested
when r = 0, r > 0 indicates risk aversion and concavity of the utility function, and r < 0
indicates risk lovingness and convex utility.11 I apply this specification for the sensitivity
analysis in the following section.12
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) elicit the utility function from intertemporal allocations
of income along a convex budget set without relying on seperate decision tasks to identify
the utility function. They find a discrepancy between utility curvature elicited from binary
choices between lotteries and the curvature elicited from intertemporal allocations of income.
I rely primarily on the identification of utility from binary choices between lotteries; however,
I show that my conclusions also hold when the utility function is elicited from intertemporal
allocations of income.
4 Time-invariant Background Consumption and
Consumption Smoothing
The review of the literature in Section 2 shows mixed effects of background consumption and
consumption smoothing on elicited discount rates. Using the framework introduced in the
previous section, I illustrate the effect of varying background consumption and consumption
smoothing on elicited discount rates.
I begin by restricting background consumption and consumption smoothing to be con-
stant over time and independent of reward size. Andersen et al. (2008b) set background
consumption equal to average daily consumption of non-durable goods using household
10I assume that consumption smoothing λRA does not vary with reward size. I comment on the case
where consumption smoothing depends on reward size in Section 5.2.
11When r = 1, utility is defined by the logarithmic function, since limr→1
(c)1−r−1
1−r = ln(c).
12I analyze the robustness of the results to alternative specifications of utility, such as exponential (CARA)
and expo-power utility, in Section 4.3.
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expenditure data, whereas Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) elicit average daily consumption
by asking subjects about their spending habits in a questionnaire. It is likely that average
daily background consumption is constant over the time delays considered in experiments,
which typically range from a few days to one year. By assuming a constant and uniform
λ, Andersen et al. (2008b, p. 596) indicate that their approach can be viewed as ”...the
simplest possible way in which one could add structure...,” and I follow their example with
respect to consumption smoothing.13
Given the theoretical framework in Section 3, if background consumption ω and con-
sumption smoothing λ are constant, the discount rate is given by
δ =
[
(ω + xL
λ
)1−r − ω1−r
(ω + xS
λ
)1−r − ω1−r
] 360
L−S
− 1. (7)
To illustrate the effects of background consumption and consumption smoothing on
elicited discount rates, I use parameter values that correspond to those that are reported
in Andersen et al. (2008b). In their baseline specification, they set daily background
consumption equal to 118 kroner and assume no consumption smoothing, i.e. λ = 1.
The estimated discount rate is 25.1% per annum when the utility function is assumed to be
linear. Indifference between a smaller, sooner payment xS of 3,000 kroner at t=30 and a
larger, later payment xL of 3,750 kroner at t=390 corresponds to a discount rate of 25% per
annum when the utility function is linear, and I use these values in the sensitivity analysis.
I investigate individual discount rates under non-linear utility and differentiate between
two estimation methods: (1) one method where the utility function is exogenous, and (2)
another method where the utility function is elicited from binary choices between lotteries.
13If longer time delays are considered, or subjects expect significant changes in their private or professional
life, then background consumption and consumption smoothing may not be constant over time. I discuss
both possibilities in Section 5.
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4.1 Individual Discount Rates and Exogenous Utility
I start by assuming that the utility function is exogenous and r=0.77.14 The discount rate
δ is then identified by
δ =
[
(ω + 3,750
λ
)1−0.77 − ω1−0.77
(ω + 3,000
λ
)1−0.77 − ω1−0.77
] 360
L−S
− 1. (8)
I first analyze the sensitivity of discount rates with respect to background consumption
when λ is equal to 1, and then I look at the association between elicited discount rates and
consumption smoothing when ω is equal to 118 kroner per day.
Background Consumption
Figure 1 shows the solutions to equation (8) for different levels of background consumption
ω between 0 kroner and 10,000 kroner per day when λ = 1.15 The horizontal line shows the
level of discounting under linear utility given by the indifference point between the sooner
and later rewards. As background consumption increases, the discount rate increases and
tends toward the level under linear utility. In Appendix A I show analytically that the
discount rate given by equation (7) tends toward the level under linear utility as ω approaches
infinity, and the limit is given by
lim
ω→∞
δ =
[
xL
xS
] 360
L−S
− 1. (9)
If the utility function is exogenous and non-linear, then the elicited discount rate is
sensitive to the level of background consumption. Marginal utility with respect to the
reward is positive and diminishing when the utility function is concave, and the curvature
of the utility function over rewards can be measured by the ratio between the second and
first order derivatives. This is the Arrow Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion with respect
14This coefficient is chosen from an indifference point in the choice set by Andersen et al. (2008b) and is
close to the estimated mean value of r = 0.74 from all observations in their analysis.
15A daily background consumption level of 10,000 kroner is unrealistically high, however, it is possible
that rewards and utility are not identified over days but instead weeks, months, or years, in which case
integration of rewards with 10,000 kroner would be reasonable.
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Figure 1: Individual Discount rates and Background Consumption under Exogenous
Utility
to income, which under the specification here is equal to
Ax = −uxx
ux
=
r
x+ ωλ
. (10)
Ax is decreasing in ω as well as λ for a given parameter r, which implies that the utility
curvature with respect to income is decreasing and the discount rate increases toward the
level under linear utility.
The implications of this sensitivity to changes in background consumption can be signif-
icant. For example, if I want to identify discount rates for a wealthy and a poor participant,
who both choose the same indifference point and for whom I assume the same utility function
and the same level of background consumption, I will estimate the same discount rate. If,
however, I ask both participants to reveal their background consumption, which is likely to
be higher for the wealthy participant, I would find a higher discount rate for the wealthy
participant than for the poor participant. This means that the identification of discount rates
across individuals depends on the ability to identify differences in background consumption
when the utility function is exogenous and constant.
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Consumption Smoothing
Figure 2 shows the solutions to equation (7) for different degrees of consumption smoothing
between 1 day and 150 days when ω = 118 kroner per day. The horizontal line shows
the level of discounting under linear utility, and as consumption smoothing increases the
discount rate tends toward the linear utility level. In Appendix A I show this property
analytically for individual discount rates given by equation (7), and the limit with respect
to consumption smoothing is given by
lim
λ→∞
δ =
[
xL
xS
] 360
L−S
− 1. (11)
Figure 2: Individual Discount rates and Consumption Smoothing under Exogenous
Utility
Given a constant utility function, discount rates are sensitive to the degree of consump-
tion smoothing. The utility curvature with respect to x, measured by the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion in equation (10), is decreasing in λ. Consumption smoothing over
longer periods of time reduces the impact of the concavity of the utility function, and elicited
discount rates move closer to the linear utility level. The implications are the same as before:
When the utility function is exogenous, identification of individual discount rates depends
on the ability to accurately identify the extent of consumption smoothing.
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4.2 Joint Elicitation of Individual Discount Rate and Utility
So far, I have assumed that the utility function was exogenous. I have not considered the
possibility that utility functions can be inferred from binary choice data, such as those
in Andersen et al. (2008b). I analyze the sensitivity of discount rates to background
consumption and consumption smoothing and allow these assumptions to also influence
the inferred utility function, as identified in equation (6). In the baseline scenario I assume
that r = 0.77, which is similar to the estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion of 0.74
in Andersen et al. (2008b). Suppose that a subject is indifferent between a relatively safe
lottery that pays 2,000 kroner with a probability of 0.7 or 1,600 kroner with a probability
of 0.3 and a relatively risky lottery that pays 3,850 kroner or 100 kroner with similar
probabilities of 0.7 and 0.3, respectively. This is one of the decision tasks in Andersen
et al. (2008b) and indifference between the two lotteries would give r = 0.77 when daily
background consumption is 118 kroner and rewards are consumed straight away. Without
loss of generality I use the rewards and probabilities from this decision task in the analysis.16
Background Consumption
I first keep consumption smoothing of both delayed rewards and lottery rewards constant
at λ = 1 and vary the level of time-invariant background consumption ω.
Applying the framework described in Section 3, the utility function is identified from
the indifference relation
[
(0.7) · (ω + 2, 000)
(1−r)
1− r + (1− 0.7) ·
(ω + 1, 600)(1−r)
1− r
]
=
[
(0.7) · (ω + 3, 850)
(1−r)
1− r + (1− 0.7) ·
(ω + 100)(1−r)
1− r
]
, (12)
which can be uniquely solved for r but does not have a closed-form solution. The discount
16In Section 4.3, I show that the conclusions also hold for other decision tasks with different rewards and
probabilities.
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Figure 3: CRRA Utility, Individual Discount Rates, and Background Consumption
(a) (b)
rate, given the value of r, is again identified by
δ =
[
(ω + 3, 750)1−0.77 − ω1−0.77
(ω + 3, 000)1−0.77 − ω1−0.77
] 360
L−S
− 1. (13)
Solving both indifference equations jointly reveals the sensitivity of individual discount
rates to changes in time-invariant background consumption when identification of the utility
function also depends on background consumption. Because there is no closed-form solution
for the r-parameter in equation (12), I cannot show analytically how the individual discount
rate varies with background consumption and I rely instead on numerical simulations.
Figure 3 (a) and (b) show the inferred values for the r-parameter and the individual
discount rate δ, respectively. The results are different from those that rely on an exogenous
utility function. While an increase in background consumption leads to a significant increase
in the r-parameter, the inferred discount rate is stable between 8% and 10%.17 Andersen
et al. (2008b) arrive at the same conclusion when they vary the level of background con-
sumption.
Although inferred discount rates increase with background consumption when r is con-
stant, an increase in r has the opposite effect on elicited discount rates. The two effects
17Because there is no analytical solution for the r-parameter in equation (12), I cannot calculate the
limit to show that discount rates are indeed robust to variation in background consumption. However, the
inferred discount rate is equal to 8.7% when background consumption is equal to 1 million kroner, which
shows that the results are robust to very high values of background consumption.
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combined lead to little variation in elicited discount rates. Absolute risk aversion decreases
with ω, as shown in Section 4.1, but it increases with r. These two effects combined lead
to little variation in the absolute risk aversion over income, and thus to little variation in
utility curvature with respect to x. The implication is that elicited discount rates are not
sensitive to background consumption.
The robustness of discount rates to background consumption means that one can elicit
individual discount rates without knowing the exact level of background consumption as
long as the utility function is jointly elicited. Comparisons of discount rates for subjects
with different levels of background consumption are possible without knowing the exact level
for each individual. If two subjects choose the same indifference points over lotteries and
over delayed rewards, the elicited discount rate will be almost the same for both subjects
regardless of background consumption.
Rabin (2000) shows that expected utility theory defined over lifetime income leads to
unrealistic out-of-sample predictions over gambles with large stakes if risk aversion over
small stakes is observed. The same critique can be applied to this analysis, although
the rewards in the decision tasks are higher than usual in the experimental literature.
However, Cox and Sadiraj (2006) show that alternative models, such as rank-dependent
utility theory and cumulative prospect theory, may suffer from calibration problems as well.
The calibration critique points to the difficulty of making out-of-sample predictions, and I
only make inferences over income levels that have been provided in previous experiments
on risk and time preferences.
Consumption Smoothing
Both Andersen et al. (2008b) and Duquette et al. (2014) find discount rate sensitivity with
respect to consumption smoothing. Duquette et al. (2014) treat the utility function as given,
and Andersen et al. (2008b) make a subtle but important assumption that also keeps the
utility function constant: While they allow for consumption smoothing of delayed rewards,
they do not make the same assumption for lottery rewards that are paid out without delay.
This assumption is motivated by an application of Fudenberg and Levine’s (2006)’s dual
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self model. Andersen et al. (2008b) assume that lottery rewards are consumed immediately,
and allow for differences between consumption smoothing from lottery rewards and delayed
rewards.
If rewards from risk aversion tasks are received at the same time and under the same
conditions as rewards from discounting tasks, it is reasonable to assume that consumption
smoothing is similar for these rewards. In this case, keeping daily background consumption
constant at 118 kroner per day, the CRRA coefficient r is identified by
p ·
(
118 + 2,000λ
)(1−r)
1− r + (1− p) ·
(
118 + 1,600λ
)(1−r)
1− r
= p ·
(
118 + 3,850λ
)(1−r)
1− r + (1 − p) ·
(
118 + 100λ
)(1−r)
1− r (14)
and the discount rate given r is identified by
δ =
[
(118 + 3,750
λ
)1−r − 1181−r
(118 + 3,000
λ
)1−r − 1181−r
] 360
L−S
− 1. (15)
Once again, equation (14) has no closed-form solution for r. Therefore, I solve both
equations numerically and illustrate the effects of consumption smoothing on the utility
function and individual discount rates in Figure 4 (a) and (b).
The results show that the estimated r-parameter is increasing in λ, but the discount
rates remain flat between 8% and 10%.18 The curvature of the utility function, measured
by absolute risk aversion over income x, increases with r, but decreases with λ, and the
combined effect leads to little variation in absolute risk aversion over income and elicited
discount rates. This result implies that one can elicit individual discount rates without
knowing the exact level of time-invariant consumption smoothing for subjects in the sample.
18Because there is no analytical solution for the the r-parameter, I cannot calculate the limit of discount
rates with respect to consumption smoothing. However, the inferred discount rate is equal to 8.7% for very
high degrees of consumption smoothing.
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Figure 4: CRRA Utility, Individual Discount Rates, and Consumption Smoothing
(a) (b)
4.3 Extensions of the Sensitivity Analysis
The analysis shows that discount rates are robust to different levels of background con-
sumption and consumption smoothing if the utility function is elicited from binary choice
data and estimated under the same assumptions as individual discount rates. However,
I have made a number of simplifying assumptions: (i) I only consider inferences from a
single lottery choice task, (ii) the atemporal utility function is characterized by constant
relative risk aversion, (iii) the discounting function is exponential, and (iv) I only consider
identification of utility curvature from binary choices between lotteries. Here I discuss these
assumptions and consider the most common alternatives.
Alternative Degrees of Risk Aversion
I previously chose an arbitrary indifference point between two lotteries that implies r =
0.77 under the baseline assumptions. However, individuals differ in their risk preferences.
Are individual discount rates also robust to variation in background consumption and
consumption smoothing for other values of the r-parameter?
I repeat the analysis from Section 4.2 and vary the probability p and (1-p) of receiving
the highest and lowest reward in each lottery, respectively. In particular, I assume that
p = { 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9 }, which gives the following coefficients of
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relative risk aversion, r = { − 1.84, −1.03, −0.53, −0.16, 0.16, 0.47, 0.77, 1.12, and 1.61 },
respectively.
Figure 5 and 6 show the numerical solutions for r and δ to changes in background con-
sumption and consumption smoothing, respectively. Whereas the r-parameter is sensitive to
these changes in both the risk-loving and risk-averse domains, the individual discount rate
δ is generally robust with respect to changes in background consumption and consumption
smoothing. The results do show some variation in individual discount rates for highly convex
utility functions, but such risk-loving behavior is rarely observed empirically. The level of
the discount rate δ varies with the degree of risk aversion, which is consistent with the
results in Andersen et al. (2008b): a higher degree of utility curvature reduces the discount
rate.
Figure 5: Individual Discount Rates and Background Consumption for Various
Degrees of Risk Aversion
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Individual Discount Rates and Consumption Smoothing for Various Degrees
of Risk Aversion
(a) (b)
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Alternative Utility Specifications
The main analysis is based on the identification of a power utility function, which is the
most commonly applied specification in the experimental literature on time preferences.
However, a natural question arises: Does this utility specification drive the results?
The constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility specification is a popular alternative
representation of individual risk attitudes and belongs to the family of exponential functions:
u(x) = 1 − e−ax. Using this specification of the utility function, I show analytically in
Appendix B that background consumption has no effect on absolute risk aversion or inferred
discount rates. Consumption smoothing has the same effect as before: Higher consumption
smoothing increases the estimated a-parameter of the utility function, but discount rates
remain constant.
A flexible one-parameter utility specification introduced by Abdellaoui et al. (2007),
which allows for increasing relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion, is
the expo-power utility function u(x) = −e−xss . I repeat the analysis for this specification
and confirm the results in Section 4.2. Increasing background consumption and the extent
of consumption smoothing have a significant effect on the s-parameter in the utility function
but small effects on elicited individual discount rates (see Appendix B).
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
I consider an exponential discounting function in the sensitivity analysis, but alternative
discounting models that capture present bias have become popular. The quasi-hyperbolic
discounting model, popularized by Laibson (1997), introduces an additional parameter to
the standard exponential discounting model. According to exponential discounting, future
utility is discounted by the factor 1
(1+δ)
t
360
, where δ is the discount rate per annum and t
is measured in days. According to the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model, future utility is
discounted by the factor β
(1+δ)
t
360
, where β is a new parameter that indicates present bias. If
β < 1, then future utility is discounted by an additional fixed premium that gives a weaker
preference for delayed rewards compared to the exponential discounting model.
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Quasi-hyperbolic discounting can also be identified from indifference points between time
delayed rewards. I assume indifference points from two decision tasks to identify both δ and
β: One decision task where both rewards are paid out in the future, and another decision
task where the sooner reward is paid out immediately. The first decision task identifies the
parameter δ, and the second decision task identifies the parameter β conditional on δ.
In Appendix C I analyze the sensitivity of both δ and β to changes in background
consumption and consumption smoothing. The discount rate δ is robust when the utility
function is jointly elicited. Because the δ-parameter in the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model is identified in the same way as δ in the exponential discounting model, the sensitivity
results are similar. The β-parameter is robust to background consumption when the utility
function is jointly elicited. However, β is sensitive to consumption smoothing, both when
the utility function is exogenous and when the utility function is jointly elicited.
Consumption smoothing over longer periods of time decreases the fraction of an imme-
diate reward that is consumed immediately. Part of the utility of the immediate reward is
realized in the future and also discounted by β. As a consequence the estimated present bias
inferred from a given indifference point becomes stronger, i.e. β decreases, as consumption
smoothing increases. Appendix C illustrates this effect in detail. The result implies that
quasi-hyperbolic discounting cannot be inferred from decision tasks on binary lotteries and
delayed rewards without knowing the extent of time-invariant consumption smoothing for
the subjects in the sample.
Individual Discount Rates and Intertemporal Allocations of Income
So far I have focused on joint elicitation of the utility function and individual discount rates
from two separate decision tasks. One might suspect that the results discussed here are
specific to this elicitation approach.
An alternative procedure is suggested by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). In their design
subjects allocate tokens (income) across two dates, and these tokens are transformed by
exchange rates into earnings that are paid out on those dates. Tokens allocated to the later
date have a higher value than tokens allocated to the sooner date. At least two of these
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decision tasks with different exchange rates are needed to uniquely identify the individual
discount rate and the utility function. I review this identification procedure in detail in
Appendix D and repeat the sensitivity analysis with respect to background consumption
and consumption smoothing. The results show that discount rates are robust to changes in
background consumption and consumption smoothing, and only the elicited utility function
is affected by these changes.
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) arrive at different conclusions in their analysis. They
estimate the parameter of the CRRA utility function and the individual discount rate at
levels of background consumption between 1 dollar per day and 25 dollars per day. The
estimation results using nonlinear least squares reveal, that the parameter of the utility
function is sensitive to the level of background consumption. However, Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012) also find that exponential discount rates are sensitive and decreasing with
background consumption (from 36% at ω=1 dollar to 15% at ω=25 dollars) and conclude,
that ”...the method of determining the ω parameters is potentially of great relevance” (p.
3348). This finding contradicts the simulation results in Appendix D. It is likely that
the sensitivity of discount rates found by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) is caused by their
estimation method. When they use a Tobit estimator instead of a nonlinear least squares
estimator, they find considerably less sensitivity of individual discount rate estimates to the
level of background consumption, consistent with the results in Appendix D.
5 Non-Constant Background Consumption and
Consumption Smoothing
Discount rates are robust to background consumption and consumption smoothing if the
utility function is jointly elicited. However, this result holds only if background consumption
and consumption smoothing are time-invariant and independent of reward size. What
happens to estimates of individual discount rates if the level of background consumption
and the extent of consumption smoothing are not constant over time and rewards? I analyze
the sensitivity of individual discount rates when the level of background consumption and
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the extent of consumption smoothing vary over time, and I discuss how individual discount
rates can be elicited if consumption smoothing varies with rewards.
5.1 Time-Variant Background Consumption and Consumption Smoothing
Unlike the results in the previous section, discount rates are highly sensitive to time-variant
background consumption and consumption smoothing. I illustrate this sensitivity by keeping
background consumption and consumption smoothing of the sooner reward constant and
vary both assumptions for the later reward. I assume that the utility function is constant
over time and identified from the same decision task as before, which implies that r = 0.77.
When the level of background consumption and the extent of consumption smoothing can
vary over time, the individual discount rate is identified by
30+λS−1∑
t=30
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·

(
ωt +
3,000
λS
)(1−0.77)
1− 0.77 −
(ωt)
(1−0.77)
1− 0.77

=
390+λL−1∑
t=390
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·

(
ωt +
3,750
λL
)(1−0.77)
1− 0.77 −
(ωt)
(1−0.77)
1− 0.77
 . (16)
In Figure 7 (a), I vary background consumption on the later date assuming that λS =
λL = 1 and background consumption on the sooner date is equal to 118 kroner. As
background consumption on the later date ωL increases, the discount rate decreases. For
example, an increase in ωL from 118 kroner to 150 kroner implies that the elicited discount
rate falls from 9.5% to 4.8%. When the level of background consumption on the later date
is 200 kroner or more per day, the elicited discount rate is negative.19
In Figure 7 (b), I vary consumption smoothing on the later date and assume that λS = 1.
Background consumption is kept constant at 118 kroner. As the degree of consumption
smoothing λL increases, the elicited discount rate also increases. For example, the individual
discount rate increases from 9.5% when λL = 1 to more than 50% when λL = 2.
20
19When the utility function is concave, higher background consumption leads to lower marginal utility
of income, and the implied individual discount rate falls when background consumption on the later date
increases.
20When the utility function is concave, consumption smoothing leads to higher marginal utility of income,
and the implied discount rate increases when λL increases.
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Figure 7: Individual Discount Rates and Time-Variant Consumption Smoothing and
Background Consumption
(a) (b)
The sensitivity of individual discount rates to time-variant consumption smoothing and
background consumption has interesting consequences. For example, an expected increase
in background consumption can be one explanation for seemingly present biased preferences.
Suppose a person is indifferent between 3,000 kroner now and 4,000 kroner in one year and
is indifferent between 3,000 kroner in one year and 3,750 kroner in two years.21 Under the
assumption of time-invariant background consumption and consumption smoothing, the first
indifference point would imply a higher discount rate than the second, which is consistent
with quasi-hyperbolic discounting. However, the two indifference points are also consistent
with exponential discounting and time-varying background consumption. A subject may
expect an increase in future background consumption, which implies that the discount rate
inferred from the first indifference point would decrease and could become the same as the
discount rate inferred from the second indifference point. In this scenario, present bias
is not the result of quasi-hyperbolic discounting but the result of an expected increase in
background consumption on later dates.
This example illustrates that time-varying background consumption and consumption
smoothing are relevant to consider in future research. How one best identifies variation in
the level of background consumption and the extent of consumption smoothing is an open
21See, for example, Thaler (1981), where the subjects reveal similar preferences over delayed rewards with
and without a front end delay to the sooner reward.
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question. One suggestion is to elicit risk preferences at different points in time and infer
variation in background consumption or consumption smoothing from variation in absolute
risk aversion. However, this method requires that the underlying utility function is the same
for all subjects and constant over time, and one cannot separate effects from background
consumption and consumption smoothing.
Andersen et al. (2008b), Andersen et al. (2014) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) iden-
tify the atemporal utility function at a single point in time. Other studies have investigated
to what extent risk aversion changes with the timing of lotteries. For example, Noussair
and Wu (2006) find that 38.6% of the subjects in their sample are more risk averse over
lotteries that are paid out in the present compared to similar lotteries that are paid out
in the future. The observed decrease in risk aversion could be influenced by an increase
in background consumption or consumption smoothing (or both) over time. Abdellaoui
et al. (2011) also find that risk aversion is sensitivity to the timing of lottery rewards, but
attribute this behavior to changes in probability weighting. Andersen et al. (2008a) elicit
risk preferences from binary choices between lotteries, and repeat the same decision task
with the same subjects after 17 months. They do not assume that rewards are integrated
with background consumption, and find no general tendencey for risk attitudes to increase
or decrease. It will be an interesting avenue for future research to further investigate time-
varying risk aversion, and analyze to what extent risk aversion varies with expected future
income.
5.2 Consumption Smoothing that Varies with Rewards
It is likely that the extent of consumption smoothing depends on reward size. For example,
small rewards may be consumed straight away, whereas large rewards may be consumed
over longer periods of time. Suppose that a subject converts the rewards into days he can
buy an additional coffee, and that a cup of coffee costs 30 kroner. When the subject is
indifferent between 300 kroner today or 360 kroner in a year from now, the sooner reward
is converted into an extra coffee on 10 subsequent days and the later reward is converted
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into an extra coffee on 12 subsequent days. This indifference point is given by
S+
xS
z
−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· (u (ωt + z)− u(ωt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming z over xS
z
days
=
L+
xL
z
−1∑
t=L
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
· (u (ωt + z)− u(ωt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming z over xL
z
days
. (17)
where z is the price of coffee, xS is the sooner reward at t = S and xL is the later reward at
t = L. If background consumption ωt is constant over time, then equation (17) simplifies to
S+
xS
z
−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
=
L+
xL
z
−1∑
t=L
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
(18)
such that identification of the discount rate becomes independent of the utility function.
One can use this insight and consider an alternative experimental design that elicits
individual discount rates over annuities. Instead of offering a choice between two rewards
xS and xL at different points in time, one can offer a choice between two annuities with
different start dates and durations. By varying the duration of the annuities one can identify
the indifference point and the implied individual discount rate without identifying the utility
function.
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6 Summary and Conclusion
I use simulated indifference points from decision tasks in time preference experiments to
analyze the sensitivity of individual discount rates with respect to background consumption
and consumption smoothing. I control for the curvature of the utility function and differ-
entiate between two estimation methods that are applied in previous studies: (1) when the
utility function is non-linear and exogenous, and (2) when the utility function is inferred
from choice data.
When the utility function is exogenous and non-linear, then individual discount rates are
sensitive to the level of background consumption and to the extent of consumption smooth-
ing. Previous experimental studies assume that the atemporal utility function is described
by the CRRA specification, and I show both analytically and in numerical simulations
that the individual discount rate tends toward the level under linear utility as consumption
smoothing or background consumption increase.
When the utility function is instead jointly elicited with discount rates from choice data,
then discount rates are robust to time-invariant background consumption and consumption
smoothing. The inferred utility function is sensitive to these assumptions, but the curvature
with respect to income and the inferred individual discount rates are stable. The result holds
for alternative specifications of the utility function and for the alternative elicitation method
in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). Considering alternative discounting functions, I find that
the β-parameter of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model is only robust to background
consumption, but not to consumption smoothing.
The different conclusions with respect to the sensitivity of discount rates under joint
elicitation and under the assumption of an exogenous utility function explain why previous
studies have found mixed results. Moreover, the results imply that exponential discount
rates can be identified without knowing the exact level of time-invariant background con-
sumption or the extent of time-invariant consumption smoothing as long as the utility
function is jointly elicited.
A possibility that has not been discussed by several previous studies is that background
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consumption and consumption smoothing may vary over time. I show that individual
discount rates are highly sensitive to time-variant background consumption and consumption
smoothing. Moreover, expected increases in future background consumption can be an
alternative explanation for present biased preferences. To date little is known about time-
varying background consumption and how this affects preferences and could be an area for
future research.
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Appendix A
Analytical Solutions for Discount Rate Sensitivity
Given the theoretical framework in Section 3, if background consumption ω and consumption
smoothing λ are time-invariant, the discount rate is given by
δ =

(
(ω+xSλ )
(1−r)
1−r − (ω)
(1−r)
1−r
)
(
(ω+xLλ )
(1−r)
1−r − (ω)
(1−r)
1−r
)

360
L−S
− 1 (19)
I present the analytical properties of individual discount rates identified by equation (19).
A.1 Discount Rates in the Limit as ω Approaches Infinity
As background consumption ω approaches infinity for a given r-parameter, the discount
rate δ tends toward the level under linear utility. The limit is given by
lim
ω→∞
δ =
 limω→∞
((
ω + xL
λ
)(1−r) − (ω)(1−r))
limω→∞
((
ω + xS
λ
)(1−r) − (ω)(1−r))

360
L−S
− 1.
I divide both the numerator and denominator by ω(1−r) and simplify the expression. The
limit is then given by
lim
ω→∞
δ =

limω→∞
((
1 +
(xLλ )
ω
)1−r
− 1
)
limω→∞
((
1 +
(xSλ )
ω
)1−r
− 1
)

360
L−S
− 1.
Both the limit of the numerator and the limit of the denominator tend to 0, which allows
me to use L’Hoˆpital’s rule. I replace the limits of the numerator and denominator with the
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limits of the first order derivatives, respectively,
lim
ω→∞
δ =

limω→∞
(
(1− r)
(
1 +
(xLλ )
ω
)−r (
−(
xL
λ )
ω2
))
limω→∞
(
(1− r)
(
1 +
(xSλ )
ω
)−r (
−(
xS
λ )
ω2
))

360
L−S
− 1,
and simplify the equation further, so that the limit of δ is given by
lim
ω→∞
δ =

limω→∞
((
1 +
(xLλ )
ω
)−r
xL
)
limω→∞
((
1 +
(xSλ )
ω
)−r
xS
)

360
L−S
− 1.
The limits of the numerator and denominator tend toward xL and xS, respectively, as
background consumption ω approaches infinity. The limit of the individual discount rate δ
is then given by
lim
ω→∞
δ =
[
xL
xS
] 360
L−S
− 1,
which is the individual discount rate under linear utility.
A.2 Individual Discount Rates in the Limit as λ Approaches Infinity
As consumption smoothing λ approaches infinity for a given r-parameter, the discount rate
δ tends toward the level under linear utility. The limit is given by
lim
λ→∞
δ =
 limλ→∞
((
ω + xL
λ
)(1−r) − (ω)(1−r))
limλ→∞
((
ω + xS
λ
)(1−r) − (ω)(1−r))

360
L−S
− 1,
Both the limit of the numerator and the limit of the denominator tend to 0 and I apply
L’Hoˆpital’s rule. I replace the limits of the numerator and denominator with the limits of
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the first order derivatives, respectively,
lim
λ→∞
δ =
 limλ→∞
(
(1− r) (ω + xL
λ
)(−r) (−xL
λ2
))
limλ→∞
(
(1− r) (ω + xS
λ
)(−r) (−xS
λ2
))

360
L−S
− 1.
The limits of the numerator and denominator tend toward ω−rxL and ω−rxS, respectively,
and the limit of the individual discount rate δ is then given by
lim
λ→∞
δ =
[
xL
xS
] 360
L−S
− 1,
which is the individual discount rate under linear utility.
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Appendix B
Alternative Utility Specifications
The analysis in Section 4 is based on the identification of a power utility function, and I
show that individual discount rates are robust to background consumption and consumption
smoothing if the utility function is jointly elicited. This result holds for other specifications of
the atemporal utility function that are applied in the experimental literature: Discount rates
are also robust to background consumption and consumption smoothing under exponential
and expo-power utility specifications.
B.1 Exponential Utility Specification
A popular alternative representation of the utility function is the constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) specification of the form u(x) = 1 − e−ax. Allowing for integration
of rewards x with background consumption ω and consumption smoothing λ gives the
atemporal utility function u(x) = 1 − e−a( xλ+ω). Absolute risk aversion with respect to
income is equal to
Ax =
a
λ
.
Absolute risk aversion is independent of background consumption ω, decreasing with con-
sumption smoothing λ, and increasing with the a-parameter.
Under exponential utility, indifference between binary lotteries is given by
λRA−1∑
t=0
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
[
p ·
(
1− e−a
(
ωt+
xA1
λRA
))
+ (1− p) ·
(
1− e−a
(
ωt+
xA2
λRA
))]
=
λRA−1∑
t=0
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
[
p ·
(
1− e−a
(
ωt+
xB1
λRA
))
+ (1− p) ·
(
1− e−a
(
ωt+
xB2
λRA
))]
(20)
which can be uniquely solved for a.
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The indifference point between delayed rewards is given by
S+λS−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
((
1− e−a
(
ωt+
xS
λS
))
− (1− e−aωt))
=
L+λL−1∑
t=L
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
((
1− e−a
(
ωt+
xL
λL
))
− (1− e−aωt)) (21)
Equations (20) and (21) simplify and ωt cancels out. The utility function and the
discount rate identified from Equations (20) and (21), respectively, are independent of
background consumption.
I assume time-invariant consumption smoothing (λRA = λS = λL) and solve both
equations numerically for the same decision tasks as in Section 4. Figure 8 (a) and (b) show
the inferred values for the a-parameter and the individual discount rate δ, respectively. The
a-parameter is increasing in λ, but the discount rate δ remains flat. The curvature of the
utility function, measured by absolute risk aversion over income x, increases with a, but
decreases with λ, and the combined effect leads to no changes in absolute risk aversion over
income and elicited discount rates.
Figure 8: CARA Utility, Individual Discount Rates, and Consumption Smoothing
(a) (b)
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B.2 Expo-Power Utility Function
A flexible specification of the utility function is the expo-power utility function introduced
by Abdellaoui et al. (2007). The utility function is u(x) = −e−xss , and it allows for both
concave and convex utility and has desirable features such as a combination of increasing
relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Under this utility function, indifference between binary lotteries is given by
λRA−1∑
t=0
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
p ·
−e−
(
ωt+
xA1
λRA
)s
s
+ (1− p) ·
−e−
(
ωt+
xA2
λRA
)s
s

=
λRA−1∑
t=0
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
p ·
−e−
(
ωt+
xB1
λRA
)s
s
+ (1− p) ·
−e−
(
ωt+
xB2
λRA
)s
s
 , (22)
and the indifference point between delayed rewards is given by
S+λS−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
−e−
(
ωt+
xS
λS
)s
s
− (−e−ωsts )

=
L+λL−1∑
t=L
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
·
−e−
(
ωt+
xL
λL
)s
s
− (−e−ωsts )
 . (23)
I assume time-invariant background consumption and consumption smoothing and solve
Equations (20) and (21) numerically for the same decision tasks as in Section 4. Figures 9
and 10 show the inferred values for the s-parameter and the individual discount rate δ
for different levels of background consumption and consumption smoothing, respectively.
The parameter of the utility function s decreases with background consumption ω and
consumption smoothing λ, and elicited discount rates remain stable.22
22The value of s that solves the indifference equation (22) is very small for large values of λ and cannot
be identified precisely. Discount rates are robust for values of λ between 1 and 16.
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Figure 9: Expo-Power Utility, Individual Discount Rates, and Background Consump-
tion
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Expo-Power Utility, Individual Discount Rates, and Consumption
Smoothing
(a) (b)
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Appendix C
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting
According to exponential discounting, future utility is discounted by the factor 1
(1+δ)
t
360
,
where δ is the discount rate per annum and t is measured in days. According to the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model, future utility is discounted by the factor β
(1+δ)
t
360
, where β is
a new parameter that indicates present bias. If β < 1, then future utility is discounted by
an additional fixed premium that gives a weaker preference for delayed rewards compared
to the exponential discounting model.
Under quasi-hyperbolic discounting, the indifference point between a smaller, sooner and
a larger, later reward depends on the delay of the later reward. In a decision task where
both rewards are paid out in the future (S > 0 and L > 0), the indifference point is given
by
S+λS−1∑
t=S
β
(1 + δ)
t
360
·
[
u
(
ωt +
xS
λS
)
− u(ωt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xS over λS days
=
L+λL−1∑
t=L
β
(1 + δ)
t
360
·
[
u
(
ωt +
xL
λL
)
− u(ωt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xL over λL days
(24)
and β cancels out on both sides of the equation, so that equation (24) simplifies to the same
equation as under exponential discounting. A decision task where both rewards are paid
out in the future identifies the δ-parameter of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model.
In a decision task where the sooner reward is paid out immediately (S = 0), I differentiate
between two scenarios. First, when rewards are consumed straight away so that λS = λL =
1, the indifference point is given by
[u (ωS + xS)− u(ωS)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xS
=
β
(1 + δ)
L
360
· [u (ωL + xL)− u(ωL)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xL
. (25)
The additional utility from the immediate reward is not discounted because the reward is
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spent at t = 0.
Second, when rewards are smoothed over more than one period, such that λS > 1 and
λL > 1, the indifference point is given by
(
1 +
λS−1∑
t=1
β
(1 + δ)
t
360
)
·
[
u
(
ωt +
xS
λS
)
− u(ωt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xS over λS days
=
L+λL−1∑
t=L
β
(1 + δ)
t
360
·
[
u
(
ωt +
xL
λL
)
− u(ωt)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Added utility from consuming xL over λL days
(26)
The additional utility from the fraction of the sooner reward that is spent immediately
at t = 0 is not discounted. However, the additional utility from the fraction of the sooner
reward that is spent later due to consumption smoothing is discounted by the factor β
(1+δ)
t
360
.
I analyze the effect of background consumption and consumption smoothing on the
estimates of β and δ with these equations. I assume indifference between a smaller, sooner
payment xS of 3,000 kroner at t=30 and a larger, later payment xL of 3,750 kroner after a
1-year delay at t=390. I assume a second indifference point between a smaller, immediate
payment xS0 of 3,000 kroner at t=0 and a larger, later payment xL0 of 4000 kroner after
a 1-year delay at t=360. These indifference points correspond to an individual discount
rate δ of 25% and present bias β = 0.9375 under the assumption of linear utility, and they
imply δ = 0.096 and β = 0.974 when utility is represented by the CRRA specification
with r = 0.77 under background consumption of 118 kroner per day and no consumption
smoothing.
C.1 Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Exogenous Utility
I start by assuming that the utility function is exogenous and r = 0.77. I first analyze the
sensitivity of δ and β with respect to background consumption when λ is equal to 1, and
then I look at the sensitivity with respect to consumption smoothing when ω is equal to
118 kroner per day.
Figure 11 (a) and (b) show the solutions for δ and β for different levels of background
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Figure 11: CRRA Utility, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Background Consump-
tion
(a) (b)
consumption, respectively. The horizontal lines indicate the parameter values under linear
utility. When r is exogenous and constant, both parameters tend toward the level under
linear utility as background consumption increases.
Figure 12: CRRA Utility, Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption Smooth-
ing
(a) (b)
Figure 12 (a) and (b) show the solutions for δ and β for different degrees of consumption
smoothing, respectively. The result for the discount rate δ is the same as before: the
individual discount rate tends toward the level of discounting under linear utility.
In contrast, the β-parameter decreases significantly. The dashed curve shows that the
β-parameter under the assumption of linear utility is also decreasing in λ. Consumption
smoothing over longer periods of time reduces the fraction of the sooner reward that is
spent immediately and present bias thus has an effect on utility from the immediate reward.
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Figure 13: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Background Consumption under Joint
Elicitation of the Utility Function
(a) (b)
Hence, the degree of present bias identified from the indifference points becomes stronger.
C.2 Joint Elicitation of Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Utility
I next analyze the sensitivity of δ and β to assumptions on background consumption and
consumption smoothing when the utility function is inferred from binary lottery choices.
I first keep consumption smoothing of both delayed rewards and lottery rewards constant
at λ = 1 and vary the level of time-invariant background consumption ω. Figure 13 (a) and
(b) show the inferred values for δ and β for different levels of background consumption ω.23
The inferred δ-parameter is stable, and the inferred β-parameter is constant.
Figure 14 (a) and (b) show the inferred values for δ and β when I keep the amount of back-
ground consumption constant at 118 kroner per day, but vary the extent of time-invariant,
uniform consumption smoothing. The inferred δ-parameter is stable as λ increases, but the
inferred β-parameter is decreasing in λ even when the utility function is jointly elicited.
23The results for r are not shown but are equivalent to those reported in Figure 3.
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Figure 14: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting to Consumption Smoothing under Joint
Elicitation of the Utility Function
(a) (b)
Appendix D
Sensitivity of Discount Rates from Convex Budget Set
Allocations
In the design by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), subjects allocate 100 tokens across two
dates, where they are transformed by exchange rates into earnings that are paid out on
those dates. Tokens allocated to the later date have a higher value than tokens allocated to
the sooner date. The utility function and the individual discount rate can be inferred from
at least two of these decision tasks with different exchange rates.
D.1 Background Consumption
Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2012) assume integration of income with background consumption
and no consumption smoothing. The utility function is represented by the CRRA specifi-
cation. The decision of allocating the shares of tokens α and 1−α between two dates t = S
and t = L is described by the maximization problem
max
α
U =
(
1
1 + δ
) S
360 [α ·XS + ω]1−r
1− r +
(
1
1 + δ
) L
360 [(1− α) ·XL + ω]1−r
1− r . (27)
53
At the sooner date, each token has a value of XS
100
, and at the later date, each token has a
value of XL
100
. If all 100 tokens are allocated to the sooner date (α = 1), the subject receives
XS at t = S and nothing at t = L, and vice versa.
Solving for the first-order condition with respect to α gives
FOC :
(
1
1 + δ
) S
360
·XS · [α ·XS + ω]−r =
(
1
1 + δ
) L
360
·XL · [(1− α) ·XL + ω]−r (28)
which has a closed form solution for the discount rate, and δ is given by
δ =
(
XL · [(1− α) ·XL + ω]−r
XS · [α ·XS + ω]−r
) 360
L−S
− 1 (29)
An allocation in a single decision task identifies δ as a function of r, and together with an
allocation in a second decision task with different exchange rates the discount rate δ and
the r-parameter are uniquely identified. Figure 15 plots the first-order condition for two
arbitrary allocations: (1) a 50:50 allocation of tokens between the sooner and later date,
where XS = 17 dollars at t = 0 and XL = 20 dollars at t = 360 and (2) a 30:70 allocation
between the sooner and later date, where XS = 15 dollars at t = 0 and XL = 20 dollars at
t = 360. I assume that all earnings are integrated with background consumption ω, which
is set equal to 7.05.24 These particular allocations identify a discount rate δ = 15% and a
utility function with r = 0.26.
I analyze the sensitivity of the inferred r-parameter and the individual discount rate δ
to different levels of time-invariant background consumption. Figure 16 shows the inferred
values for r and δ for different levels of ω between 0 and 1,000. The r-parameter increases
with background consumption while the individual discount rate is constant at 15%.
Most respondents in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) do not make interior allocations to
both dates. 70% of respondents allocate all tokens to either date. Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) estimate individual discount rates and the utility function for the pooled sample and
find a similar discount rate and a similar r-parameter as I use in this analysis. Harrison
24This is the amount (in dollars) that Andreoni and Sprenger’s (2012) elicit from the subjects via a survey
question probing average daily consumption.
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Figure 15: Identification of Individual Discount Rates from Intertemporal Allocations
Figure 16: CRRA Utility, Exponential Discount Rates and Background Consumption
from Intertemporal Allocations
(a) (b)
et al. (2013, p. 4) comment on Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and state that the majority of
respondents that make only corner allocations ”...must either have linear or convex utility
functions.” If the utility function is convex, the decision tasks in Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) cannot uniquely identify the discount rate and the utility function: A subject with
a slightly convex utility function and a subject with a highly convex utility function would
both make the same corner allocations.
D.2 Consumption Smoothing
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) do not consider consumption smoothing in their analysis.
I adapt equations (27) and (28) to include consumption smoothing. The choice problem,
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when the sooner (later) earnings are smoothed over λS (λL) periods, is given by
max
α
U =
S+λS−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) t
360
[
α · XSλS + ω
]1−r
1− r +
L+λL−1∑
t=L
(
1
1 + δ
) L
360
[
(1− α) · XLλL + ω
]1−r
1− r (30)
and the first-order condition is given by
FOC :
S+λS−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) S
360
· XS
λS
·
[
α · XS
λS
+ ω
]−r
=
L+λL−1∑
t=S
(
1
1 + δ
) L
360
· XL
λL
·
[
(1− α) · XL
λL
+ ω
]−r
(31)
If λS = λL = λ, equation (31) simplifies to
FOC :
(
1
1 + δ
) S
360
· XS
λ
·
[
α · XS
λ
+ ω
]−r
=
(
1
1 + δ
) L
360
· XL
λ
·
[
(1− α) · XL
λ
+ ω
]−r
(32)
The individual discount rate δ is identified by
δ =
(
XL
λ
· [(1− α) · XL
λ
+ ω
]−r
XS
λ
· [α · XS
λ
+ ω
]−r
) 360
L−S
− 1 (33)
Figure 17 shows the inferred values for δ and r from the two allocations described
previously for different values of consumption smoothing λ between 1 day and 100 days.
The inferred r-parameter is increasing in λ, but the individual discount rate δ is flat.
Figure 17: CRRA Utility, Exponential Discount Rates and Consumption Smoothing
from Intertemporal Allocations
(a) (b)
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and Discounting Behavior
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Abstract
Life cycle models of consumption and saving behavior associate higher discount rates with
lower financial wealth and present bias with liquidity constraints. We test these associations
and analyze whether discounting behavior in time preference experiments is correlated with
wealth and liquidity. We combine choice data from a field experiment in Denmark with detailed
administrative data on individual income and financial wealth and estimate exponential and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. Our results reveal no evidence of present bias for either
aﬄuent or liquidity constrained subjects. However, subjects in the lowest wealth quartiles
exhibit exponential discount rates that are nearly twice as high as those we estimate for
subjects in the highest wealth quartiles.
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1 Introduction
Each day we make decisions that have some future effects on our wellbeing. The tradeoff
between sooner and later payoffs influences our choices with respect to what we eat, how
long we invest in education, how hard we work, consumption of alcohol, cigarettes or drugs,
etc. In an economic context, the concept of time preferences is particularly important in one
area: intertemporal decisions regarding consumption, saving, and investment. John Rae’s
(1834) The Sociological Theory of Capital suggests that differences in the wealth of nations
are related to psychological factors that influence patience, and calibrations of modern life
cycle models to aggregate consumption and income data assume that individual discount
rates are correlated with private saving decisions and financial wealth (e.g. Krusell and
Smith, 1998; Hendricks, 2007).
The identification and measurement of time preferences has received considerable at-
tention in experimental economics. The typical experimental design involves choices over
time delayed rewards from which individual discount rates are identified (for reviews, see
Frederick et al., 2002, and Andersen et al., 2014). There is an extensive experimental
literature on the association between individual discount rates and behavior with potential
long-term negative health effects, such as smoking, obesity, or drug addiction.1 However,
there is a distinct lack of empirical evidence on the association between time preferences and
saving behavior, and only a few experimental studies, namely Meier and Sprenger (2010),
Pender (1996), Yesuf and Bluffstone (2008), and Kirby et al. (2002), have investigated the
association between individual discounting behavior and wealth.
We contribute to the experimental literature on individual discounting and saving be-
havior with new empirical evidence. We combine data on income and financial wealth
from registers at Statistics Denmark with data from a field experiment on risk and time
preferences. The sample of 413 subjects is representative of the adult Danish population
and is stratified according to population size in each region of the country. Using maximum
likelihood estimation, we identify differences in individual discount rates with respect to
1See for example Khwaja et al. (2007) and Harrison et al. (2010) on smoking behavior, Kirby et al.
(1999) on drug addiction, and Komlos et al. (2004) on obesity.
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financial wealth while controlling for relevant socio-demographic characteristics. Subjects
with high wealth reveal lower discount rates than subjects with low or negative wealth.
This result suggests that heterogeneity in individual discount rates and financial wealth are
associated.
Life cycle models that apply the quasi-hyperbolic discounting function predict that
present biased consumers will hold fewer deposits of liquid assets and are more likely to
accumulate consumer debt than otherwise. We test this prediction by estimating the quasi-
hyperbolic discounting model and study the correlation between present bias and deposits
of liquid assets. We find no evidence of present bias in the sample and reject the quasi-
hyperbolic model in favor of exponential discounting. We also find that present bias is
not significantly correlated with liquidity constraints measured by deposits of liquid assets.
These results stand in sharp contrast to previous empirical results by Meier and Sprenger
(2010) who find a significant association between present bias and consumer debt.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we review the theoretical and empirical
literature on the association between individual discount rates and financial wealth and
formulate the hypotheses we will test with our data. We present the experimental design
and data in Section 3 and discuss the structural econometric specifications. We introduce
the administrative data in Section 4 and explain the measurement of wealth and liquidity
that we use in the analysis. The estimation results and sensitivity analysis are presented in
Section 5 before we conclude the analysis.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature
The discussion on time preferences in the economics literature originates from studies on
saving and wealth across nations. We review the theoretical and empirical literature on
time preferences and private saving decisions.
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2.1 Wealth and Exponential Discounting
John Rae (1834) directly links time preferences to accumulation of private wealth, and
he suggests that psychological attitudes toward delayed gratification and self-restraint are
associated with private saving. Private saving leads to accumulation of capital and is thus
an important factor in economic growth theory. Using Samuelson’s (1937) exponential
specification of individual discounting in an additive life cycle model of intertemporal con-
sumption (e.g., Hall, 1978) captures the effect of time preferences on private saving. The
solution to the intertemporal maximization problem is characterized by the Euler equation,
which specifies the relation between the (expected) marginal utility of consumption in period
t and t+ 1, respectively, by
Et [u
′(ct+1)] =
(
1 + δ
1 + i
)
u′(ct), (1)
where i is the market interest rate between period t and t + 1, and δ is the individual
discount rate. Equation (1) shows the optimal consumption profile, which is determined
by the relative difference between the discount rate and market interest rate: a higher
discount rate δ is associated with lower consumption growth. The model predicts that
higher discount rates reduce private saving for future consumption and thus have a negative
impact on consumption growth, ceteris paribus.
Heterogeneity in individual discount rates has important theoretical implications for
private saving and capital accumulation. In a simple economy with two households, Becker
(1980) shows that all capital eventually will be held by the most patient household. Using
that model, Becker asserts Ramsey’s (1928) conjecture on "...a division of society into
two classes, the thrifty enjoying bliss and the improvident at the subsistence level." These
extreme wealth distributions that are predicted by early life cycle models do not conform to
aggregate data on consumption and private saving, and alternative specifications with non-
additive intertemporal utility functions lead to more realistic wealth distributions. These
models still predict that there is a significant effect of individual discount rates on private
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saving and wealth (e.g., Lucas Jr and Stokey, 1984; Epstein and Hynes, 1983).
The empirical evidence on the association between individual discount rates and private
saving implied by theoretical life cycle models is scarce. Lawrance (1991) estimates individ-
ual discount rates using administrative panel data on consumption, income, and savings.
The results indicate that discount rates are lower for individuals with high permanent
income compared to those with low income, but she does not study the association between
individual discount rates and private saving rates. Furthermore, her identification approach
is not appropriate when prudence and precautionary measures against income fluctuations
are added as motives for private saving (see Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1997). In this case,
individual discount rates cannot be identified from administrative consumption and saving
data because patience and prudence cannot be disentangled (Carroll, 1997).
Krusell and Smith (1998) use a model that incorporates precautionary saving motives and
show in a calibration exercise that heterogeneity in individual discount rates help explain the
distribution of private wealth in U.S. consumption data. In particular, consumers with high
discount rates hold significantly less wealth than those with lower discount rates. Hendricks
(2007) confirms these results, applying a different model with a finite planning horizon to
the same administrative data instead of the model with an infinite planning horizon that is
applied in Krusell and Smith (1998).
The theoretical implications of individual discounting behavior on private saving and
wealth are clear: Patience in the form of lower discount rates is associated with higher
private saving and wealth. The first hypothesis we test is:
Hypothesis 1: Individual discount rates are significantly correlated with pri-
vate financial wealth: subjects with high financial wealth have significantly lower
discount rates than subjects with low financial wealth.
To date, the experimental evidence that tests this hypothesis is limited, as it is rare
to have reliable information on both individual discount rates and financial wealth. Some
studies using data from developing countries have collected information on household assets
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from surveys and conducted time preference experiments with subjects from the same
sample, whereas other studies rely entirely on proxies of private saving and wealth.
Pender (1996) tests different models of credit supply and imperfect capital markets in
India. He runs intertemporal choice experiments with a sample of subjects from two villages,
who are asked to make binary choices over a smaller amount of rice received at a sooner date
or a larger amount received at a later date. The front-end delay to the sooner reward was 1
month, 4 months, and 8 months, and the time delay between the sooner and later rewards
was 7, 12, 19, and 24 months. Data on socio-demographic characteristics and information
on private assets and debt from a related study are used to test the association between
individual discount rates and private wealth.2 Positive wealth is significantly correlated
with the observed willingness to wait for the larger, later reward when there is a front-end
delay of 1 month, but not when the front-end delay is 4 months or 8 months.
Yesuf and Bluffstone (2008) conduct a comparable study with 262 farm households in
Ethiopia and find that private wealth is negatively correlated with elicited discount rates.3
The subjects made binary choices over rewards that were paid out in cash, where the sooner
reward was paid out immediately and the time delay between the sooner and later rewards
was 3, 6 and 12 months. Interestingly, they find that cash holdings are not correlated
with individual discount rates, despite the significant correlation between discount rates
and private wealth.
A third study, also conducted in a developing country, is by Kirby et al. (2002). They
analyze the association between individual discount rates and information on health, educa-
tion, age, and private wealth using a sample of 154 subjects between 10 and 80 years of an
indigenous society from the Bolivian rain forest. They collect data on individual discount
rates from incentivized decision tasks, as well as data on socio-demographic characteristics
that includes a measure of private wealth based on the monetary value of physical assets
owned by the person.4 The subjects made choices between immediate and delayed rewards,
2Private wealth is measured as the cash value of land, buildings, livestock, farming tools, stocks of
agricultural products, inputs, household items and consumer durables, plus financial assets and minus
financial debt.
3Wealth is measured as the cash value of land, oxen and capital.
4These assets include cattle, ducks, chickens, pigs, rifles, radios, canoes, mosquito nets, dogs, machetes
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and the time delay between the sooner and later rewards varied between 7 and 157 days.
Kirby et al. (2002) do not find a significant association between individual discount rates
and private wealth, but they do find a significant negative correlation between individual
discount rates and income.
While the results are mixed, there is some support for the hypothesis that individual
discount rates are significantly correlated with private wealth. However, the previous studies
consider only empirical evidence from developing countries and there is no empirical evidence
yet for developed countries.5 Moreover, none of the previous studies elicit discount rates
over utility of income, and we return to this issue later.
2.2 Liquidity and Present Bias
Several experimental studies show that the assumption of constant individual discount rates
in the exponential discounting model may be violated (see reviews by Frederick et al.,
2002; Andersen et al., 2014). In particular, individual discount rates may be declining over
time and some subjects may have a preference for the present that cannot be explained
by the exponential discounting model. A discounting model that captures present bias
was introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and popularized by Laibson (1997), and it is
known as the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model.6 Laibson (1997) applies this discounting
function to a model of life cycle consumption and saving behavior and the intertemporal
utility function is specified as
Ut = Et
[
u(ct) + β
T−t∑
τ=1
(
1
1 + δ
)τ
u(ct+τ )
]
. (2)
In the quasi-hyperbolic model future utiliy is discounted by the discount rate, δ, and an
additional parameter β that measures present bias. The exponential discounting model is
and axes.
5Dohmen et al. (2015) use survey instruments to measure time preferences across several countries and
they find a positive relationship between their measure of patience and a country’s capital stock, gross
savings, net savings and household savings rate. However, they do not have measures of private wealth at
the individual level and instead consider proxies such as income and education. Moreover, their measure of
time preferences is based on hypothetical survey questions and not on incentivized decision tasks.
6The structural model was introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) in an overlapping-generations context
in which current generations discount the utility of future generations.
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nested in equation (2) when β = 1. A lower value of β implies that future rewards are
discounted more, and β < 1 indicates a present bias. One implication of present bias is
that time preferences are dynamically inconsistent in the sense that one may systematically
deviate from long-term plans and consume more in the present than planned in the past.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting may also have important implications for portfolio choice.
Because liquid assets allow an individual to succumb to temptation and consume more than
initially planned, Laibson asserts that a present biased consumer, who is more likely to give
in to temptation, will hold fewer liquid assets than a consumer who is not present biased but
otherwise has the same preferences. Holding fewer liquid assets is either the result of giving
in to temptation as just described or the result of holding larger stocks of illiquid assets as
a commitment device to prevent falling for temptation. Laibson furthermore asserts that
easy access to consumer debt against illiquid assets and future income, such as credit cards,
may undermine the commitment aspect of holding illiquid assets, which results in higher
borrowing by present biased individuals with access to consumer credit.
Angeletos et al. (2001) incorporate quasi-hyperbolic discounting into a life cycle model
with precautionary savings and simulate portfolio choice between liquid and illiquid assets.
They find that the quasi-hyperbolic model is more appropriate than the exponential dis-
counting model in explaining aggregate data from the US Survey of Consumer Finances.7
We formulate our second hypothesis based on this literature:
Hypothesis 2: Present bias is significantly correlated with portfolio choice and
the allocation of financial wealth between liquid and illiquid assets. Subjects who
are present biased hold significantly fewer liquid assets than subjects who are not
present biased.
While model calibrations and simulations such as those in Angeletos et al. (2001) or
Laibson et al. (2007) are valuable, and the concept of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is
intuitive, the empirical evidence from experimental economics that supports the association
7Angeletos et al. (2001) assume that present biased individuals are sophisticated and correctly anticipate
tempting consumption opportunities. As a result, the consumption profiles and wealth levels of quasi-
hyperbolic and exponential discounters are similar but quasi-hyperbolic discounters hold fewer liquid assets
than exponential discounters.
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between present bias and portfolio choice is scarce. The only study to our knowledge that
examines the correlation between present bias and financial wealth is that by Meier and
Sprenger (2010). They conduct a field experiment with predominantly low-income people
seeking assistance in filing their annual income tax statements. Each subject made choices
between smaller, sooner rewards and a larger, later reward that was fixed. The sooner
and later dates in the experimental design were: (a) immediately and in 1 month, (b)
immediately and in 6 months, and (c) in 6 months and in 7 months. This design allows one
to identify exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions.8
Meier and Sprenger (2010) combine data from the field experiment with administrative
data on income and credit records, which allows them to generate reliable measures of
credit card debt and credit ratings.9 The analysis reveals that present biased subjects have
significantly higher credit card debt than otherwise, and the exponential discount rate δ is
not significantly correlated with the debt balance. These results support the assertion by
Laibson (1997) that present bias may be significantly correlated with consumer debt, but
the study is limited by only looking at short term liabilities and leaving out (liquid and
illiquid) assets.
3 Experimental Design and Identification of Time Preferences
In this section, we describe the experimental data, underlying theoretical assumptions, and
procedures for the identification of individual discount rates from choices over monetary
rewards that are paid out at different points in time.
8Meier and Sprenger (2010) note that differences in utility curvature across subjects may confound their
conclusions with respect to individual discount rates. They address this issue by eliciting a survey measure
of risk tolerance and use it as a control variable in their estimations. The results are not influenced by this
control variable and remain unchanged.
9Meier and Sprenger (2010) do not have access to administrative data on liquid and illiquid assets and
only have limited survey information on liabilities other than credit card debt. They can only analyze
the correlation between discount rates (or present bias) and borrowing behavior, and not the correlation
between discount rates (or present bias) and total wealth.
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3.1 Experimental Choice Data
We use choice data from a field experiment by Andersen et al. (2014) with a representative
sample of the Danish population consisting of 413 subjects. We refer to the original pub-
lication for details on experimental procedures, sample selection, payment procedures and
implementation of treatments. In our analysis, we use data from two standard experimental
decision tasks: The first decision task identifies discounting behavior from binary choices
between smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards. The second decision task identifies the
utility function (risk aversion) from binary choices between lotteries. In both decision tasks,
subjects had a 10% chance of being paid according to one of their decisions.
Discounting Task
Andersen et al. (2014) ask subjects to make a series of choices over two certain outcomes.
For example, one option can be 3,000 kroner in 1 month, and another option can be 3,300
kroner in 13 months. If the subject selects the earlier option, we can infer that his or her
discount rate over one year is more than 10%, and if the subject picks the later option, we
can infer that his or her discount rate over one year is less than 10%. By varying the amount
of the later option, we can identify the individual discount rate.
The time horizon between the sooner and later payments and the front-end delay to the
sooner payment were varied to identify the shape of the discounting function and present
bias. The time delays were .5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12 months. Each subject made
40 decisions in total, with 10 decisions for each of 4 randomly assigned time delays, and the
interest rate in the decision tasks varied between 5% and 50% per annum. The front-end
delay was assigned between subjects and the sooner reward was either paid out immediately
or 1 month after the experiment. Four other treatments were assigned between subjects:
(i) the sooner reward was either 1,500 kroner or 3,000 kroner, (ii) the time horizons were
presented in ascending or descending order, (iii) information on implied interest rates was
either provided or not provided, and (iv) the discounting task came either before or after
the risk aversion task. The decision tasks were displayed one at a time and the subjects
were asked to select their preferred option (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Example of Discounting Task (Source: Andersen et al., 2014)
Risk Aversion Task
Risk attitudes are evaluated by asking subjects to make a series of choices over outcomes
that involve some uncertainty. The decision tasks allow us to identify the utility function,
and thus discount rates over the utility of income. The experimental design is based on
the risk aversion experiments by Holt and Laury (2002) and poses a series of binary lottery
choices. For example, lottery A might give the subject a 50-50 chance of receiving 1,600
kroner or 2,000 kroner to be paid today, and lottery B might have a 50-50 chance of receiving
3,850 kroner or 100 kroner today. The subject picks A or B. One series of 10 choices would
offer these prize sets, where the probability of the highest prize in each lottery starts at 0.1
in the first decision task, it increases by 0.1 to 0.2 in the next decision task, and so on until
the last decision task is between two certain amounts of money (2,000 kroner and 3,850
kroner in this example).
The experimental procedures in Holt and Laury (2002) provided a single decision sheet
with all 10 decision tasks displayed at once and presented in an ordered manner. Andersen
et al. (2014) iused a similar experimental design but presented the decision tasks one at a
time and used pie charts to display the probabilities in each lottery (as in Figure 2). Each
subject made 40 decisions in total, with 10 decisions for each of 4 randomly assigned prize
sets.10
10These prize sets were [A1: 2,000 and 1,600; B1: 3,850 and 100], [A2: 1,125 and 750; B2: 2,000 and
250], [A3: 1,000 and 875; B3: 2,000 and 75] and [A4: 2,250 and 1,000; B4: 4,500 and 50].
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Figure 2: Example of Risk Aversion Task (Source: Andersen et al., 2014)
3.2 Structural Specification and Identification
Our identification of individual discount rates relies on binary choices between sooner,
smaller and larger, later monetary rewards. We follow the existing literature (e.g., Andersen
et al., 2008; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a) and assume that utility is defined over a constant
measure of background consumption (or income) ω plus the monetary reward x from the
experiment. Under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion, atemporal utility is
defined as
u(x) =
(ω + x)1−r
1− r . (3)
Under the assumption of exponential discounting, the added utility from a smaller sooner
reward xS at time t = S is
DUS =
1
1 + δ
S
·
(
(ω + xS)
1−r
1− r −
ω1−r
1− r
)
, (4)
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Figure 3: (δ, r) Combinations Implied by Indifference Between Delayed Rewards
and the added utility for a larger later reward xL at time t = L is
DUL =
1
1 + δ
L
·
(
(ω + xL)
1−r
1− r −
ω1−r
1− r
)
. (5)
The indifference point between the smaller, sooner and larger, later rewards identifies the
discount rate δ and is given by
δ =
(
(ω+xL)
1−r
1−r − ω
1−r
1−r
(ω+xS)1−r
1−r − ω
1−r
1−r
) 1
L−S
− 1. (6)
The experimental design also allows us to identify the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model
and present bias. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model is specified by
DUt =

β
(1+δ)t
·
(
(ω+xt)1−r
1−r − ω
1−r
1−r
)
if t > 0,(
(ω+xt)1−r
1−r − ω
1−r
1−r
)
if t = 0.
(7)
Equation (6) shows that discount rates are a function of the relative risk aversion, r.
Figure 3 plots the (δ, r) combinations that are implied by an indifference point between a
sooner payment of 3,000 kroner now and and a later payment of 3,400 kroner in 1 year.
Different levels of relative risk aversion result in different levels of individual discount rates,
as shown by Andersen et al. (2008).
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We thus control for relative risk aversion in our estimation of individual discount rates.11
Under expected utility theory, the utility from selecting a relatively safe lottery A, which
pays out the rewards xA1 and xA2 with probability p and (1− p) respectively is
EUA = p · (ω + xA1)
1−r
1− r + (1− p) ·
(ω + xA2)
1−r
1− r , (8)
and the utility of selecting a relative more risky lottery B with rewards xB1 and xB2 is
EUB = p · (ω + xB1)
1−r
1− r + (1− p) ·
(ω + xB2)
1−r
1− r . (9)
The utility function is uniquely identified from the indifference point between EUA and
EUB given the outcomes and probabilities. We assume that the utility function is constant
over time, which is standard in the literature on individual discounting. Combining data
from the risk aversion and discounting tasks we can identify a unique point on the graph in
Figure 3.
3.3 Econometric Methodology
We use maximum likelihood to estimate individual discount rates and the utility function
and follow the same statistical method as Andersen et al. (2014). We first estimate individual
discount rates under the assumption that utility is linear, which is the traditional approach
in the literature, and then relax this assumption and allow for non-linear utility.
Estimation of Discount Rates under Linear Utility
For each choice over delayed rewards, we define a latent index as the difference between the
discounted utility from the larger, later reward DUL and the discounted utility from the
11Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) find a significant difference between utility curvature elicited from
lottery choices and utility curvature elicited from intertemporal allocations along a convex budget set. They
claim that "the practice of using [...] risk experiments to identify and correct for curvature in discounting
may be problematic" (p. 3353) and further argue in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) that risk preferences
are not time preferences. However, the results in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) can be explained by
correlation aversion, which is discussed by Cheung (2015).
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smaller, sooner reward DUS
∆DU = DUL −DUS. (10)
We assume that ∆DU is linked to the probability of choosing the larger, later reward over
the smaller, sooner reward via the cumulative logistic distribution function, hence
P (choose later reward) = F (∆DU). (11)
Indifference between the smaller, sooner and the larger, later reward, such that ∆DU =
0, indicates that the probability of choosing either reward is equal to 0.5. When ∆DU > 0,
the probability of choosing the larger, later reward is higher than 0.5, and vice versa. We
then define the log likelihood function, given the structural decision model and observed
choices y, as
ln L(δ; y, r = 0) =
∑
i
[ln (F (∆DU)) · I(y = L) + ln (F (−∆DU)) · I(y = S)] . (12)
We adopt two extensions to this basic framework. First, we introduce a parameter that
controls the stochastic component in the decision-making process by adding a behavioral
Fechner (1966) error term. We replace equation (10) with
∆DU ′ =
DUL −DUS
µIDR
. (13)
The parameter µIDR is endogenous and estimated within the maximum likelihood model
and is a measure of noise in the data: as µIDR becomes larger, ∆DU ′ tends toward 0 and
the probability of choosing either lottery tends toward 0.5. Conversely, as µIDR goes toward
0, ∆DU ′ becomes larger, and the choice becomes more deterministic. The variation in
individual choices identifies the error term µIDR in the maximum likelihood estimation.
The second extension is to control for observable socio-demographic characteristics and
treatments in the experimental design. For example, if we allow the discount rate to be a
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linear function of sex, we have
δ = δconstant + δfemale · female, (14)
which allows us to estimate the marginal effect of being a female instead of a male.
Estimation of the Utility Function
We elicit the parameter r of the utility function from the risk aversion tasks. For each
binary choice in the risk aversion tasks, the difference between the expected values of the
two lotteries is
∆EU = EUB − EUA. (15)
The probability of choosing lottery B over lottery A is then specified by a logistic linking
function, hence
P (choose lottery B) = F (∆EU). (16)
The logistic linking function transforms the difference in expected utilities between the
two lotteries into a value between 0 and 1. If both lotteries yield the same utility such
that ∆EU = 0, the probability of choosing either lottery is 0.5. If the utility from lottery
B is higher than the utility from lottery A, such that ∆EU > 0, then the probability of
choosing lottery B is higher than the probability of choosing lottery A, and vice versa. The
log likelihood function is then
ln L(r; y) =
∑
i
[ln (F (∆EU)) · I(y = B) + ln (F (−∆EU)) · I(y = A)] , (17)
where y indicates the observed outcome of the binary choice and the log likelihood, which
depends only on the parameter r, is summed over all i lottery choices.
We make the same two adjustments as before. First, we introduce a stochastic error
76
term and follow Wilcox (2011) by replacing equation (15) with
∆EU ′ =
(EUB−EUA)
ν
µRA
, (18)
where µRA is a stochastic error term, and ν is a normalizing parameter defined as the
difference between the utility of the highest prize and utility of the lowest prize in the
two lotteries. The normalization implies that the latent index is always between 0 and 1.
Second, we allow for variation in the estimated parameters by controlling for observable
characteristics in the same way as before. The log likelihood function is then
ln L(r, µRA; y, Z) =
∑
i
[ln (F (∆EU ′)) · I(y = B) + ln (F (−∆EU ′)) · I(y = A)] , (19)
where µRA is the stochastic error term, and Z is a vector of control variables.
Joint Estimation of Discount Rates and the Utility Function
We jointly estimate both the coefficient of relative risk aversion, r, and the individual
discount rate, δ, from the risk aversion and discounting tasks. We define the log likelihood
function as
ln L(r, µRA, δ, µIDR; y, Z) = ln LRA(r, µRA; y, Z)
+ ln LIDR(δ, µIDR, r; y, Z), (20)
where r is estimated from the choices in the risk aversion task, and used in the estimation
of discount rates by deriving the utility gain of rewards given r.
It is straightforward to allow for alternative utility and discounting functions in the
statistical model. While we rely on expected utility theory to identify the utility function,
we also estimate the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model as an alternative to the canonical
exponential discounting model.
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4 Register Data on Wealth and Income
One of the possible reasons for the lack of research on the association between individual
discount rates and financial wealth is the difficulty in getting access to reliable financial
information at the individual level. We overcome this challenge by combining the experi-
mental data with detailed administrative data at Statistics Denmark. Every subject in the
experiment can be linked to administrative records via her unique civil registration number.
In this way, we get access to relevant economic, financial and personal information collected
from different government agencies such as the Danish Civil Registration Office and the
Danish Ministry of Taxation.
4.1 Control Variables for Sex, Age and Education
Socio-demographic information on sex and age is obtained from records at the Danish Civil
Registration Office, and information on the highest level of completed education is obtained
from the Education Register, which contains records of ongoing and completed education.
We list summary statistics of these demographic variables in Table 1. In the analysis we use
binary indicator variables for age and education groups. The analysis excludes 6 subjects
from the original sample due to missing data on education, and the final sample consists of
407 subjects.12
The summary statistics show substantial variation in observed individual characteristics
such as age, and the sample is more diverse than usually found in experimental studies.
The data allows us to analyze the correlation between individual discount rates and private
wealth, and to control for individual characteristics that may be correlated with wealth.13
12The data in the Education Register is collected from Danish Ministry of Education. For immigrants
data on education, among other things, is obtained from surveys and the last survey of this kind was
conducted in 2006. Our sample is drawn from the Civil Registration Office, which also contains records for
immigrants, and it is likely that the 6 subjects with missing information on education are immigrants. Our
results do not change if we keep the 6 subjects in the sample and use their self-reported education level to
replace the missing values in the administrative data.
13There are several other demographic control variables that we could have included in the analysis. We
focus on sex, age and education because these characteristics may be correlated with private wealth. When
we control for other demographic variables, such as marital status or number of children, we do not observe
significantly different results, but we do observe higher standard errors in the estimated marginal effects
due to the inclusion of more covariates.
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Table 1: List of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD
Female 0.48 0.50
Age 47.49 15.10
below 30 years old 0.18 0.38
30-39 years old 0.12 0.32
40-49 years old 0.23 0.42
50-59 years old 0.24 0.43
60 years old and above 0.23 0.42
Years of Education 12.74 3.08
Not finished high school 0.25 0.43
High school graduate 0.41 0.49
Higher education, Bachelor 0.26 0.44
Higher education, Master and above 0.09 0.29
N 407
4.2 Income and Wealth Data
Information on income and financial wealth is obtained from official records at the Danish
Ministry of Taxation. Labor income and returns to financial assets are subject to taxa-
tion, and Danish tax authorities collect information directly from employers and financial
institutions. We measure income as annual disposable income from labor and capital, and
Figure 4 shows the distribution of income in the sample. For data confidentiality reasons, we
calculate average values for each percentile of the distribution.14 We also added the income
distribution for the entire Danish population between 18 and 75 years, excluding the top
and bottom 0.5% of the distribution, and we observe that the two distributions are similar.
The average annual disposable income in the sample is 200,000 kroner. Some subjects
have negative disposable income due to financial losses. We generate binary indicator
variables for each income quartile (Table 2) and use these as control variables in the
statistical model of individual discount rates. We also generate a separate set of indicator
variables for each income quartile over a 3-year period from January 1, 2008 to December
31, 2010, to reduce the effects of fluctuations in individual income from year to year. The
income quartiles over the 3-year period are reported in Table 3.
14We do not have permission from the Data Protection Agency to report any information that is related
to a single person, such as minimum, maximum or median values, or outliers in a histogram.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Annual Disposable Income
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Table 2: Disposable Income Quartiles (in 1,000 kroner)
N Mean SD
1 101 91.61 34.61
2 101 174.84 19.18
3 103 229.50 16.04
4 102 379.00 384.60
Total 407 219.18 219.61
Table 3: Disposable Income Quartiles over a 3-Year Period (in 1,000 kroner)
N Mean SD
1 101 97.11 31.52
2 101 177.52 17.12
3 103 232.14 16.45
4 102 358.95 222.90
Total 407 216.86 147.74
The information on private wealth in the registry data is detailed and contains different
types of assets and liabilities (Table 4). Bank Assets is balances in regular Danish bank
accounts, Stock Assets is the market value of shares and equity held in Danish deposits,
80
Bond Assets is tradable bonds and liabilities held in Danish deposits, and Privateloan
Assets is any other non-traded financial assets held, such as private loans to friends and
family. Housingvalue is the appraised value of property owned, which may deviate from the
actual market value.15 Unfortunately, information on contributions to pension funds is not
available, which accounts for about a third of overall private wealth in Denmark.
Looking at liabilities, we have information on Bank Debt, which is consumer credit
and debt owed to financial institutions in Denmark, Bond Debt is privately issued bonds
(including mortgages), and Privateloan Debt is other liabilities such as private debt to friends
and family.
Cash holdings and valuable items such as yachts, cars, art, jewelry, etc. and assets and
liabilities held outside Denmark are self-reported. If assets and liabilities are reported, then
it is included in the Net Wealth variable, which is the difference between reported assets
and liabilities. There are slight differences between Net Wealth and the sum of all assets
and liabilities listed above, but the correlation coefficient between the two measures of net
wealth is 0.97, which suggests that few subjects report other wealth than already recorded
by the tax authorities.
Although the data is highly detailed at the individual level, there are several weaknesses.
First, not all assets are recorded and measured according to market values, particularly
private property and pensions. Second, assets and liabilities are recorded once per year on
December 31. Hence, we do not observe wealth at the exact date of the experiment, which
was conducted in September and October 2009. Third, and finally, we cannot identify
consumer debt because bank debt also includes loans for downpayments on houses and
apartments. Despite these issues, the measures of private wealth that we have at our disposal
are more reliable and complete than alternative measures based on survey questions.
We create several measures of private wealth for our analysis. First, we use Net Wealth
as the baseline measure of accumulated wealth. The distribution of Net Wealth for our
sample is shown in Figure 5, and it is similar to the distribution of net wealth for the entire
15Unfortunately, housing value only includes privately owned apartments and houses and does not include
cooperatively owned apartments. In 2009, 7% of all housing in Denmark was cooperatively owned (Statistics
Denmark, 2010).
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population.16 The average net wealth in the sample is approximately 500,000 kroner (which
is roughly 100,000 dollars at the time net wealth was recorded), but we also observe that a
third of the subjects in the sample have negative net wealth. If we take into account that
most employees in Denmark receive their paycheck by the end of the month, then 40% of all
subjects in the sample have no positive net wealth beyond their monthly disposable income.
Table 4: List of Financial Wealth Variables (in 1,000 kroner)
Mean SD
Bank Assets 117.36 307.41
Stock Assets 40.50 181.06
Bond Assets 30.38 174.66
Privateloan Assets 0.00 0.00
Housingvalue 88.70 2,416.68
Total Assets 1,113.71 3,110.71
Bank Debt 140.37 280.89
Bond Debt 439.02 1,073.29
Privateloan Debt 7.10 90.21
Total Debt 586.49 1,227.96
Net Wealth 527.22 2,172.91
Table 5: Net Wealth Quartiles (in 1,000 kroner)
N Mean SD
1 104 -337.70 361.02
2 100 -0.19 23.90
3 101 233.98 133.65
4 102 2,216.54 3,848.99
Total 407 527.22 2,172.91
Table 6: Net Wealth Quartiles over a 3-Year Period (in 1,000 kroner)
N Mean SD
1 104 -297.01 296.63
2 100 5.57 26.04
3 101 274.22 148.76
4 102 2,213.91 3,631.27
Total 407 548.36 2,068.70
16We exclude the highest percentile in Figure 5 which had average net wealth of more than 10 million
kroner.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Net Wealth
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We generate binary indicators for each quartile of the net wealth distribution in 2009
(Table 5) and a separate set of indicator variables for each quartile of the (average) net wealth
distribution over a 3-year period from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2010 (Table 6).
To test the hypothesis that present biased subjects are less likely to hold liquid assets
and more likely to accumulate debt, we consider several measures of liquidity. Leth-Petersen
(2010) identifies individuals as being credit constrained if the value of their liquid assets
is less than monthly disposable income, where liquid assets are defined as all non-housing
assets.17 We follow Leth-Petersen’s (2010) approach but define liquid assets as bank deposits
only and exclude deposits of stocks and bonds. This measure of liquidity is closer to
Laibson’s (1997) definition, whereby liquid assets can be used for consumption without
significant transaction costs. We specify an indicator variable for positive bank deposits,
which is equal to 1 if Bank Assets is higher than monthly disposable income, and 0 otherwise.
Table 7 shows that two thirds of the subjects in the sample had positive bank deposits that
17The reason for this definition is that most wages are paid at the end of the month before rent and
utility bills for the coming month have been paid, and the wealth related variables in the administrative
data are recorded at the end of the year. Hence, monthly income ends up being recorded as private wealth
without consideration of monthly expenses.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics for Positive Bank Assets and Positive Bank Wealth (by
Net Wealth Quartile)
Positive Bank Assets Positive Bank Wealth
% %
1 0.44 0.07
2 0.61 0.37
3 0.81 0.66
4 0.81 0.65
Total 0.67 0.43
exceeded monthly income at the end of 2009. While the share of subjects with positive bank
deposits increases with private wealth, we observe that 20% of the subjects in the highest
net wealth quartile had fewer bank deposits than their monthly income.
While we cannot directly measure credit card debt as in Meier and Sprenger (2010), we
measure consumer debt using the Bank Debt variable. In addition to overdrafts on bank
accounts and consumer credit, this variable also includes down payments for real estate,
and it is therefore not a perfect measure of consumer debt. We define Bank Wealth = Bank
Assets - Bank Debt and generate another measure of liquidity, which is an indicator variable
that is equal to 1 if Bank Wealth is higher than monthly disposable income, and 0 otherwise.
Only 7% of the subjects in the lowest net wealth quartile had net bank wealth that exceeded
monthly income, as opposed to 66% of the subjects in the highest net wealth quartile.
One concern is a high degree of multicolinearity between our measures of private wealth
and other demographic variables such as income, age and education. Table 8 shows that net
wealth indeed is significantly correlated with these other demographic variables. However,
the estimated coefficients of correlation are not close to 1 and the results suggest that we
have sufficient variation in net wealth within age, education and income groups to identify
marginal effects of net wealth on individual discount rates while controlling for these other
demographic factors.
Income has sometimes been used as a proxy for private wealth (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2010;
Harrison et al., 2002), and we find that the coefficient of correlation between net wealth
quartile and income quartile is equal to 0.33 and significantly different from 0. However,
Table 9 illustrates that income is not a perfect proxy for net wealth. Within the highest
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net wealth quartile, some subjects fall into the lowest income quartile. Similarly, within
the lowest net wealth quartile, some subjects fall into the highest income quartile. This
variation in net wealth and income illustrates the value of observing private wealth directly.
Table 8: Pairwise Correlations Between Variables
Net
Wealth
Quartile
Income
Quartile Age
Years of
Educa-
tion
Positive
Bank
Assets
Positive
Bank
Wealth
Net Wealth Quartile 1
Income Quartile 0.331*** 1
Age 0.301*** 0.245*** 1
Years of Education 0.176*** 0.446*** 0.0619 1
Positive Bank Assets 0.314*** 0.0950* 0.0927* 0.112** 1
Positive Bank Wealth 0.461*** 0.0640 0.134*** 0.0953* 0.618*** 1
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 9: Fraction of Subjects by Income Quartile and Net Wealth Quartile (in percent)
Income Quartile
Net Wealth Quartile 1 2 3 4
1 5.90 8.35 6.88 4.42
2 11.79 7.86 4.42 0.49
3 5.16 4.18 0.74 7.62
4 1.97 4.42 6.14 12.53
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Figure 6: Fraction of Delayed Choices by Net Wealth Quartile
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5 Results
The data set provides a unique opportunity to investigate the association between individual
discount rates and measures of private wealth and liquidity.
5.1 Wealth and Exponential Discounting
We first address the hypothesis that individual discount rates are significantly correlated
with private net wealth. Figure 6 displays the fraction of delayed choices across net wealth
quartiles and implied annual interest rate in the discounting tasks. We observe that subjects
in the highest net wealth quartile are more likely to choose the larger, later reward than
subjects in the lowest net wealth quartile. The descriptive data thus indicates that subjects
in higher net wealth quartiles have lower discount rates than those in lower net wealth
quartiles.
Table 10 reports estimated discount rates under the assumption of exponential discount-
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Table 10: Exponential Discounting under Linear Utility
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.282 0.072 0.000 { 0.141; 0.423 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.028 0.069 0.689 {-0.162; 0.107 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.094 0.048 0.050 {-0.187; -0.000 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.114 0.057 0.045 {-0.225; -0.002 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.057 0.069 0.408 {-0.192; 0.078 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.049 0.062 0.427 {-0.171; 0.072 }
4th Income Quartile -0.098 0.065 0.132 {-0.227; 0.030 }
Female -0.009 0.044 0.836 {-0.096; 0.077 }
30-39 Years 0.080 0.060 0.185 {-0.038; 0.198 }
40-49 years 0.030 0.058 0.609 {-0.084; 0.144 }
50-59 Years 0.005 0.074 0.949 {-0.141; 0.150 }
60 Years and older -0.060 0.071 0.395 {-0.199; 0.079 }
Highschool Graduate 0.051 0.049 0.302 {-0.046; 0.147 }
Higher Education, Bachelor 0.049 0.058 0.400 {-0.065; 0.164 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. 0.036 0.071 0.610 {-0.103; 0.176 }
Note: We estimate exponential discount rates using maximum likelihood under the assumption of linear
utility. The full set of of estimates including stochastic error terms is documented in Appendix A.
ing and linear utility. The results show that individual discount rates vary significantly
with net wealth: the marginal effects of being in the two highest net wealth quartiles are
negative and significantly different from 0 relative to the lowest net wealth quartile, which
is omitted. To our surprise we do not find any significant marginal effects of other control
variables such as income, sex, age and education on estimated discount rates.
To control for the curvature of the utility function we jointly elicit individual risk atti-
tudes and discount rates. The results are presented in Table 11. We reject the assumption
that utility is linear and find empirical support for concave utility, but we do not find any
significant correlation between relative risk aversion and net wealth.18 Controlling for utility
curvature does not change our previous conclusions: we continue to find a significant negative
association between individual discount rates and net wealth. The estimated marginal effect
for the highest net wealth quartile is -0.054 with a p-value of 0.064, and the estimated
marginal effect for the second highest net wealth quartile is also -0.054 with a p-value of
0.038. These marginal effects are measured relative to the lowest net wealth quartile. We
18We do find that women are significantly more risk averse than men. All other control variables are not
significant at the 5% level.
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do not find any significant marginal effects of other control variables such as income, sex,
age and education on estimated discount rates.
Table 11: Exponential Discounting under Non-Linear Utility
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.185 0.039 0.000 { 0.109; 0.261 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.027 0.033 0.406 {-0.091; 0.037 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.054 0.026 0.038 {-0.106; -0.003 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.054 0.029 0.064 {-0.111; 0.003 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.031 0.036 0.391 {-0.101; 0.040 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.047 0.033 0.163 {-0.112; 0.019 }
4th Income Quartile -0.044 0.035 0.204 {-0.113; 0.024 }
Female -0.027 0.023 0.246 {-0.073; 0.019 }
30-39 Years 0.045 0.034 0.193 {-0.023; 0.112 }
40-49 Years 0.024 0.031 0.438 {-0.037; 0.085 }
50-59 Years 0.014 0.036 0.700 {-0.057; 0.085 }
60 Years and older -0.033 0.037 0.371 {-0.106; 0.039 }
Highschool Graduate -0.006 0.027 0.824 {-0.060; 0.047 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.016 0.032 0.621 {-0.079; 0.047 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.023 0.041 0.574 {-0.104; 0.058 }
Utility Curvature r
Constant 0.295 0.085 0.001 { 0.127; 0.462 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.077 0.077 0.318 {-0.075; 0.229 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.086 0.077 0.260 {-0.064; 0.237 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.054 0.091 0.557 {-0.232; 0.125 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.032 0.083 0.696 {-0.130; 0.194 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.148 0.103 0.150 {-0.053; 0.349 }
4th Income Quartile -0.007 0.100 0.944 {-0.204; 0.189 }
Female 0.174 0.056 0.002 { 0.065; 0.284 }
30-39 Years -0.005 0.098 0.958 {-0.197; 0.186 }
40-49 Years -0.003 0.093 0.972 {-0.185; 0.178 }
50-59 Years 0.058 0.087 0.503 {-0.112; 0.228 }
60 Years and older 0.189 0.120 0.115 {-0.046; 0.424 }
Highschool Graduate 0.132 0.078 0.088 {-0.020; 0.284 }
Higher Education, Bachelor 0.167 0.088 0.058 {-0.006; 0.339 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. 0.181 0.116 0.117 {-0.045; 0.407 }
Note: We jointly estimate exponential discount rates and utility curvature using maximum likelihood and
use frequency weights (fweight=50) with respect to observations from the risk aversion task. The full set of
of estimates including stochastic error terms is documented in Appendix A.
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Figure 7: Predicted Discount Rates by Net Wealth Quartile
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Figure 7 shows the distribution of predicted discount rates across the four net wealth
quartiles. The height of the box indicates the mean estimate and the vertical line indicates
the 95% significance interval. Panel (a) shows the predicted values under linear utility,
and panel (b) shows the predicted values under non-linear utility. The association between
individual discount rates and net wealth is negative under both assumptions, and predicted
discount rates are significantly lower in the highest net wealth quartile compared to the
lowest net wealth quartile. Under concave utility, the predicted discount rates for the lowest
and highest net wealth quartiles is 14% and 8.5%, respectively.
We now investigate the association between individual discount rates and alternative
measures of net wealth and liquidity. Table 12 reports the results from those estimations,
which control for utility curvature and include covariates for income, sex, age and education.
First, we test to what extent liquidity is correlated with individual discount rates.
Table 12 panels (A) and (B) show that the binary indicators for Positive Bank Assets and
Positive Bank Wealth have no significant effect on individual discount rates, and including
these measures of liquidity do not change our conclusions regarding the significant negative
correlation between net wealth and individual discount rates.
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Table 12: Exponential Discounting - Sensitivity Analysis
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
(A) Discount Rate δ: Net Wealth Quartiles and Positive Bank Assets
Constant 0.176 0.039 0.000 { 0.100; 0.252 }
Positive Bank Assets 0.013 0.020 0.524 {-0.026; 0.052 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.027 0.033 0.413 {-0.091; 0.038 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.058 0.028 0.040 {-0.113;-0.003 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.057 0.031 0.065 {-0.117; 0.004 }
(B) Discount Rate δ: Net Wealth Quartiles and Positive Bank Wealth
Constant 0.186 0.041 0.000 { 0.105; 0.267 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.003 0.026 0.911 {-0.048; 0.053 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.028 0.035 0.423 {-0.097; 0.041 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.057 0.026 0.032 {-0.109; -0.005 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.056 0.031 0.071 {-0.117; 0.005 }
(C) Discount Rate δ: Positive Net Wealth
Constant 0.186 0.032 0.000 { 0.123; 0.248 }
Positive Net Wealth -0.054 0.021 0.010 {-0.095;-0.013 }
(D) Discount Rate δ: Positive Net Wealth interacted with Age
Constant 0.265 0.079 0.001 { 0.110; 0.421 }
Pos. Net Wealth -0.146 0.071 0.041 {-0.285;-0.006 }
30-39 Years -0.029 0.062 0.640 {-0.151; 0.093 }
40-49 Years -0.033 0.067 0.624 {-0.163; 0.098 }
50-59 Years -0.078 0.076 0.305 {-0.228; 0.071 }
60+ Years -0.095 0.096 0.324 {-0.283; 0.093 }
Pos. Net Wealth * 30-39 Years 0.121 0.088 0.169 {-0.051; 0.293 }
Pos. Net Wealth * 40-49 Years 0.089 0.076 0.243 {-0.060; 0.238 }
Pos. Net Wealth * 50-59 Years 0.141 0.082 0.088 {-0.021; 0.302 }
Pos. Net Wealth * 60+ Years 0.086 0.109 0.430 {-0.127; 0.299 }
(E) Discount Rate δ: 3 Year Average Net Wealth Quartiles
Constant 0.209 0.042 0.000 { 0.127; 0.292 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.067 0.034 0.048 {-0.132;-0.001 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.086 0.031 0.005 {-0.146;-0.026 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.075 0.032 0.020 {-0.139;-0.012 }
Note: We jointly estimate exponential discount rates and utility curvature using maximum likelihood and
use frequency weights (fweight=50) with respect to observations from the risk aversion task. The variables
included in the estimations are similar to those in Table 11, and the full set of of estimates is available upon
request.
When net wealth quartiles are replaced by a binary indicator for positive net wealth,
we continue to observe a significant negative correlation between net wealth and discount
rates. Table 12 panel (C) shows that the estimated coefficient for positive net wealth is
equal to -0.054 with a p-value of 0.010. We can also consider interaction effects between
positive net wealth and age groups, and the estimated coefficients are reported in panel
(D). We find a significant effect of net wealth on predicted discount rates for the youngest
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Figure 8: Association between Discount Rates and Net Wealth by Age Group
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age group, but we do not find a significant association between individual discount rates
and positive net wealth for any of the other age groups. Figure 8 (a) shows the predicted
discount rates across net wealth and age groups, and Figure 8 (b) illustrates the marginal
effects of net wealth on discount rates across age groups. We do not know to what extent
individual discount rates vary over the life cycle and across generations, and it is therefore
difficult to say whether the significant correlation between individual discount rates and net
wealth that we observe for the youngest age group is transitory or persists throughout life.
It is also possible that older subjects are more likely to experience exogenous shocks to their
net wealth than younger subjects, which makes it harder to identify the association between
net wealth and discounting behavior.
Finally, in panel (E) of Table 12 we replace the measures of net wealth, liquidity, and
income with alternative measures that are based on average net wealth, liquditiy, and income
over a 3-year period instead of 1 year. The negative correlation between net wealth and
individual discount rates is now more pronounced, and subjects in the lowest net wealth
quartile have significantly higher discount rates than otherwise. These results suggest that
subjects who consistently find themselves in the lowest net wealth quartile over the 3-year
period are significantly less patient than subjects who are consistently more wealthy over
the same period. Hence, variation in net wealth over longer periods of time appears to
have a stronger association with individual discount rates than short-term variation in net
wealth.
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5.2 Present Bias and Liquidity
We now consider the second hypothesis that present bias is significantly correlated with
financial liquidity. The two treatments with respect to the front-end delay to the smaller,
sooner reward allow us to identify the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model and present bias.
Andersen et al. (2014) do not find any evidence of present bias in their estimations of
individual discount rates on the full sample, but we may still find a significant association
between present bias and bank deposits. Recall that our binary indicator of financial
liquidity is based on bank deposits and does not include stocks and bonds. It is equal
to 1 if bank deposits exceed monthly income, and 0 otherwise.
We estimate the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model and control for net wealth and
liquidity along with the other control variables for demographic characteristics. Table 13
shows the estimated coefficients of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model under non-linear
utility. We find no evidence of present bias, and there is no significant association between
present bias and our measure of liquidity constraints: the marginal effect of positive bank
deposits on the estimated parameters in the discounting function are small and close to 0 and
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no significant association with discounting behavior.19
Figure 9 shows the predicted values of the β-parameter across net wealth quartiles for
subjects with and without liquidity constraints, respectively. We observe some variation
in the estimated β-parameter, but it is not significantly different from 1 for any of the net
wealth quartiles or liquidity constraints. Hence, there is no evidence of present bias, and no
significant association with net wealth and financial liquidity.20
19The p-value of a one-sided t-test that β = 1 against the alternative hypothesis that β < 1 is equal
to 0.209 for the constant term in the equation, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exponential
discounting.
20We do observe significant effects of net wealth on the estimated δ-parameter in the quasi-hyperbolic
model, and the results are similar to those in the exponential discounting model.
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Table 13: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Positive Bank Assets
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Present Bias β
Constant 0.989 0.013 0.000 { 0.963; 1.015 }
Positive Bank Assets -0.002 0.007 0.761 {-0.016; 0.012 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.010 0.013 0.451 {-0.016; 0.036 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.005 0.013 0.683 {-0.020; 0.031 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.004 0.011 0.748 {-0.026; 0.018 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.001 0.013 0.953 {-0.024; 0.025 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.001 0.015 0.930 {-0.028; 0.031 }
4th Income Quartile 0.003 0.016 0.859 {-0.028; 0.034 }
Female -0.001 0.013 0.958 {-0.025; 0.024 }
30-39 Years -0.002 0.014 0.904 {-0.030; 0.027 }
40-49 Years -0.004 0.021 0.849 {-0.046; 0.038 }
50-59 Years 0.008 0.023 0.716 {-0.036; 0.053 }
60 Years and older 0.019 0.020 0.354 {-0.021; 0.058 }
Highschool Graduate 0.004 0.009 0.617 {-0.013; 0.022 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.004 0.014 0.770 {-0.032; 0.024 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.003 0.023 0.912 {-0.048; 0.043 }
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.158 0.040 0.000 { 0.080; 0.235 }
Positive Bank Assets 0.008 0.019 0.650 {-0.028; 0.045 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.016 0.039 0.686 {-0.093; 0.061 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.050 0.030 0.100 {-0.109; 0.009 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.081 0.049 0.098 {-0.177; 0.015 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.036 0.033 0.281 {-0.101; 0.029 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.038 0.037 0.310 {-0.111; 0.035 }
4th Income Quartile -0.036 0.039 0.356 {-0.112; 0.040 }
Female -0.034 0.025 0.164 {-0.082; 0.014 }
30-39 Years 0.036 0.031 0.252 {-0.026; 0.098 }
40-49 Years 0.026 0.030 0.396 {-0.033; 0.084 }
50-59 Years 0.025 0.037 0.509 {-0.049; 0.098 }
60 Years and older 0.001 0.055 0.989 {-0.106; 0.108 }
Highschool Graduate 0.011 0.047 0.823 {-0.082; 0.103 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.016 0.051 0.747 {-0.117; 0.084 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.045 0.083 0.591 {-0.208; 0.118 }
Note: We jointly estimate exponential discount rates and utility curvature using maximum likelihood and
use frequency weights (fweight=50) with respect to observations from the risk aversion task. The full set of
of estimates including stochastic error terms is documented in Appendix A.
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Figure 9: Predicted Present Bias by Net Wealth and Positive Bank Assets
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The only other study that looks at the association between present bias and financial
outcomes is Meier and Sprenger (2010). They do not consider financial assets but instead
investigate the correlation between present bias and consumer debt. We include consumer
debt in an alternative measure of liquidity which is based on positive bank wealth instead of
bank deposits. Table 14 shows the estimated coefficients of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting
model when we control for positive bank wealth. The conclusions do not change: we find no
evidence of present bias, and no significant association with net wealth or liquidity.21 In fact,
none of the control variables are significantly correlated with present bias. Figure 10 shows
the predicted values of the β-parameter across net wealth quartiles and liquidity constraints.
We observe some variation in the estimated β-parameter, but it is not significantly different
from 1 for any of the net wealth quartiles or liquidity constraints.
21The p-value of a one-sided t-test that β = 1 against the alternative hypothesis that β < 1 is equal
to 0.237 for the constant term in the equation, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exponential
discounting.
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Table 14: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Positive Bank Wealth
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Present Bias β
Constant 0.978 0.031 0.000 { 0.917; 1.039 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.013 0.017 0.461 {-0.021; 0.047 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.012 0.014 0.401 {-0.016; 0.040 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.004 0.013 0.761 {-0.022; 0.030 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.011 0.018 0.556 {-0.047; 0.025 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.010 0.028 0.715 {-0.045; 0.066 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.014 0.036 0.700 {-0.056; 0.084 }
4th Income Quartile 0.017 0.043 0.704 {-0.069; 0.102 }
Female 0.004 0.018 0.808 {-0.031; 0.040 }
30-39 Years -0.006 0.020 0.751 {-0.045; 0.033 }
40-49 Years -0.009 0.025 0.703 {-0.058; 0.039 }
50-59 Years 0.004 0.023 0.874 {-0.041; 0.048 }
60 Years and older 0.023 0.019 0.228 {-0.014; 0.059 }
Highschool Graduate 0.003 0.010 0.750 {-0.016; 0.023 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.014 0.028 0.615 {-0.069; 0.041 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.012 0.036 0.733 {-0.082; 0.058 }
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.159 0.044 0.000 { 0.074; 0.244 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.020 0.027 0.462 {-0.033; 0.072 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.015 0.037 0.690 {-0.088; 0.058 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.053 0.027 0.052 {-0.106; 0.000 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.113 0.104 0.276 {-0.316; 0.090 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.027 0.040 0.500 {-0.105; 0.051 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.028 0.047 0.542 {-0.120; 0.063 }
4th Income Quartile -0.026 0.049 0.597 {-0.122; 0.070 }
Female -0.037 0.020 0.061 {-0.076; 0.002 }
30-39 Years 0.032 0.039 0.416 {-0.045; 0.109 }
40-49 years 0.026 0.027 0.344 {-0.028; 0.079 }
50-59 Years 0.029 0.035 0.411 {-0.040; 0.097 }
60 Years and older 0.013 0.061 0.829 {-0.106; 0.133 }
Highschool Graduate 0.002 0.043 0.964 {-0.083; 0.087 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.034 0.061 0.581 {-0.153; 0.086 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.070 0.114 0.536 {-0.293; 0.153 }
Note: We jointly estimate quasi-hyperbolic discounting and utility curvature using maximum likelihood and
use frequency weights (fweight=50) with respect to observations from the risk aversion task. The full set of
of estimates including stochastic error terms is documented in Appendix A.
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Figure 10: Predicted Present Bias by Net Wealth and Positive Bank Wealth
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Finally, we investigate the association between present bias and alternative measures of
net wealth and liquidity. Table 15 reports the results from those estimations, which control
for utility curvature and include covariates for income, sex, age and education. In panels (A)
and (B), we replace the net wealth quartiles with a binary indicator for positive net wealth.
The conclusions are the same as before: the β-coefficient is not significantly different from
1, and the measure of liquidity has no significant effect on present bias. In panels (C) and
(D) we replace the measures of net wealth and income with alternative measures that are
based on average net wealth and income over a 3-year period instead of 1 year. The results
do not change and we continue to find no evidence in favor of present bias and no significant
correlation with net wealth and liquidity.22
22The marginal effects of net wealth on the estimated δ-parameter are robust in these estimations, with
the exception of panel D.
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Table 15: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting - Sensitivity Analysis
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
(A) Positive Net Wealth and Positive Bank Assets
Present Bias β:
Constant 1.003 0.019 0.000 { 0.965; 1.041 }
Positive Bank Assets -0.002 0.008 0.822 { -0.018; 0.014 }
Positive Net Wealth -0.003 0.008 0.726 { -0.019; 0.013 }
Discount Rate δ:
Constant 0.173 0.030 0.000 { 0.113; 0.232 }
Positive Bank Assets 0.015 0.019 0.439 { -0.023; 0.053 }
Positive Net Wealth -0.062 0.026 0.015 { -0.112; -0.012 }
(B) Positive Net Wealth and Positive Bank Wealth
Present Bias β:
Constant 0.999 0.013 0.000 { 0.974; 1.024 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.005 0.007 0.518 { -0.010; 0.019 }
Positive Net Wealth -0.005 0.008 0.566 { -0.021; 0.012 }
Discount Rate δ:
Constant 0.182 0.031 0.000 { 0.122; 0.242 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.023 0.028 0.411 { -0.031; 0.077 }
Positive Net Wealth -0.071 0.026 0.007 { -0.123; -0.019 }
(C) 3yr Average Net Wealth Quartile and Positive Bank Assets
Present Bias β:
Constant 0.993 0.015 0.000 { 0.963; 1.023 }
Positive Bank Assets -0.003 0.010 0.797 { -0.023; 0.018 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.008 0.016 0.630 { -0.023; 0.039 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.012 0.019 0.548 { -0.026; 0.049 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile 0.003 0.022 0.905 { -0.041; 0.046 }
Discount Rate δ:
Constant 0.196 0.043 0.000 { 0.112; 0.279 }
Positive Bank Assets 0.007 0.023 0.752 { -0.038; 0.052 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.058 0.054 0.287 { -0.164; 0.048 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.075 0.040 0.061 { -0.152; 0.003 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.084 0.043 0.052 { -0.169; 0.001 }
(D) 3yr Average Net Wealth Quartile and Positive Bank Wealth
Present Bias β:
Constant 0.995 0.012 0.000 { 0.972; 1.018 }
Positive Bank Wealth -0.002 0.007 0.824 { -0.015; 0.012 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.002 0.012 0.872 { -0.022; 0.026 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.007 0.007 0.304 { -0.007; 0.021 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.001 0.008 0.868 { -0.017; 0.015 }
Discount Rate δ:
Constant 0.228 0.075 0.002 { 0.081; 0.375 }
Positive Bank Wealth -0.045 0.080 0.574 { -0.203; 0.112 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.085 0.055 0.120 { -0.193; 0.022 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.065 0.040 0.103 { -0.143; 0.013 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.042 0.079 0.590 { -0.197; 0.112 }
Note: We jointly estimate quasi-hyperbolic discounting and utility curvature using maximum likelihood and
use frequency weights (fweight=50) with respect to observations from the risk aversion task. The variables
included in the estimations are similar to those in Tables 13 and 14, and the full set of of estimates is
available upon request.
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6 Conclusion
We use a unique combination of data on individual discount rates from a field experiment
with a representative sample of the Danish population and administrative data on income
and financial wealth. Our analysis leads to two important insights. First, we find a negative
association between net wealth and individual discount rates, with wealthier subjects having
significantly lower individual discount rates than less wealthy subjects. Second, we do not
find a significant association between present bias and deposits of liquid asset.
The first result of our analysis, a negative correlation between net wealth and individual
discount rates, is consistent with economic theory on saving and capital accumulation; more
patient individuals accumulate more savings and capital than less patient individuals. No
other study has so far combined experimental data on individual discount rates from a
broad sample of a population with reliable administrative data on accumulated financial
wealth and asset classes. Our results confirm the findings by Pender (1996) and Yesuf and
Bluffstone (2008), who combine experimental data on discount rates with survey data on
broad definitions of wealth in developing countries.
We cannot identify the direction of causality but only estimate the correlation between
net wealth and individual discount rates. Pender (1996) suggests that differences in individ-
ual discount rates across different levels of wealth are due to differences in financial liquidity
constraints and opportunity interest rates. This interpretation follows Fisher’s (1930)
Theory of Interest, in which choices over time delayed rewards identify opportunity interest
rates. Under the alternative interpretation that intertemporal choices in experiments are
made irrespective of capital market opportunities, individual discount rates may be a cause
of wealth accumulation, which is consistent with the assumptions in life cycle models of
individual saving and investment behavior.
To identify the extent to which financial wealth leads to more patient decisions in
experiments, one would require exogenous changes in net wealth and measure discount rates
before and after these exogenous changes at the individual level. A recent study related
to this question is Dean and Sautmann (2014). They combine data on weekly income
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and consumption from a household survey in Mali with data from repeated incentivized
discounting tasks and find that the marginal rate of substitution over delayed rewards is
correlated with financial shocks. This result indicates that there is a causal effect from net
wealth on individual discount rates.
The second result of our analysis, that there is no significant association between present
bias and financial liquidity, has important theoretical and policy implications. In particular,
our results challenge the assumption of present bias in discounting models: we find no
evidence of present biased time preferences. Laibson (1997) highlights the risks posed by
easy access to consumer credit via financial instruments such as credit cards, since these
instruments allow subjects to consume more in the short term at the expense of future
consumption. However, we do not observe a significant association between consumer debt
and present bias, which does not provide support for restricting access to consumer credit.
Our results stand in contrast to the conclusions by Meier and Sprenger (2010), but there
are several important differences to consider between their study and ours. First, the two
samples are very different: our sample is representative of the adult Danish population,
whereas the sample in Meier and Sprenger (2010) is predominantly low-income individuals
from the United States seeking assistance with their tax returns. Second, while we consider
assets and liabilities in our measures of wealth and liquidity, they only consider liabilities.
To make definite conclusions regarding the connection between present bias and financial
wealth, further empirical evidence will be useful.
99
References
Andersen, Steffen, Glenn Harrison, Morten Lau, and Elisabet Rutstroem (2014), “Discount-
ing behavior: A reconsideration.” European Economic Review, 71, 15–33.
Andersen, Steffen, Glenn W Harrison, Morten I Lau, and Elisabet E Rutström (2008),
“Eliciting risk and time preferences.” Econometrica, 76, 583–618.
Andreoni, James and Charles Sprenger (2012a), “Estimating time preferences from convex
budgets.” The American Economic Review, 102, 3333–3356.
Andreoni, James and Charles Sprenger (2012b), “Risk preferences are not time preferences.”
The American Economic Review, 102, 3357–3376.
Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen
Weinberg (2001), “The hyperbolic consumption model: Calibration, simulation, and
empirical evaluation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 47–68.
Becker, Robert A (1980), “On the long-run steady state in a simple dynamic model of
equilibrium with heterogeneous households.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 375–
382.
Carroll, Christopher D (1997), “Buffer-stock saving and the life cycle/permanent income
hypothesis.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 1–55.
Cheung, Stephen L (2015), “Comment on "risk preferences are not time preferences": On the
elicitation of time preference under conditions of risk.” The American Economic Review,
105, 2242–2260.
Dean, Mark and Anja Sautmann (2014), “Credit constraints and the measurement of time
preferences.” Working Paper.
Deaton, Angus (1991), “Saving and liquidity constraints.” Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, 1221–1248.
100
Dohmen, Thomas, Benjamin Enke, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde (2015),
“Patience and the wealth of nations.” Working Paper.
Epstein, Larry G and J Allan Hynes (1983), “The rate of time preference and dynamic
economic analysis.” The Journal of Political Economy, 611–635.
Fechner, Gustav (1966), Elements of psychophysics. Vol. I. (tr. H.E. Adler). New York:
Reinehart and Winston.
Fisher, Irving (1930), The theory of interest. New York: Macmillan.
Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’donoghue (2002), “Time discounting and
time preference: A critical review.” Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 351–401.
Hall, Robert E (1978), “Stochastic implications of the life cycle-permanent income hypoth-
esis: Theory and evidence.” The Journal of Political Economy, 971–987.
Harrison, Glenn W, Morten I Lau, and Elisabet E Rutström (2010), “Individual discount
rates and smoking: Evidence from a field experiment in denmark.” Journal of Health
Economics, 29, 708–717.
Harrison, Glenn W, Morten I Lau, and Melonie B Williams (2002), “Estimating individual
discount rates in denmark: A field experiment.” American Economic Review, 1606–1617.
Hendricks, Lutz (2007), “How important is discount rate heterogeneity for wealth inequal-
ity?” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 3042–3068.
Holt, Charles A and Susan K Laury (2002), “Risk aversion and incentive effects.” American
Economic Review, 92, 1644–1655.
Khwaja, Ahmed, Dan Silverman, and Frank Sloan (2007), “Time preference, time discount-
ing, and smoking decisions.” Journal of Health Economics, 26, 927–949.
Kirby, Kris N, Ricardo Godoy, Victoria Reyes-Garcıa, Elizabeth Byron, Lilian Apaza,
William Leonard, Eddy Perez, Vincent Vadez, and David Wilkie (2002), “Correlates of
101
delay-discount rates: Evidence from tsimane’amerindians of the bolivian rain forest.”
Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 291–316.
Kirby, Kris N, Nancy M Petry, and Warren K Bickel (1999), “Heroin addicts have higher
discount rates for delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls.” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 128, 78.
Komlos, John, Patricia K Smith, and Barry Bogin (2004), “Obesity and the rate of time
preference: is there a connection?” Journal of Biosocial Science, 36, 209–219.
Krusell, Per and Anthony A Smith, Jr (1998), “Income and wealth heterogeneity in the
macroeconomy.” Journal of Political Economy, 106, 867–896.
Laibson, David (1997), “Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 443–477.
Laibson, David, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman (2007), “Estimating discount
functions with consumption choices over the lifecycle.”
Lawrance, Emily C (1991), “Poverty and the rate of time preference: evidence from panel
data.” Journal of Political Economy, 54–77.
Leth-Petersen, Søren (2010), “Intertemporal consumption and credit constraints: Does total
expenditure respond to an exogenous shock to credit?” The American Economic Review,
1080–1103.
Lucas Jr, Robert E and Nancy L Stokey (1984), “Optimal growth with many consumers.”
Journal of Economic Theory, 32, 139–171.
Meier, Stephan and Charles Sprenger (2010), “Present-biased preferences and credit card
borrowing.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 193–210.
Pender, John L (1996), “Discount rates and credit markets: Theory and evidence from rural
india.” Journal of Development Economics, 50, 257–296.
102
Phelps, Edmund S and Robert A Pollak (1968), “On second-best national saving and game-
equilibrium growth.” The Review of Economic Studies, 185–199.
Rae, John (1834), “The sociological theory of capital.”
Ramsey, Frank Plumpton (1928), “A mathematical theory of saving.” The Economic
Journal, 543–559.
Samuelson, Paul A (1937), “A note on measurement of utility.” The Review of Economic
Studies, 4, 155–161.
Statistics Denmark (2010), “Danmark i tal 2010.”
Tanaka, Tomomi, Colin F Camerer, and Quang Nguyen (2010), “Risk and time preferences:
linking experimental and household survey data from vietnam.” The American Economic
Review, 100, 557–571.
Wilcox, Nathaniel T (2011), “Stochastically more risk averse: A contextual theory of
stochastic discrete choice under risk.” Journal of Econometrics, 162, 89–104.
Yesuf, Mahmud and Randall Bluffstone (2008), “Wealth and time preference in rural
ethiopia.” Working Paper.
103
Appendix A
Complete Estimation Results
We present estimation results for Tables 10 11, 13, and 14, including the estimates for
stochastic errors and curvature.23 We describe the estimation models in Section 3.2. For
risk choices, we include a contextual stochastic error, and for discounting choices, we include
a Fechner error.
We include covariates for the time delay of the discounting choice in the stochastic
error for discounting choices. The higher the delay, the higher the stochastic error in all
estimations.24 This result is consistent with the fact that a higher time delay results in a
higher latent index. The higher stochastic error for these choices normalizes the magnitude
of the latent index to comparable levels across treatments.
Table 16: Exponential Discounting under Linear Utility - Complete Set of Estimates
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.282 0.072 0.000 { 0.141; 0.423 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.028 0.069 0.689 {-0.162; 0.107 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.094 0.048 0.050 {-0.187; -0.000 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.114 0.057 0.045 {-0.225; -0.002 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.057 0.069 0.408 {-0.192; 0.078 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.049 0.062 0.427 {-0.171; 0.072 }
4th Income Quartile -0.098 0.065 0.132 {-0.227; 0.030 }
Female -0.009 0.044 0.836 {-0.096; 0.077 }
30-39 Years 0.080 0.060 0.185 {-0.038; 0.198 }
40-49 years 0.030 0.058 0.609 {-0.084; 0.144 }
50-59 Years 0.005 0.074 0.949 {-0.141; 0.150 }
60 Years and older -0.060 0.071 0.395 {-0.199; 0.079 }
Highschool Graduate 0.051 0.049 0.302 {-0.046; 0.147 }
Higher Education, Bachelor 0.049 0.058 0.400 {-0.065; 0.164 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. 0.036 0.071 0.610 {-0.103; 0.176 }
23The complete estimation results for all robustness checks in Tables 12 and 15 are available from the
authors upon request.
24In the quasi-hyperbolic discounting estimates, the estimates are not statistically significantly different
form zero but have the same point estimates as in the other estimations.
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Stochastic Error Discounting ln(µIDR)
Constant 3.841 0.601 0.000 { 2.663; 5.019 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.173 0.371 0.641 {-0.554; 0.901 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.061 0.260 0.815 {-0.570; 0.448 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.002 0.248 0.994 {-0.488; 0.484 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.230 0.338 0.495 {-0.892; 0.431 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.211 0.346 0.542 {-0.888; 0.467 }
4th Income Quartile -0.603 0.398 0.130 {-1.384; 0.177 }
Female 0.272 0.207 0.189 {-0.134; 0.677 }
30-39 Years 0.280 0.256 0.274 {-0.221; 0.782 }
40-49 years 0.224 0.275 0.414 {-0.314; 0.762 }
50-59 Years 0.271 0.368 0.462 {-0.450; 0.992 }
60 Years and older 0.764 0.316 0.015 { 0.146; 1.383 }
Highschool Graduate -0.179 0.239 0.452 {-0.647; 0.288 }
Higher Education, Bachelor 0.076 0.307 0.804 {-0.525; 0.677 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.015 0.346 0.965 {-0.692; 0.662 }
T: Low Stakes -0.551 0.206 0.008 {-0.956; -0.147 }
T: 1 Month Horizon 0.280 0.333 0.401 {-0.373; 0.933 }
T: 2 Month Horizon 0.659 0.352 0.061 {-0.032; 1.350 }
T: 3 Month Horizon 0.648 0.450 0.150 {-0.234; 1.530 }
T: 4 Month Horizon 1.140 0.385 0.003 { 0.385; 1.895 }
T: 5 Month Horizon 1.298 0.420 0.002 { 0.475; 2.121 }
T: 6 Month Horizon 1.357 0.423 0.001 { 0.529; 2.186 }
T: 7 Month Horizon 1.463 0.446 0.001 { 0.588; 2.338 }
T: 8 Month Horizon 1.607 0.423 0.000 { 0.778; 2.436 }
T: 9 Month Horizon 1.717 0.482 0.000 { 0.772; 2.662 }
T: 10 Month Horizon 1.777 0.440 0.000 { 0.915; 2.638 }
T: 11 Month Horizon 1.783 0.434 0.000 { 0.932; 2.633 }
T: 12 Month Horizon 1.900 0.441 0.000 { 1.036; 2.765 }
Table 17: Exponential Discounting controlling for Utility Curvature - Complete Set
of Estimates
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.185 0.039 0.000 { 0.109; 0.261 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.027 0.033 0.406 {-0.091; 0.037 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.054 0.026 0.038 {-0.106; -0.003 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.054 0.029 0.064 {-0.111; 0.003 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.031 0.036 0.391 {-0.101; 0.040 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.047 0.033 0.163 {-0.112; 0.019 }
4th Income Quartile -0.044 0.035 0.204 {-0.113; 0.024 }
Female -0.027 0.023 0.246 {-0.073; 0.019 }
30-39 Years 0.045 0.034 0.193 {-0.023; 0.112 }
40-49 Years 0.024 0.031 0.438 {-0.037; 0.085 }
50-59 Years 0.014 0.036 0.700 {-0.057; 0.085 }
60 Years and older -0.033 0.037 0.371 {-0.106; 0.039 }
Highschool Graduate -0.006 0.027 0.824 {-0.060; 0.047 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.016 0.032 0.621 {-0.079; 0.047 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.023 0.041 0.574 {-0.104; 0.058 }
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Utility Curvature r
Constant 0.295 0.085 0.001 { 0.127; 0.462 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.077 0.077 0.318 {-0.075; 0.229 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.086 0.077 0.260 {-0.064; 0.237 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.054 0.091 0.557 {-0.232; 0.125 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.032 0.083 0.696 {-0.130; 0.194 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.148 0.103 0.150 {-0.053; 0.349 }
4th Income Quartile -0.007 0.100 0.944 {-0.204; 0.189 }
Female 0.174 0.056 0.002 { 0.065; 0.284 }
30-39 Years -0.005 0.098 0.958 {-0.197; 0.186 }
40-49 Years -0.003 0.093 0.972 {-0.185; 0.178 }
50-59 Years 0.058 0.087 0.503 {-0.112; 0.228 }
60 Years and older 0.189 0.120 0.115 {-0.046; 0.424 }
Highschool Graduate 0.132 0.078 0.088 {-0.020; 0.284 }
Higher Education, Bachelor 0.167 0.088 0.058 {-0.006; 0.339 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. 0.181 0.116 0.117 {-0.045; 0.407 }
Stochastic Error Discounting ln(µIDR)
Constant 1.681 0.952 0.077 {-0.184; 3.546 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.581 0.752 0.440 {-2.055; 0.894 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.834 0.692 0.228 {-2.190; 0.522 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile 0.375 0.800 0.640 {-1.194; 1.944 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.437 0.735 0.552 {-1.877; 1.004 }
3rd Income Quartile -1.312 0.840 0.118 {-2.957; 0.334 }
4th Income Quartile -0.568 0.897 0.526 {-2.326; 1.189 }
Female -1.135 0.495 0.022 {-2.104; -0.165 }
30-39 Years 0.233 0.743 0.754 {-1.224; 1.689 }
40-49 Years 0.132 0.798 0.869 {-1.432; 1.697 }
50-59 Years -0.335 0.800 0.676 {-1.902; 1.233 }
60 Years and older -0.930 1.079 0.389 {-3.044; 1.185 }
Highschool Graduate -1.117 0.629 0.076 {-2.350; 0.115 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -1.058 0.757 0.162 {-2.542; 0.425 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -1.293 0.983 0.188 {-3.219; 0.634 }
T: Low Stakes -0.103 0.240 0.668 {-0.573; 0.368 }
T: 1 Month Horizon 0.099 0.411 0.810 {-0.707; 0.904 }
T: 2 Month Horizon 0.519 0.400 0.195 {-0.266; 1.303 }
T: 3 Month Horizon 0.415 0.492 0.398 {-0.548; 1.379 }
T: 4 Month Horizon 0.929 0.422 0.028 { 0.103; 1.756 }
T: 5 Month Horizon 1.094 0.469 0.020 { 0.174; 2.014 }
T: 6 Month Horizon 1.188 0.456 0.009 { 0.294; 2.082 }
T: 7 Month Horizon 1.213 0.483 0.012 { 0.266; 2.159 }
T: 8 Month Horizon 1.364 0.487 0.005 { 0.410; 2.318 }
T: 9 Month Horizon 1.424 0.515 0.006 { 0.415; 2.433 }
T: 10 Month Horizon 1.529 0.485 0.002 { 0.579; 2.478 }
T: 11 Month Horizon 1.544 0.478 0.001 { 0.607; 2.480 }
T: 12 Month Horizon 1.609 0.485 0.001 { 0.659; 2.559 }
Stochastic Error Risk ln(µRA)
Constant -2.237 0.133 0.000 {-2.498; -1.976 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.058 0.119 0.628 {-0.175; 0.290 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.032 0.113 0.774 {-0.254; 0.189 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.121 0.125 0.333 {-0.366; 0.124 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.013 0.115 0.908 {-0.213; 0.239 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.151 0.135 0.264 {-0.114; 0.416 }
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4th Income Quartile -0.157 0.151 0.299 {-0.453; 0.139 }
Female -0.007 0.079 0.925 {-0.162; 0.147 }
30-39 Years 0.254 0.138 0.065 {-0.016; 0.524 }
40-49 Years 0.416 0.118 0.000 { 0.184; 0.648 }
50-59 Years 0.381 0.121 0.002 { 0.143; 0.618 }
60 Years and older 0.859 0.126 0.000 { 0.611; 1.106 }
Highschool Graduate -0.161 0.103 0.118 {-0.362; 0.041 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.249 0.121 0.040 {-0.486; -0.011 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.201 0.164 0.220 {-0.521; 0.120 }
Table 18: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Positive Bank Assets - Complete Set of
Estimates
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Present Bias β
Constant 0.989 0.013 0.000 { 0.963; 1.015 }
Positive Bank Assets -0.002 0.007 0.761 {-0.016; 0.012 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.010 0.013 0.451 {-0.016; 0.036 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.005 0.013 0.683 {-0.020; 0.031 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.004 0.011 0.748 {-0.026; 0.018 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.001 0.013 0.953 {-0.024; 0.025 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.001 0.015 0.930 {-0.028; 0.031 }
4th Income Quartile 0.003 0.016 0.859 {-0.028; 0.034 }
Female -0.001 0.013 0.958 {-0.025; 0.024 }
30-39 Years -0.002 0.014 0.904 {-0.030; 0.027 }
40-49 Years -0.004 0.021 0.849 {-0.046; 0.038 }
50-59 Years 0.008 0.023 0.716 {-0.036; 0.053 }
60 Years and older 0.019 0.020 0.354 {-0.021; 0.058 }
Highschool Graduate 0.004 0.009 0.617 {-0.013; 0.022 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.004 0.014 0.770 {-0.032; 0.024 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.003 0.023 0.912 {-0.048; 0.043 }
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.158 0.040 0.000 { 0.080; 0.235 }
Positive Bank Assets 0.008 0.019 0.650 {-0.028; 0.045 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.016 0.039 0.686 {-0.093; 0.061 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.050 0.030 0.100 {-0.109; 0.009 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.081 0.049 0.098 {-0.177; 0.015 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.036 0.033 0.281 {-0.101; 0.029 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.038 0.037 0.310 {-0.111; 0.035 }
4th Income Quartile -0.036 0.039 0.356 {-0.112; 0.040 }
Female -0.034 0.025 0.164 {-0.082; 0.014 }
30-39 Years 0.036 0.031 0.252 {-0.026; 0.098 }
40-49 Years 0.026 0.030 0.396 {-0.033; 0.084 }
50-59 Years 0.025 0.037 0.509 {-0.049; 0.098 }
60 Years and older 0.001 0.055 0.989 {-0.106; 0.108 }
Highschool Graduate 0.011 0.047 0.823 {-0.082; 0.103 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.016 0.051 0.747 {-0.117; 0.084 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.045 0.083 0.591 {-0.208; 0.118 }
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Utility Curvature r
Constant 0.347 0.089 0.000 { 0.173; 0.521 }
Positive Bank Assets -0.101 0.056 0.072 {-0.211; 0.009 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.091 0.077 0.235 {-0.059; 0.242 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.119 0.076 0.119 {-0.031; 0.269 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.023 0.090 0.801 {-0.198; 0.153 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.034 0.083 0.681 {-0.129; 0.197 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.153 0.103 0.138 {-0.049; 0.355 }
4th Income Quartile -0.003 0.102 0.975 {-0.202; 0.196 }
Female 0.174 0.056 0.002 { 0.064; 0.283 }
30-39 Years -0.012 0.096 0.901 {-0.201; 0.177 }
40-49 Years -0.021 0.092 0.817 {-0.201; 0.158 }
50-59 Years 0.052 0.087 0.546 {-0.118; 0.223 }
60 Years and older 0.192 0.122 0.114 {-0.046; 0.430 }
Highschool Graduate 0.127 0.079 0.109 {-0.028; 0.281 }
Higher Education, Bachelor 0.172 0.089 0.054 {-0.003; 0.347 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. 0.185 0.116 0.112 {-0.043; 0.413 }
Stochastic Error Risk ln(µRA)
Constant -2.180 0.144 0.000 {-2.463; -1.897 }
Positive Bank Assets -0.076 0.093 0.415 {-0.259; 0.107 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.064 0.120 0.594 {-0.171; 0.298 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.005 0.119 0.964 {-0.239; 0.228 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.092 0.132 0.484 {-0.350; 0.166 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.022 0.116 0.848 {-0.205; 0.249 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.163 0.135 0.225 {-0.101; 0.427 }
4th Income Quartile -0.150 0.150 0.317 {-0.444; 0.144 }
Female -0.013 0.079 0.868 {-0.168; 0.142 }
30-39 Years 0.218 0.139 0.115 {-0.054; 0.490 }
40-49 Years 0.378 0.118 0.001 { 0.147; 0.609 }
50-59 Years 0.363 0.122 0.003 { 0.124; 0.601 }
60 Years and older 0.849 0.127 0.000 { 0.600; 1.098 }
Highschool Graduate -0.174 0.104 0.094 {-0.377; 0.030 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.253 0.121 0.037 {-0.490; -0.016 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.210 0.165 0.203 {-0.533; 0.113 }
Stochastic Error Discounting ln(µIDR)
Constant 1.572 1.388 0.257 {-1.149; 4.293 }
Positive Bank Assets 0.871 0.542 0.108 {-0.192; 1.934 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.693 1.156 0.549 {-2.959; 1.573 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -1.173 0.827 0.156 {-2.794; 0.449 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile 0.375 0.940 0.690 {-1.468; 2.218 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.465 0.812 0.567 {-2.057; 1.126 }
3rd Income Quartile -1.465 1.285 0.254 {-3.983; 1.052 }
4th Income Quartile -0.776 1.105 0.483 {-2.942; 1.391 }
Female -1.071 0.576 0.063 {-2.200; 0.058 }
30-39 Years 0.228 0.975 0.815 {-1.684; 2.140 }
40-49 Years 0.323 1.096 0.768 {-1.824; 2.470 }
50-59 Years -0.156 1.081 0.885 {-2.275; 1.963 }
60 Years and older -1.059 1.148 0.356 {-3.309; 1.190 }
Highschool Graduate -1.323 0.705 0.061 {-2.705; 0.059 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -1.265 0.816 0.121 {-2.864; 0.334 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -1.145 1.194 0.338 {-3.486; 1.197 }
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T: Low Stakes 0.048 0.642 0.940 {-1.211; 1.307 }
T: 1 Month Horizon -0.096 0.653 0.883 {-1.377; 1.184 }
T: 2 Month Horizon 0.194 0.906 0.831 {-1.583; 1.970 }
T: 3 Month Horizon 0.144 0.930 0.877 {-1.680; 1.967 }
T: 4 Month Horizon 0.683 0.914 0.455 {-1.108; 2.475 }
T: 5 Month Horizon 0.885 0.917 0.335 {-0.913; 2.683 }
T: 6 Month Horizon 0.934 0.936 0.318 {-0.901; 2.769 }
T: 7 Month Horizon 0.999 0.918 0.276 {-0.800; 2.798 }
T: 8 Month Horizon 1.107 0.912 0.225 {-0.681; 2.895 }
T: 9 Month Horizon 1.146 0.937 0.221 {-0.690; 2.982 }
T: 10 Month Horizon 1.267 0.969 0.191 {-0.633; 3.167 }
T: 11 Month Horizon 1.245 0.942 0.187 {-0.602; 3.092 }
T: 12 Month Horizon 1.385 0.925 0.134 {-0.428; 3.198 }
T: Front End Delay 0.023 0.298 0.939 {-0.561; 0.607 }
Table 19: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and Positive Bank Wealth - Complete Set of
Estimates
Coefficient Standard Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
Present Bias β
Constant 0.978 0.031 0.000 { 0.917; 1.039 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.013 0.017 0.461 {-0.021; 0.047 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.012 0.014 0.401 {-0.016; 0.040 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.004 0.013 0.761 {-0.022; 0.030 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.011 0.018 0.556 {-0.047; 0.025 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.010 0.028 0.715 {-0.045; 0.066 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.014 0.036 0.700 {-0.056; 0.084 }
4th Income Quartile 0.017 0.043 0.704 {-0.069; 0.102 }
Female 0.004 0.018 0.808 {-0.031; 0.040 }
30-39 Years -0.006 0.020 0.751 {-0.045; 0.033 }
40-49 Years -0.009 0.025 0.703 {-0.058; 0.039 }
50-59 Years 0.004 0.023 0.874 {-0.041; 0.048 }
60 Years and older 0.023 0.019 0.228 {-0.014; 0.059 }
Highschool Graduate 0.003 0.010 0.750 {-0.016; 0.023 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.014 0.028 0.615 {-0.069; 0.041 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.012 0.036 0.733 {-0.082; 0.058 }
Discount Rate δ
Constant 0.159 0.044 0.000 { 0.074; 0.244 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.020 0.027 0.462 {-0.033; 0.072 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -0.015 0.037 0.690 {-0.088; 0.058 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.053 0.027 0.052 {-0.106; 0.000 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.113 0.104 0.276 {-0.316; 0.090 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.027 0.040 0.500 {-0.105; 0.051 }
3rd Income Quartile -0.028 0.047 0.542 {-0.120; 0.063 }
4th Income Quartile -0.026 0.049 0.597 {-0.122; 0.070 }
Female -0.037 0.020 0.061 {-0.076; 0.002 }
30-39 Years 0.032 0.039 0.416 {-0.045; 0.109 }
40-49 years 0.026 0.027 0.344 {-0.028; 0.079 }
50-59 Years 0.029 0.035 0.411 {-0.040; 0.097 }
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60 Years and older 0.013 0.061 0.829 {-0.106; 0.133 }
Highschool Graduate 0.002 0.043 0.964 {-0.083; 0.087 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.034 0.061 0.581 {-0.153; 0.086 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.070 0.114 0.536 {-0.293; 0.153 }
Utility Curvature r
Constant 0.297 0.088 0.001 { 0.126; 0.469 }
Positive Bank Wealth -0.039 0.066 0.553 {-0.167; 0.090 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.088 0.079 0.265 {-0.067; 0.243 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile 0.111 0.082 0.177 {-0.050; 0.271 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.032 0.097 0.742 {-0.222; 0.158 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.029 0.083 0.725 {-0.133; 0.192 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.148 0.103 0.154 {-0.055; 0.350 }
4th Income Quartile -0.011 0.101 0.915 {-0.210; 0.188 }
Female 0.177 0.056 0.002 { 0.067; 0.287 }
30-39 Years -0.011 0.099 0.908 {-0.206; 0.184 }
40-49 years -0.006 0.095 0.953 {-0.191; 0.180 }
50-59 Years 0.056 0.089 0.528 {-0.118; 0.230 }
60 Years and older 0.191 0.121 0.113 {-0.045; 0.427 }
Highschool Graduate 0.135 0.078 0.083 {-0.018; 0.288 }
Higher Education, Bachelor 0.168 0.088 0.058 {-0.006; 0.341 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. 0.187 0.116 0.106 {-0.040; 0.413 }
Stochastic Error Risk ln(µRA)
Constant -2.226 0.137 0.000 {-2.493; -1.958 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.015 0.099 0.879 {-0.179; 0.209 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile 0.055 0.120 0.649 {-0.181; 0.290 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -0.047 0.127 0.711 {-0.296; 0.202 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile -0.132 0.141 0.348 {-0.408; 0.144 }
2nd Income Quartile 0.017 0.116 0.885 {-0.211; 0.245 }
3rd Income Quartile 0.159 0.136 0.244 {-0.108; 0.426 }
4th Income Quartile -0.149 0.153 0.329 {-0.449; 0.150 }
Female -0.011 0.080 0.890 {-0.168; 0.146 }
30-39 Years 0.242 0.145 0.095 {-0.042; 0.527 }
40-49 years 0.406 0.123 0.001 { 0.166; 0.647 }
50-59 Years 0.366 0.125 0.003 { 0.121; 0.611 }
60 Years and older 0.851 0.126 0.000 { 0.604; 1.098 }
Highschool Graduate -0.168 0.103 0.102 {-0.369; 0.033 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -0.254 0.122 0.037 {-0.492; -0.015 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -0.210 0.163 0.199 {-0.529; 0.110 }
Stochastic Error Discounting ln(µIDR)
Constant 2.577 1.806 0.154 {-0.963; 6.117 }
Positive Bank Wealth 0.248 0.655 0.705 {-1.035; 1.531 }
2nd Net Wealth Quartile -1.043 1.391 0.454 {-3.770; 1.684 }
3rd Net Wealth Quartile -1.257 0.899 0.162 {-3.020; 0.505 }
4th Net Wealth Quartile 0.621 1.040 0.551 {-1.418; 2.660 }
2nd Income Quartile -0.766 1.182 0.517 {-3.081; 1.550 }
3rd Income Quartile -2.055 1.871 0.272 {-5.723; 1.612 }
4th Income Quartile -1.221 1.837 0.506 {-4.821; 2.380 }
Female -1.133 0.547 0.038 {-2.205; -0.061 }
30-39 Years 0.609 1.257 0.628 {-1.855; 3.073 }
40-49 years 0.536 1.223 0.661 {-1.860; 2.933 }
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50-59 Years 0.257 1.462 0.860 {-2.608; 3.122 }
60 Years and older -0.766 1.193 0.520 {-3.104; 1.571 }
Highschool Graduate -1.411 0.666 0.034 {-2.716; -0.106 }
Higher Education, Bachelor -1.255 0.765 0.101 {-2.754; 0.244 }
Higher Education, Master a.a. -1.054 1.175 0.370 {-3.358; 1.249 }
T: Low Stakes 0.200 0.710 0.779 {-1.192; 1.592 }
T: 1 Month Horizon -0.287 0.552 0.603 {-1.370; 0.795 }
T: 2 Month Horizon -0.063 0.738 0.932 {-1.509; 1.383 }
T: 3 Month Horizon -0.136 0.766 0.859 {-1.637; 1.365 }
T: 4 Month Horizon 0.431 0.755 0.568 {-1.050; 1.911 }
T: 5 Month Horizon 0.530 0.841 0.529 {-1.119; 2.179 }
T: 6 Month Horizon 0.656 0.803 0.414 {-0.917; 2.230 }
T: 7 Month Horizon 0.728 0.766 0.342 {-0.773; 2.229 }
T: 8 Month Horizon 0.754 0.888 0.396 {-0.988; 2.495 }
T: 9 Month Horizon 0.878 0.776 0.258 {-0.643; 2.399 }
T: 10 Month Horizon 1.017 0.774 0.189 {-0.500; 2.534 }
T: 11 Month Horizon 0.932 0.833 0.264 {-0.702; 2.565 }
T: 12 Month Horizon 1.157 0.748 0.122 {-0.309; 2.623 }
T: Front End Delay -0.022 0.336 0.949 {-0.680; 0.637 }
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Abstract 
 
We compare several popular survey instruments of gambling behavior and gambling propensity to 
assess if they differ in their classification of individuals in the general adult Danish population. We 
also examine correlations with standard survey instruments for alcohol use, anxiety, depression and 
impulsiveness. A feature of our design is that nobody was excluded on the basis of their response to a 
“trigger,” “gateway” or “diagnostic item” question about previous gambling history. Our sample 
consists of 8,405 adult Danes. We administered the Focal Adult Gambling Screen to all subjects and 
find that 95% of the population has no detectable risk, 2.9% has an early risk, 0.8% has an 
intermediate risk, 0.7% has an advanced risk, and 0.2% can be classified as problem gamblers. There is 
a significant correlation with the scores of other gambling risk instruments and the instruments 
measuring alcohol use, anxiety, depression and impulsivity. We also find that controlling for sample 
selection has a significant effect on prevalence rates: we observe a significant decrease in prevalence 
rates of detectable gambling risk groups when we control for endogenous sample selection, since 
gambling behavior is positively correlated with the decision to participate in gambling survey 
instruments.  
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1 Introduction 
Gambling surveys have provided measures of the extent of gambling problems in the general 
population, but have proven to be controversial. Several concerns with these surveys derive from 
the goal of mimicking prevalence estimates obtained from “face to face” assessments by trained 
clinicians. Indeed, these concerns motivated, in part, the revisions to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) between editions III, III-R and IV, to emphasize the criteria 
for clinically significant distress or impairment. Many of the survey instruments of mental health to 
come out of that period reflected those criteria.1 
 It is worthwhile listing the DSM-IV criteria, to get a sense of the type of gambling problems 
that these survey instruments seek to identify: 
1.  Have you found yourself thinking about gambling (e.g. reliving past gambling experiences, 
planning the next time you will play or thinking of ways to get money for gambling)? 
2. Have you needed to gamble with more and more money to get the amount of excitement you 
are looking for? 
3. Have you become restless or irritable when trying to cut down or stop gambling? 
4. Have you gambled to escape from problems or when you are feeling depressed, anxious or bad 
about yourself? 
5. After losing money gambling, have you returned another day in order to get even? 
6. Have you lied to your family, or others, to hide the extent of your gambling? 
7. Have you made repeated unsuccessful attempts to control, cut back or stop gambling? 
8. Have you been forced to go beyond what is strictly legal, in order to finance gambling or to 
pay gambling debts? 
9. Have you risked or lost a significant relationship, job, educational or career opportunity 
because of gambling? 
10. Have you sought help from others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation 
caused by gambling? 
 
If someone meets 5 or more of these 10 criteria they are deemed to be a “pathological gambler.”2 
These criteria seek to identify and screen someone one might expect to be seeking help from 
1 As Kessler et al. (2004; p. 123) noted, in explanations of the extensive efforts they undertook to 
clinically calibrate the instruments used in NCS-R, “The initial reaction to these results among health policy 
analysts was one of disbelief. The most obvious interpretation was that the lay administered diagnostic 
interviews [...] were upwardly biased.” 
2 The term “pathological gambler” was introduced in DSM-III, and has been replaced in DSM-V with 
the term “gambling disorder.” The old expression was regarded by some clinicians as being “outdated and 
pejorative”, to borrow the words of the Working Group that changed the name (Petry et al., 2014; p.494). 
The new terminology might also be regarded as improving on the situation in which the terms “problem 
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gambling outcomes, and who might well exhibit some other psychiatric disorder, such as anxiety, 
panic attacks or depression.3 All survey instruments, as far as we are aware, employ a “screener,” 
“gateway” or “diagnostic stem” question to filter out individuals that have never engaged in certain 
gambling behavior. In many cases the filter is whether they have ever lost a certain amount of 
money in any one day of gambling, and in other cases it is whether they have ever gambled more 
than a certain number of times in any year.4 
 There are several issues with these criteria. The first for us is that they place emphasis solely on 
meeting clinical criteria, in effect predicting whether someone is likely to “present” for treatment or 
should “present” for treatment. This is certainly not wrong per se, but it is only one criterion for 
deciding if someone has a gambling problem. 
 The second issue is that these measures could easily skip someone who one might reasonably 
view as having a gambling problem. To take an extreme example, somebody who builds up a 
considerable debt from gambling that burdens them for years, but who is not in denial or wanting 
to get back into the casino in the optimistic hope of winning the money back. 
 The third issue is that there could be someone with serious symptoms of 4 of these criteria, but 
not 5. This is more a criticism of the binary threshold applied to the criteria than the criteria 
themselves, and of the fact that the criteria are unweighted.5 
gambling” and “pathological gambling” were not used consistently and contributed to confusion in 
comparing different prevalence estimates. 
3 The DSM-IV explicitly excludes someone whose gambling behavior might be better diagnosed as due 
to a Manic Episode. 
4 For example, the NCS-R has gateway questions that ask if the individual has gambled 11 or more times 
ever in any one of a wide range of activities and ever lost $365 or more in a year; the NESARC has a gateway 
question that asks if the individual has ever gambled in any organized form 5 times in one year; and the 
CCHS Cycle 1.2 survey asked, inter alia, “In the past 12 months, how often have you bet or spent more 
money than you wanted on gambling?” and excluded anyone that responded “I am not a gambler.” 
5 The DSM-V has removed the 8th criterion to do with illegal activities associated with gambling, and 
lowered the threshold to 4 of 9, but the point we make is a more general one. One might also imagine a 
clinician being able to apply weights to the criteria, even if this might be frowned on by some (e.g., insurance 
companies covering reimbursable psychiatric expenses). There have been evaluations of “subclinical” sets of 
criteria, which means individuals meeting between 1 and 4 of the DSM-IV criteria other than the threshold 
defining pathological gambling: see Blanco et al. (2006), for example, who stress gender differences in 
comorbidities when comparing subclinical and clinical gambling problems.  
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 The fourth issue is the fact that according to the criteria someone has to have engaged in 
gambling in order to have a potential gambling problem. It is not self-evident that everyone with the 
potential for a gambling problem has had the opportunity to legally exercise that opportunity.  
 The fifth issue has to do with the gateway question. One of the possible criteria for the disorder 
is that the respondent has lied to family or others to hide the extent of their gambling, but is 
magically assumed not to do this when asked if they gamble in a survey, particularly in response to 
the gateway question. The possibility that someone might lie in response to the gateway question, to 
avoid being asked questions about their gambling behavior is well documented in clinical test-retest 
interview settings: see Kessler et al. (2004; p.125). One simply does not know a priori if this applies 
to survey instruments.6 
 A final issue is that clinical criteria can fuel political battles when applied in general population 
surveys. It is not hard to discern from discussions of revisions to the DSM criteria for pathological 
gambling and clinically-based instruments that a major concern has been that prevalence estimates 
cannot be allowed to get “too high” because that would imply a shortage of funding for mental 
health treatment. Clear (enough) statements of this “tail wags dog” problem can be easily found, 
and the issue is well known in the research folklore.7 
 Another dimension to this final issue is that the operators in the gambling industry welcome 
prevalence measures for pathological gambling or gambling disorders that are very low. For 
instance, the lobbying association The American Gambling Association notes that “Although the 
6 There exist econometric methods for evaluating “sample selection” issues such as these. Harrison, Lau 
and Ross (2016) show that correction for sample selection makes a significant difference to inferences drawn 
from large-scale surveys of gambling disorders of the general population in the United States and Canada. 
7 For example, Regier et al. (1998; p. 110) commented that “Both the scientific and political implications 
of these high prevalence rates were highlighted by the timing of this release during the national debate on 
health reform. Major policy questions were raised about the need for mental health services that were 
implied by these high rates, along with concerns about possible insurance cost-benefit consequences. Some 
major media commentators identified such high rates as indicating a bottomless pit of possible demand for 
mental health services.” More recently, from Petry et al., (2014; p.497): “The American Psychiatric 
Association requires strong empirical data in support of changes to DSM-5 that would substantially increase 
the base rate of a disorder.” But the only motivation then mentioned is the circular argument that reducing 
the number of threshold criteria would empirically make the base rate increase. 
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vast majority of Americans are able to gamble responsibly, a small percentage of people – 
approximately 1 percent of the adult population – cannot.”8 These prevalence estimates come from 
measures of pathological gambling as defined by clinical criteria. The thrust of the industry’s 
comments on responsible gambling is that 99 out of 100 gamblers are just having fun, and should 
be left alone, and regulators should only worry about the 1-in-a-100 who is not gambling 
responsibly. 
 Again, we stress that these concerns arise for a simple reason: the general purpose survey 
instruments were intended, by design, to mimic and correlate with the screening that would occur in 
a clinical setting. Whether that setting is a “gold standard” for some mental health screening 
purposes or not, it simply differs from other reasons for wanting to measure gambling problems. 
Society may take a broader view of what constitutes a gambling problem, and certainly economists 
take a broader view. 
 Our primary objective is to evaluate for a general population surveys of gambling problems 
that did not restrict themselves to clinical criteria. We want to see how well these measures 
correlated with traditional clinically-oriented surveys, of course, if for no other reason than to build 
a bridge to the type of instrument that has dominated the scene. We stress that we do not see any 
problem in finding low correlations between a non-clinical instrument and a clinical instrument, and 
indeed this would be informative. 
 Our secondary objective is to have a “wide screen” for subjects to be recruited to subsequent 
experiments to evaluate gambling behavior in controlled gambling tasks. Our view is that the 
“proof of the pudding” for these instruments is whether they can predict, or be reweighted or 
calibrated to predict, actual gambling problems. In effect, we agree with the thrust of the movement 
to have psychiatric disorders measured by clinical tests (e.g. Kapur, Phillips, and Insel, 2012), but 
8 On http://www.americangaming.org/social-responsibility/responsible-gaming, accessed on 
9/21/2014.  
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differ in what we call a “clinical test.” For us, any controlled experiment, whether it is the evaluation 
of a physical tissue specimen in a laboratory setting or the evaluation of gambling choice behavior 
in a laboratory setting, can potentially serve as an appropriate measure.  
 In Section 1 we review several instruments for measuring gambling problems, with an eye to 
widening the screens beyond ex post evaluation of clinical metrics of gambling behavior to consider 
ex ante measures of gambling propensity. We also build some bridges to clinically-motivated 
measures of gambling problems. In Section 2 we review several instruments for detecting 
psychiatric disorders that are widely linked to gambling disorders through numerous comorbidity 
studies. In our case we focus on alcohol abuse, anxiety, depression and impulsiveness. 
 Our overall survey design is intended to evaluate several methodological questions. One, as 
noted, is the extent of correlation between different survey instruments of gambling behavior, 
particularly instruments designed to identify different latent factors relevant to gambling behavior. 
Another methodological issue is the use of randomization of question order, and in some cases 
instrument order. Another methodological issue is whether one uses lifetime gambling behavior or 
the last year’s gambling behavior as the time frame for responses. A final methodological issue is 
the role of the “trigger” or “gateway” question. We discuss this design in Section 3, along with 
specifics of our sample frame and procedures. Section 4 reviews the survey results, and Section 5 
presents implications and conclusions. 
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2 Survey Instruments of Gambling Problems 
We examine several survey instruments designed to measure gambling problems. We focus on the 
Focal Adult Gambling Screen (FLAGS) designed by Schellinck et al. (2015a, 2015b) to span both 
reflective and formative constructs. A reflective construct is an instrument that seeks to reflect the 
effects and consequences of some latent variable, and a formative construct is an instrument that 
seeks to detect the presence of the latent variable. In this case the latent variable is “problem 
gambling,” which we keep in quotation marks because that term can mean different things to 
different people. The idea from psychometrics is that these two types of constructs provide insights 
into two different types of causal statements. In the one case problem gambling causes certain 
behaviors and attributes, and in the other case certain attributes cause problem gambling to arise. 
The attributes in each case are the traits and beliefs probed by the survey instruments. 
 Most of the major surveys of gambling behavior based on clinical criteria rely solely on 
reflective constructs. There have been surveys of gambling propensity building on formative 
constructs, most notably Breen and Zuckerman (1999). They administered their own Gambling 
Beliefs and Attitudes Survey (GABS) to college students, and then studied their actual gambling 
behavior in laboratory card-game. A formal psychometric evaluation of the reflective construct of 
GABS was undertaken by Strong et al. (2004a), boiling the original 35-item instrument down to a 
preferred 15-item instrument.9 
 The latest version of FLAGS contains 64 questions designed to measure 10 latent constructs. 
As applied to machine gambling, these constructs are: 
 
9 The same general psychometric methods can in principle be used to re-tool clinically based instruments 
to identify a continuum of gambling types rather than just the binary classification into pathological gamblers 
and others: see Strong et al. (2003, 2004b) for an application to the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS), 
Strong and Kahler (2007) for an application to the Alcohol Use Disorder and Associated Disability Interview 
Schedule – DSM-IV (AUDADIS-IV), and Sharp et al. (2012) for an application to the PGSI. The efforts for 
SOGS and AUDADIS-IV did not met with great success, suggesting that more fundamental ex ante survey 
design methods are needed as a complement to ex post statistical forensics. 
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1. Risky Cognitions: Beliefs (RCB), such as irrational or inaccurate beliefs about machine 
gambling. 
2. Risky Cognitions: Motives (RCM), such as risky reasons for gambling (e.g., to pay off bills, 
to escape problems, for self-esteem or status). 
3. Preoccupation: Desire (POD), such as a strong drive to play the machines as much as 
possible. 
4. Impaired Control: Continue (ICC), such as the inability to stop playing slots/machines once 
started. 
5. Risky Practices: Earlier (RBE), such as less extreme types of risky practices that usually 
precede more harmful practices (e.g., using bank card to get more money to play). 
6. Risky Practices: Later (RBL), such as more extreme or harmful types of risky practices (e.g., 
using credit to finance play). 
7. Impaired Control: Begin (ICB), such as an inability to resist or stop oneself from going to 
play slots/machines. 
8. Preoccupation: Obsessed (POO), such as excessive preoccupation, constantly thinking 
about slot gambling or finding ways to gamble on machines. 
9. Negative Consequences (NGC), such as negative impacts in at least 3 of 14 different areas 
of life including financial, personal, family, work, health, social. 
10. Persistence (PST): such as continuing to gamble, over an extended period, in a risky manner 
that leads to harms. 
 
Five of these constructs are formative (items 1, 2 5, 6 and 9), and the other five are reflective. The 
complete list of statements can be found in Appendix A. 
 We consider two other popular survey instruments for existing gambling problems. One is the 
9-item scored component of the 12-item Canadian Problem Gambling Inventory (CPGI) developed 
by Ferris and Wynne (2001), and known as the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI). The 
other is based on the DSM-IV criteria. Both the PGSI and DSM-IV are reflective constructs. We 
also evaluate three survey instruments of potential gambling problems, each stressing formative 
constructs. One is the Gambling Craving Scale (GACS) developed by Young and Wohl (2009), 
another is the Gambling Urge Screen (GUS) developed by Raylu and Oei (2004a), and the third is 
the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS) developed by Raylu and Oei (2004b).10 Each 
instrument is listed in Appendix A, and Appendix B explains how each instrument was scored. In 
most cases the scores follow the standard algorithms, but in some instances the scoring is not 
obvious. 
10 We also considered the Gambling Beliefs and Attitudes Survey (GABS) developed in 1994 by Breen 
and Zuckerman in unpublished research, and listed in Breen and Zuckerman (1999; p. 1109). 
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To evaluate the effects of order we only evaluated one instrument along with FLAGS for any 
one person, and randomized the order of presentation. Thus one randomly selected subject 
received FLAGS and then PGSI, another received PGSI then FLAGS, another received FLAGS 
and then DSM-IV, and another received DSM-IV then FLAGS, etc.   
 In addition, we asked several questions to identify past gambling behavior, since we did not use 
these as a “trigger” question. Subjects were separately asked, in the lifetime frame, if they had ever 
lost more than 40 kroner or 500 kroner on gambling in a single day. The lower amount corresponds 
to the amount of a common state lottery ticket, and the larger amount to a naturally larger 
denomination that a Dane would likely recall. We also asked these questions for 50% of the sample 
in the time frame that spanned the last 12 months. 
 
 
3 Survey Instruments for Other Problems 
There is a long history of interest in comorbidities of gambling disorders. Indeed, some research 
points to virtually every measured psychiatric disorder as being correlated with pathological 
gambling.11 The implication of much of this research is to focus attention on common causes of 
several psychiatric disorders. Our evaluation cannot be that exhaustive, but we do consider 
instruments to measure certain other psychiatric disorders. 
 These survey instrument are the Beck Anxiety Index (BAI) developed by Beck, Epstein, Brown 
and Steer (1988) and Beck and Steer (1990), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) developed by 
Beck et al. (1961), and the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS) developed by Patton, Stanford and Barratt 
(1995). Because alcohol is often highly correlated with gambling, and of particular concern in 
11 For instance, evaluating data from the NESARC Petry et al., (2005; Table 3, p. 570; model 3) report 
95% confidence interval lower bounds of Odds Ratio in excess of 1 for alcohol dependence, any drug abuse, 
any drug dependence, nicotine dependence, major depressive episodes, dysthymic disorders, manic episodes, 
panic disorders, social phobia, specific phobia, generalized anxiety, and every personality disorder considered 
(avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive, paranoid, schizoid, histrionic and antisocial). Kessler et al. 
(2008; Table 2, p.1357) report a similar list from the NCS-R.  
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Denmark, we implemented the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) of Babor, 
Higgins-Biddle, Saunders and Monteiro (2001). We also asked if the individual currently smoked, 
and if so how many cigarettes per day. 
 To allow for the effects of recent life events, we asked if the individual had experienced the 
death of an immediate family member (partner, child, parent or sibling) in the past 12 months, or 
been hospitalized for a major medical problem during the past 12 months.  
 
 
4 Survey Design 
4.1 Treatments 
We split our sample into 10 treatments: 
1. FLAGS, PGSI, BIS 
2. PGSI, FLAGS, BIS 
3. FLAGS, DSM-IV, BAI, AUDIT 
4. DSM-IV, FLAGS, BAI, AUDIT 
5. FLAGS, GACS, AUDIT 
6. GACS, FLAGS, AUDIT 
7. FLAGS, GUS, BDI, AUDIT 
8. GUS, FLAGS, BDI, AUDIT 
9. FLAGS, GRCS, AUDIT 
10. GRCS, FLAGS, AUDIT 
 
The only difference between the odd and even treatments here is the order of the gambling 
instrument, to assess if comparisons of FLAGS with the other instruments are affected by subjects 
having already completed the more expansive FLAGS.12  
 We further split each treatment equally into cases in which the timeframe for the gambling 
instruments FLAGS, PGSI and DSM are lifetime or just the past 12 months. This only affects the 
introductory text to each instrument. 
12 We do not randomize the order of the sub-blocks of questions for each of the 10 constructs within 
FLAGS. There is a natural aggregation of these 10 sub-blocks into three groupings, often used in the field 
implementation of FLAGS (§1: RCB, RCM and POD, §2: ICC, RBE and RBL, and §3: ICB, POO, NGC 
and PST), and we do not randomize across those groupings either. 
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 Finally, for 50% of the subjects we randomize within each block, when possible, and otherwise 
present the questions in the standard order. The software used to implement the survey did not 
allow randomization within a block unless the responses were all the same, so we could not 
randomize the order for AUDIT, the BDI, and our few concluding questions. 
 
4.2 Sample Frame 
We contracted with Analyse Danmark (http://www.analysedanmark.dk/english) to obtain 10,000 
completed survey responses from the adult population of Denmark. This sample was to be assigned 
equally to all treatments. Our completed sample consisted of 8,405 respondents, which is 12.8% of 
the sample frame of 65,592 Danes contacted. Of those contacted that did not complete the survey, 
3,331 started but gave up. The cost of these surveys was 272,425 DKK, which was just over 
$45,400 at the time they were implemented. 
 The sample was stratified according to sex and age across three regions in Denmark: (i) greater 
Copenhagen, (ii) Jutland, and (iii) Funen and Zealand. We assigned different weights to the three 
regions, with a 50% weight on the sample from greater Copenhagen and a 25% weight on each 
sample from the two other regions. This design allows us to recruit subjects for later experiments 
from a relatively large sample in greater Copenhagen. The respondents in our survey were recruited 
from two internet-based panels with 165,000 active members.13 Invitations were sent out by email 
and the respondents could answer the survey questions on the internet using personal computers or 
mobile devices (phones and tablets). They were told in the invitation letter that 40 respondents who 
completed the survey would be randomly chosen to receive a gift card of 500 kroner.14 Summary 
statistics for all participants and non-participants are provided in Appendix C.  
 
13 Analyse Danmark have a panel of 25,000 active members, and Userneeds have a panel of 140,000 
members. The two internet panels are regularly updated and members are recruited via the internet (banners, 
newsgroups, etc.), email, and by phone. 
14 The gift cards were issued by www.gavekortet.dk, which is an internet based portal for gift cards.  
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5 Results 
We are interested in answering several questions with these data. First, what is the distribution over 
the Danish adult population of gambling risk as assessed using the FLAGS instrument? The answer 
to this question provides the sampling frame for subsequent experimental evaluation of actual 
gambling behavior by individuals who were recruited into incentivized experiments. We want to 
evaluate the raw distribution, based on the sample that completed our surveys, since that is the basis 
that is typically used to assess population gambling risk. 
 Second, how is the distribution of gambling risks affected by the treatments we considered? 
Does it matter if FLAGS comes first or second, or if we randomize question order? And how does 
the lifetime frame affect the distribution of gambling risk? 
 Third, what is the inferred population distribution after correcting for sample weights and 
sample selection? The correction for sample weights, based on observable differences in the 
demographic mix of the sample and the population, is familiar in many survey settings, but is not 
always applied in assessments of gambling risk. The correction for sample selection, based on 
unobservable differences of the sampled and non-sampled population, has never been applied in 
published assessments of gambling risk. 
 Fourth, what is the effect on inferences about the distribution of gambling risks of applying a 
threshold trigger question based on past gambling history? These trigger questions are usually 
applied ex ante the administration of the survey, and some status then assumed for the individual. 
Our design deliberately avoided such assumptions, allowing us to impose them ex post the 
administration of the survey to study their effect. 
 Finally, what are the correlates of gambling risk, as assessed by FLAGS? We examine the 
correlation between different instruments, and when possible the partial correlation holding 
constant the effect of a third instrument. 
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 5.1 Gambling Risk in the Danish Sample 
Table 1 shows the distribution of gambling risks in the Danish sample based on the FLAGS 
instrument. We do not apply here any gambling history threshold, which was in fact asked after the 
individual had completed all instruments. We find that 80% of the sample has no detectable risk, 
12% has an early risk, 3.9% has an intermediate risk, 3.3% has an advanced risk, and 1.1% is 
classified as a problem gambler. Out of 8,405 in the sample, we detect 95 problem gamblers with 
this instrument. 
 Table 1 also shows the distribution of FLAGS risk levels broken down by comparison with the 
risk levels implied by the DSM and PGSI instruments. Note that the samples here are smaller, at 
1,671 and 1,757 respectively, but these were assigned at random within the complete sample. For 
the DSM comparison, the biggest difference in classification in percentage terms is for those that 
FLAGS classifies as problem gamblers. Although the sample of 12 is small, DSM classifies 5 of 
these as non-gamblers and 6 as problem gamblers, and only 1 of the 12 is classified by DSM as a 
pathological gambler. The other DSM mismatch is for those that FLAGS classifies as being at 
advanced risk: DSM classifies 86% of those 56 individuals as being non-gamblers. The PGSI has a 
better match with FLAGS for the highest risk level, but a significant difference in classification for 
those that FLAGS classifies as being at advanced risk. In that case 27.7% and 25.5% of the 47 are 
classified by PGSI as being non-gamblers or low risk, respectively. Similarly, for those 62 
individuals that FLAGS classifies as being an intermediate risk, the PGSI classifies 43.6% as being 
non-gamblers.  
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Table 1: Sample Tabulations of FLAGS Risk Levels 
(A) FLAGS Risk Level  
 N Percent 
     
          No Detectable Risk 
 
6,698 79.69% 
     Early Risk 
  
1,010 12.02% 
     Intermediate Risk 
 
328 3.90% 
     Advanced Risk 
 
274 3.26% 
     Problem Gambler 
 
95 1.13% 
     
          Total 
  
8,405 100% 
     
          
          (B) FLAGS Risk Level  DSM Risk Level 
      N Percent 
  
Non-
Gambler 
Problem 
Gambler 
Pathological 
Gambler 
          No Detectable Risk 
 
1,360 81.39% 
  
1,353 7 0 
Early Risk 
  
177 10.59% 
  
174 3 0 
Intermediate Risk 
 
66 3.95% 
  
64 2 0 
Advanced Risk 
 
56 3.35% 
  
48 7 1 
Problem Gambler 
 
12 0.72% 
  
5 6 1 
          Total 
  
1,671 100% 
  
1,644 25 2 
          
          (C) FLAGS Risk Level  PGSI Risk Level 
 
N Percent 
 
Non-
Gambler Low Risk 
Moderate 
Risk 
Problem 
Gambler 
          No Detectable Risk 
 
1,399 79.62% 
 
1,291 93 14 1 
Early Risk 
  
229 13.03% 
 
161 53 15 0 
Intermediate Risk 
 
62 3.53% 
 
27 25 10 0 
Advanced Risk 
 
47 2.68% 
 
13 12 19 3 
Problem Gambler 
 
20 1.14% 
 
0 0 2 18 
          Total 
  
1,757 100% 
 
1,492 183 60 22 
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5.2 Effects of Treatments 
The effects of treatments on gambling risk levels determined by FLAGS can be gauged by standard 
measures of association applied to a 5×2 contingency table, but for more informative analysis we 
develop an Ordered Probit statistical model. The statistical model allows us to estimate the size and 
significance of the effect of a variable on the probability of each gambling risk level. It also allows 
us to examine the marginal effect of the treatment, controlling for other correlated effects. For 
some inferential purposes we want to know the total (unconditional) effect, but typically we are 
interested in the marginal effect. Appendix D documents this statistical model and the first column 
of Table 3 documents the estimation results. 
 Figure 1 shows the marginal effect of FLAGS being the first survey instrument on the inferred 
probabilities of different gambling risk levels. The lines show the point estimates of the effect, and 
the shaded bars show the 95% confidence interval, so one can quickly ascertain if the effect is 
statistically significant. The vertical axis is the change in probability, so a value of +0.02 implies a 
change of 2 percentage points. We find that when FLAGS is presented first it does increase the 
likelihood of someone being classified as having a detectable risk, particularly an early risk.15 Of 
course, these marginal effects must sum to zero across all of the possible levels, so there is a 
corresponding decline in the likelihood of someone being classified as having no detectable risk. 
 The opposite qualitative effect occurs when we randomize question order within the FLAGS 
instrument. Figure 2 shows that randomization significantly lowers the likelihood of being classified 
with a detectable risk, again with the biggest effect on the early risk level.16 
 Perhaps the most surprising treatment effect comes from using a lifetime gambling frame 
rather than just the past year, shown in Figure 3. Here one might have expected a priori to find  
 
15 A Pearson χ2 test of the hypothesis of no association has a p-value less than 0.001. 
16 A Pearson χ2 test of the hypothesis of no association has a p-value less than 0.001. 
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greater gambling risk, since it cannot be less as a logical matter. However, we find a significant and 
large reduction in detectable risk using the statistical model.17 We implement the lifetime gambling 
frame by asking the respondents to “…think about your lifetime gambling experiences,” as opposed 
to “…think about your gambling experiences in the last year.” It is likely that some respondents 
answer “yes” to a question when they are asked to consider their behavior in the last year and no 
when they are asked to consider their lifetime behavior. For example, the respondents are asked to 
consider the following question “I would like to gamble almost every day” and answer yes or no. 
Someone who recently has developed a gambling problem might answer “yes” when the question is 
framed over the last year and answer “no” when it is framed over the lifetime. Predicted gambling 
prevalence rates could therefore be lower when the respondents are asked to consider their lifetime 
behavior instead of their most recent behavior.  
 
5.3 Gambling Risk in Denmark 
We focus next on gambling risk in Denmark and address two questions. What is the inferred 
distribution of gambling risk in the population after controlling for sample selection into the survey 
instrument? Are individual characteristics correlated with gambling risk?  
We estimate an Ordered Probit model with and without controls for sample selection to gauge 
the effect of selection bias from the sample frame of 65,592 Danes in the two internet-based panels. 
Sample weights are constructed from administrative data at Statistics Denmark on the population 
size of men and women in various age groups and regions in Denmark, and these weights are 
included in the predicted distributions of gambling risk. We control for endogenous sample 
selection bias using full information maximum likelihood estimation of the Ordered Probit model, 
17 A Pearson χ2 test of the hypothesis of no association has a p-value less than 0.001. This is a two-sided 
test, but the direction of the effect is in the opposite of the alternative hypothesis that lifetime risks can be 
no smaller than recent risks. 
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and follow the direct likelihood approach due to Heckman (1976), Hausman and Wise (1979) and 
Diggle and Kenward (1994). The statistical model is documented in Appendix D. 
Table 2 shows the predicted distribution of gambling risk in the adult Danish population. The 
predictions in the first column are based on the Ordered Probit model without sample weights and 
without controls for sample selection. They are similar to those reported in Table 1. Roughly 80% 
of the sample has no detectable risk, 12% has an early risk, 3.9% has an intermediate risk, 3.3% has 
an advanced risk, and 1.1% is classified as a problem gambler.  
Adding sample weights increases the prevalence of detectable risk as opposed to no detectable 
risk. The second column in Table 2 shows that roughly 76% of the sample has no detectable risk, 
13.3% has an early risk, 4.2% has an intermediate risk, 4.6% has an advanced risk, and 1.9% is 
classified as a problem gambler. We thus observe an increase from 1.1% to 1.9% in the prevalence 
of problem gambling when sample weights are added to the model.  
Finally, controlling for sample selection has a significant negative effect on prevalence rates. The 
third column in Table 2 shows that more than 95% of the sample has no detectable risk, 2.9% has 
an early risk, 0.8% has an intermediate risk, 0.7% has an advanced risk, and only 0.2% is classified 
as a problem gambler. Thus we see a significant drop in prevalence rates of detectable risk 
compared to non-detectable risk, since respondents in detectable risk groups are more likely to 
answer the survey questions than those in the non-detectable risk group.  
Table 3 shows the estimated parameter values that generate the predicted distributions of 
gambling risk in Table 2. The Ordered Probit models control for treatment variables and 
demographic characteristics such as sex, age, income and smoking behavior. Indicators for trigger 
questions and subcontractor are also added as control variables in the models. In the first model 
with no sample weights and controls for sample selection, demographic characteristics are 
significantly correlated with gambling risk. The marginal effect of being female is negative and equal 
to -0.28, which indicates that women are less likely to have a higher level of gambling risk. This 
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estimated coefficient for women is significantly different from 0 and has a p-value < 0.001. We also 
confirm the conventional findings that young people are more likely to have a detectable gambling 
risk than older age groups; and those with low income are more likely to have a detectable gambling 
risk than people with higher income. The results also show that smokers are more likely to be 
classified in a detectable risk group than non-smokers.  
The second model with sample weights shows similar marginal effects of the treatment 
variables and demographic characteristics. However, the estimated coefficients for medium and 
high income groups are smaller and no longer significantly different from 0.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Predicted FLAGS Level 
 
(1) 
 
No Sample Weights 
 (2) 
 
Sample Weights 
 (3) 
Sample Weights and 
Sample Selection 
Correction 
            No Risk 79.71%  
 
 76.04%    95.39%  
Early Risk  11.98%  
 
 13.25%    2.87%  
Intermediate Risk  3.93%  
 
 4.24%    0.82%  
Advanced Risk  3.25%  
 
 4.62%    0.70%  
Problem Gambler  1.13%  
 
 1.86%    0.21%  
             
Note: The predicted distributions of gambling risk are based on the estimated parameters that are reported in Table 3. 
Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals of the predicted gambling risk distributions for each model are reported 
in Appendix E.  
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Table 3: Ordered Probit With and Without Sample Selection Correction 
 
(1) 
No Sample Weights 
 
(2) 
Sample Weights  
 
(3) 
Sample Weights and 
Sample Selection Correction 
 Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
 
Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
 
Coef. Std. Err. p-value 
          A. FLAGS Level 
                      Lifetime -0.208 0.033 0.000 
 
-0.208 0.044 0.000 
 
-0.172 0.037 0.000 
Randomized -0.098 0.031 0.002 
 
-0.129 0.044 0.004 
 
-0.090 0.031 0.003 
FLAGS first 0.162 0.032 0.000 
 
0.125 0.044 0.004 
 
0.134 0.029 0.000 
            Female -0.280 0.036 0.000
 
-0.311 0.045 0.000
 
-0.200 0.043 0.000 
            Young 0.194 0.057 0.001
 
0.257 0.076 0.001
 
0.068 0.051 0.184 
Ripe Aged -0.237 0.052 0.000 
 
-0.206 0.060 0.001 
 
-0.107 0.055 0.051 
Older -0.358 0.047 0.000 
 
-0.292 0.054 0.000 
 
0.107 0.073 0.142 
            Low Inc. 0.108 0.049 0.028
 
0.168 0.066 0.011
 
0.103 0.047 0.029 
Medium Inc. -0.089 0.051 0.084 
 
-0.007 0.068 0.921 
 
-0.034 0.050 0.498 
High Inc. -0.134 0.063 0.034 
 
-0.054 0.086 0.526 
 
-0.060 0.059 0.309 
Very High Inc. -0.042 0.107 0.693 
 
-0.082 0.130 0.529 
 
-0.033 0.098 0.739 
            40 kr. Trigger 0.671 0.035 0.000
 
0.655 0.050 0.000
 
0.513 0.049 0.000 
500 kr. Trigger 1.032 0.059 0.000 
 
1.007 0.077 0.000 
 
0.786 0.080 0.000 
            Smoker 0.169 0.038 0.000
 
0.151 0.048 0.002
 
0.108 0.036 0.003 
            Subcontractor 0.015 0.033 0.640
 
0.085 0.046 0.066
 
0.021 0.033 0.521 
            Cut 1 0.829 0.075 0.000
 
0.892 0.097 0.000
 
2.021 0.129 0.000 
Cut 2 1.479 0.076 0.000 
 
1.541 0.100 0.000 
 
2.501 0.104 0.000 
Cut 3 1.868 0.078 0.000 
 
1.880 0.104 0.000 
 
2.782 0.093 0.000 
Cut 4 2.571 0.086 0.000 
 
2.598 0.128 0.000 
 
3.354 0.094 0.000 
                      B. Selection 
                       Constant 
        
-1.348 0.025 0.000 
            Female 
        
0.002 0.016 0.906 
            Young 
        
-0.135 0.025 0.000 
Ripe Aged 
        
0.115 0.022 0.000 
Older 
        
0.606 0.021 0.000 
            Subcontractor 
        
-0.002 0.016 0.911 
            Midtjyylland  
       
-0.023 0.021 0.267 
Nordjyland  
       
-0.037 0.030 0.219 
Sjælland 
        
-0.038 0.023 0.107 
Syddanmark 
       
-0.018 0.021 0.391 
            Ρ 
        
0.766 0.075
              
Note: We estimate an Ordered Probit model in (1), an Ordered Probit model with sample weights in (2), and an 
Ordered Probit model with sample weights and sample selection correction in (3). The omitted age category is Middle 
Aged (those between 30 and 39 years of age); the omitted income category is Silent About Income (those who did not 
report annual income); and the omitted region is Hovedstaden (those living in the Greater Copenhagen area). The four 
cut points refer to the thresholds along the cumulative standard normal distribution that distinguish the five ordered 
outcomes of gambling risk. The first cut point refers to the probability threshold between no detectable risk and early 
risk, the second cut point refers to the probability threshold between early risk and intermediate risk, and so on.  
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The third model adds controls for endogenous sample selection. Estimated coefficients in the 
selection equation are reported in Panel B of Table 3, and we find a significant association between 
response rates and age groups: subjects younger than 30 have significantly lower response rates than 
middle aged between 30 and 39; middle aged subjects have significantly lower response rates than 
ripe aged between 40 and 49; and subjects older than 50 have significantly higher response rates 
than ripe aged. We also find evidence of significant sample selection bias: the estimated correlation 
coefficient, ρ, is equal to 0.77 and is significantly different from 0 (p-value < 0.001). Hence there is a 
significant positive correlation between the error terms in the main equation and in the selection 
equation, and we observe a significant increase in the gambling risk thresholds that are given by the 
cut points along the cumulative standard normal distribution. The first cut point identifies the 
probability of no detectable gambling risk, the second cut point identifies the probability of early 
risk, and so on. We continue to observe significant marginal effects of being a female and a smoker. 
However, we do not find a significant effect on gambling risk of being young or old compared to 
the omitted age group of respondents between 30 and 39. The estimated coefficient of being young 
is equal to 0.068 and has a p-value of 0.184, and the estimated coefficient of being older is positive 
and equal to 0.107 with a p-value of 0.142. The results suggest that ripe aged people between 40 and 
49 are less likely than any other age group of having a detectable gambling risk, followed by middle 
aged people between 30 and 39. People younger than 30 and older than 50 are most likely to have a 
detectable gambling risk. Low income continues to be associated with significantly higher gambling 
risk than other income groups.  
Figure 4 shows the marginal effect of being female on inferred probabilities for each FLAGS 
risk level. The probability of having no detectable gambling risk is 2 percentage points higher for 
women than for men, and women are significantly less likely than men to be classified in one of the 
detectable risk groups. Figure 5 shows the marginal effect of reporting low income compared to 
those who did not report their income. The probability of having no detectable gambling risk 
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decreases by 1 percentage point for respondents in the low income group compared to the control 
group that did not report any income, and the probability of having a detectable gambling risk 
consequently increases for the low income group compared to the control group. We present 
additional figures in Appendix E that show marginal effects on gambling risk of the remaining 
demographic characteristics.  
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Being Female
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure 5: Marginal Effect of Having Low Income
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We can compare our results to the existing Danish gambling prevalence studies by Bonke and 
Borregard (2006, 2009) and Ekholm et al. (2012). These two gambling prevalence studies do not 
control for sample selection bias, and we therefore compare our uncorrected prevalence rates of 
gambling risk with the prevalence rates reported in the existing studies. 
The predicted prevalence rates of gambling risk (without controls for sample selection) in our 
study are significantly higher than those reported for Denmark by Bonke and Borregard (2006, 
2009). They use the National Opinion Research Center DSM (NODS) screen to estimate prevalence of 
gambling risk in a sample of 8,153 Adult Danes between 18 and 74 years of age.18 The sample frame 
of 11,737 people was randomly drawn from the Danish Central National Register and stratified 
according to sex, age, geographical information and marital status. The survey was conducted 
mainly by telephone and in some cases by face-to-face interviews, and the overall response rate to 
the survey instrument was 69.5%. Bonke and Borregard (2006, 2009) ask the respondents to 
consider their lifetime (past-year) gambling behavior and identify 0.26% (0.14%) of the sample as 
being a pathological gambler, 0.42% (0.23%) of the sample as being a problem gambler, and 3.14% 
(1.85%) as having some gambling risk.19 They also report higher prevalence rates of gambling risk 
for men than for women, lower prevalence rates for respondents older than 45, and lower 
prevalence rates for respondents in the highest income quartile than in lower quartiles. Despite the 
researchers having had access to administrative data for the full sample frame, the estimated 
coefficients by Bonke and Borregard (2006, 2009) are not corrected for endogenous sample 
selection and the corrected prevalence rates may be smaller than those reported.  
Ekholm et al. (2012) use data from the Danish Health Interview Survey in 2005 and the 
Danish Health and Morbidity Survey in 2010. The two samples are nationally representative and 
18 The NODS was developed by Gerstein et al. (1999) and builds on the DSM IV gambling screen. It is a 
reflective construct with 17 questions that measure lifetime and past-year prevalence of gambling risk. Bonke 
and Borregard (2006) compare the NODS instrument with the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) in a 
pre-test with 1,232 subjects and find that the NODS detects a lower prevalence of gambling risk. 
19 The respondents were first asked whether they had ever lost 35 kroner in a single day, and those who 
gave a positive answer were asked the same question considering past-year instead of lifetime experience.  
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include 10,916 respondents in 2005 and 23,405 respondents in 2010. After the main face-to-face 
interview the respondents were asked to complete a self-administered questionnaire that, among 
things, included two questions that are related to gambling behavior. The so-called lie/bet 
questionnaire, which consists of two questions from the DSM IV screen, was used in the survey, 
and those respondents who answered yes to at least one of the two questions are classified as 
problem gamblers.20 The final sample contains 5,686 respondents in 2005 and 14,670 respondents 
in 2010. Ekholm et al. (2012) find that the prevalence rate of lifetime (past-year) problem gambling 
is 2.6% (0.9%) in 2005, and falls to 2.0% (0.8%) in 2010. Prevalence rates are higher among men 
than women and decrease with age. They do not report any estimates that control for endogenous 
sample selection, but mention that “non-response adjusted prevalence estimates did not indicate 
that non-response bias affects the conclusion of the present study.”  
 
5.4 Effects of Trigger Questions Based on Gambling History 
Our design allows an immediate data-only comparison of the effects of using trigger questions 
based on gambling history to make inferences about future gambling risk. The usual tabulations do 
not do justice to the careful language used in scoring FLAGS when gambling history is used. An 
individual is classified as a Non-Gambler in FLAGS if the threshold gambling history is applied, 
with this explanation of that category: 
FLAGS instrument categorizes a person’s risk based on their perceptions 
about and behaviors associated with gambling. It cannot therefore categorize a 
person’s risk if they do not have gambling experience within the last year. There is a 
long list of correlates that have been shown to be associated with risk of problem 
gambling that we have left out of FLAGS that if possessed by an individual could 
indicate risk for problem gambling should they start to gamble. It was decided that 
in order to keep the instrument to a reasonable size its constructs would only be 
gambling specific; from the point of view of FLAGS these risk factors are therefore 
latent or unobservable. (Schellinck et al., 2011) 
 
20 The two questions are: “Have you ever lied to people important to you about how much you 
gambled?” and “Have you ever felt the need to bet more and more money?” The possible answers were: Yes, 
in the past 12 months; Yes, previously; No, I never gamble. 
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This is saying that one could develop a different instrument if the intention was to ignore 
gambling history as a determining factor of future gambling risk, as we do here. On the other hand, 
FLAGS contains many more formative constructs for detecting latent risk than the popular 
alternative instruments (DSM and PGSI) for detecting future gambling risk. Thus the above 
statement is exactly correct, and well-stated in terms of latent and unobservable tendencies. But we 
know how readers of measures of gambling prevalence will often slide over this statement, 
particularly if they are conditioned by other reflective-construct instruments to just assume outright 
that historical non-gamblers must have no clinical risk of “presenting.” 
 The same qualifications apply to the lowest FLAGS “risk” level, “No Detectable Risk.” This is 
defined as follows: 
Those at No Detectable Risk do not flag on any of the risk indicators although 
it is possible that they answered yes to one or more statements making up some of 
the constructs. For those who answered yes to at least one statement there was 
insufficient certainty for us to say there was an indication on one of the dimensions. 
These people may still have unobservable or latent characteristics that would make 
them susceptible to becoming a problem gambler should the right conditions exist. 
(Schellinck et al., 2011) 
 
Again, the emphasis is on latent tendencies to exhibit gambling risk, which we seek to measure. 
 The tabulations we present below are unfair to these nuanced statements, and follow the 
standard approach by just assuming that historical non-gamblers are not at future risk. In effect, in 
terms of FLAGS categories, we assume that individuals that should be classified as non-gamblers are 
in fact classified as having no detectable risk. 
 With these qualifications, Table 4 and Figure 6 shows the dramatic effects of imposing a 
threshold gambling history on the classification of gambling risk. With the 500 kroner and 40 
kroner threshold applied, we overstate the fraction of Danes that have no detectable risk, and 
understate those that have detectable gambling risk levels. Hence the standard practice in surveys of 
using these thresholds leads to an underestimate of the prevalence of gambling problems in the 
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general population. The bottom panel of Figure 5 rescales just on the detectable gambling risks, to 
provide more information on these effects. 
 Table 4 shows that 95% of the sample had not lost 500 kroner in gambling in one day, and that 
18.1% (= 100% - 81.9% = 11.5% + 3.5% + 2.3% + 0.6%) of those 7,991 had some detectable risk. 
Certainly those that had lost 500 kroner from gambling had a higher likelihood of exhibiting some 
gambling risk according to FLAGS, as one would expect. But the crucial point is that it is not the 
case that individuals with no historical gambling losses of 500 kroner can be safely assigned to have 
no risk, nor can those individuals with these losses be assumed to have some detectable risk. We 
stress again that the FLAGS classifications, when read in full, are clear on this point. Out of the 
complete sample, 46 individuals are deemed by the FLAGS instrument to be problem gamblers, but 
did not say that they had lost 500 kroner in the past year. In terms of numbers, this is almost exactly 
the same number of individuals (49) deemed to be problem gamblers but who did say that they had 
lost 500 kroner. 
The 40 kroner threshold has a predictably smaller effect, since many Danes would have met 
this threshold compared to the 500 kroner threshold. In fact, 3,206 of the sample say that they had 
lost 40 kroner, compared to only 414 saying that they had lost 500 kroner. The fraction is less than 
a majority in the sample: 38% in fact. 
Figure 7 and 8 show the effect of the thresholds for the classification of risk levels using the 
DSM and PGSI instruments, respectively. Since the DSM instrument assigns so many people to the 
lowest risk non-gambler category, and is very conservative compared to FLAGS about assigning 
any higher risk, there is a smaller effect than with FLAGS. This could be mitigated if one adopted a 
more “continuous” scoring of the DSM, as proposed in the British Gambling Prevalence Study of 
2007 (p. 135) and 2010 (p. 154). The PGSI instrument shows more effect from the threshold. 
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Table 4: Effect of Gambling History Thresholds on FLAGS Risk Levels 
 
(A) Have you ever lost more than 500 DKK in one day?   
         
 
No  Yes  Total FLAGS Risk Level N Percent  N Percent  N Percent 
         No Detectable Risk 6,557 82.05%  141 34.06%  6,698 79.69% Early Risk 922 11.54%  88 21.26%  1010 12.02% Intermediate Risk 283 3.54%  45 10.87%  328 3.90% Advanced Risk 183 2.29%  91 21.98%  274 3.26% Problem Gambler 46 0.58%  49 11.84%  95 1.13% 
         Total 7,991 100%  414 100%  8,405 100%          
    
 
(B) Have you ever lost more than 40 DKK in one day? 
       
 
No  Yes  Total FLAGS Risk Level N Percent  N Percent  N Percent 
         No Detectable Risk 4,600 88.48%  2,098 65.44%  6,698 79.69% Early Risk 404 7.77%  606 18.90%  1010 12.02% Intermediate Risk 109 2.10%  219 6.83%  328 3.90% Advanced Risk 61 1.17%  213 6.64%  274 3.26% Problem Gambler 25 0.48%  70 2.18%  95 1.13% 
         Total 5,199 100%  3,206 100%  8,405 100% 
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5.5 Correlates of Gambling Risk 
Figure 9 shows the unconditional correlations of the FLAGS gambling risk levels with the levels of 
other gambling risk instruments (DSM and PGSI), related instruments measuring formative 
gambling risk (GACS, GRCS and GUS), an instrument measuring alcohol use (AUDIT), and 
instruments measuring anxiety, depression and impulsiveness (BAI, BDI and BIS). All correlations 
are statistically significantly different than zero at p-values less than 0.001, except the correlation 
with the BIS which has a p-value of 0.094. 
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 In terms of the popular instruments for gambling risk, FLAGS is more correlated with PGSI 
than DSM, although both have positive and large correlation coefficients. The correlation of 
FLAGS with GACS and GUS, respectively, is very high, but the correlation with GRCS is quite 
low. The correlation coefficient between FLAGS and the substance abuse instrument for alcohol is 
very low, as are the pairwise correlation coefficients with the measures of anxiety, depression and 
impulsiveness. 
 We find a different pattern of correlation when we examine each of the instruments in the 
context of our statistical model of the determinants of FLAGS gambling risk levels. This model 
controls for all the observable demographics and treatments considered earlier: we just add the 
score or level of the instrument being studied and re-estimate. In each case the detailed impact 
varies with the FLAGS risk level, but the pattern is by now familiar from other marginal effects 
considered. The impact on the “no detectable risk” level is the opposite sign as the impact on the 4 
detectable risk levels, and the largest impact on a detectable risk is for early risk. 
 Detailed results for these marginal effects from the statistical model are shown in Appendix F. 
In summary, they show the predicted effects in terms of direction: someone that scores more highly 
on DSM or PGSI also scores more highly on FLAGS. They also show much higher connections 
between the formative constructs and personality instruments for anxiety, depression and 
impulsiveness than the unconditional correlations discussed above, and there is now a positive 
association between gambling risk and the measure of impulsivity.   
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
We compare several popular survey instruments of gambling behavior and gambling propensity 
to assess whether they differ in their classification of individuals in the general adult Danish 
population. We also examine correlations with standard survey instruments for alcohol use, anxiety, 
depression and impulsivity. A feature of our design is that nobody was excluded on the basis of 
their response to a “trigger,” “gateway” or “diagnostic item” question about previous gambling 
history.  
Our sample consists of 8,405 adult Danes and is stratified according to age and sex across 
three regions in Denmark. We estimate an Ordered Probit model with and without controls for 
sample selection to gauge the effect of selection bias from the overall sample frame of 65,592 
Danes. Sample weights are constructed from administrative data at Statistics Denmark on the 
population size of men and women in various age groups and regions in Denmark, and these 
weights are included in the predicted distributions of gambling risk. We control for endogenous 
sample selection bias using full information maximum likelihood estimation of the Ordered Probit 
model. The FLAGS instrument was administered to all subjects, and we find that roughly 80% of 
the sample has no detectable risk, 12% has an early risk, 3.9% has an intermediate risk, 3.3% has an 
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advanced risk, and 1.1% is classified as a problem gambler. Controlling for sample selection has a 
significant negative effect on prevalence rates, and the corrected estimates of gambling risk show that 
more than 95% of the population has no detectable risk, 2.9% has an early risk, 0.8% has an 
intermediate risk, 0.7% has an advanced risk, and only 0.2% is classified as a problem gambler. 
There are significant (unconditional and conditional) correlations of the FLAGS gambling risk 
levels with the levels of other gambling risk instruments (DSM and PGSI), related instruments 
measuring formative gambling risk (GACS, GRCS and GUS), an instrument measuring alcohol use 
(AUDIT), and instruments measuring anxiety, depression and impulsiveness (BAI, BDI and BIS). 
All correlations are positive and statistically significantly different than zero: for example, someone 
that scores more highly on DSM or PGSI also scores more highly on FLAGS.  
Finally, we administered two “trigger” questions based on past gambling history that asked 
subjects if they had ever lost more than 40 kroner or 500 kroner on gambling in a single day. These 
questions are common in gambling prevalence studies and the survey instruments are administered 
if the answer is affirmative. We find significant effects of imposing a threshold gambling history on 
the classification of gambling risk. With the 500 kroner and 40 kroner threshold, we understate the 
fraction of Danes with detectable gambling risk levels. Hence the standard practice in surveys of 
using these thresholds leads to an underestimate of the prevalence of gambling problems in the 
general population. 
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Appendix A 
Survey Instruments 
 
The instruments listed below were employed for use in our surveys. The format displayed below is 
the easiest to document the blocks and response formats, but is not literally the text given to 
respondents. For instance, the block headings with the FLAGS instrument were not given to 
respondents, but make it easier to see which questions go together. 
 
 
A.1  Focal Adult Gambling Screen (FLAGS) 
 
Please read the following list of statements about gambling, and for each please indicate whether or 
not this statement is true for you. A simple YES or NO response is all you need to provide. If some 
statement does not apply to you, just respond NO. The statements are in no particular order. Think 
about your lifetime gambling experiences [OR: your gambling experiences in the last year]. 
 
Risky Cognition: Belief (RCB) 
RCB01 People who are good at gambling get more respect from others. 
RCB02 Gambling is an easy way to get extra money when you need it. 
RCB03 Using a system or a strategy when you play games like lottery draws, roulette, slots or 
other gambling machines improves your chances of winning. 
RCB04 After you have been gambling and losing for a while your chances of winning improve. 
RCB05 If you are on a winning streak it makes sense to keep gambling to take advantage of your 
luck. 
RCB06 Once someone has been gambling and losing for a while they should keep playing so they 
don’t miss out on the chance to win back their money. 
RCB07 Some people are luckier than others and so they have a better chance of winning when 
they gamble. 
RCB08 I had a big win when I first started to gamble. 
RCB09 I used to win a lot when I gambled but it seems like the odds aren’t as good anymore. 
 
Risky Cognition: Motives (RCM) 
RCM01 I find things a lot more interesting when I have a bet or wager riding on the outcome. 
RCM02 I sometimes gamble when I am feeling down or depressed. 
RCM03 I gamble when I want money. 
RCM04 Even if I don’t have much money I gamble to try to get a big win. 
RCM05 Gambling helps me to fit in better with others. 
RCM06 I want people to think I am good at gambling. 
RCM07 I gamble because it feels good to beat others at the game. 
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Preoccupation: Desire (POD) 
POD01 I would like to gamble almost every day. 
POD02 Compared to many other things I can do I would rather gamble. 
POD03 I wish I could gamble more often. 
 
Impaired Control: Continue (ICC) 
ICC01 Even when I only wanted to spend a few dollars gambling, I often ended up spending 
much more. 
ICC02 Once I start gambling I sometimes find it difficult to stop. 
ICC03 When I gambled I usually exceeded the amount of money I intended to spend. 
ICC04 I often had trouble stopping/quitting play when I was ahead. 
 
Risky Practices: Earlier (RBE) 
RBE01 When I won big I usually kept playing rather than stop. 
RBE02 I usually played at maximum bet or bet the most I could afford when I was on a winning 
streak. 
RBE03 I often spend more time gambling than I intended. 
RBE04 I am making bigger bets than I used to. 
RBE05 I gamble or make bets when I get a good luck sign or I am feeling lucky. 
RBE06 When I am gambling I am interested in the game, not socializing with others. 
 
Risky Practices: Later (RBL) 
RBL01 I sometimes borrowed money from others so I could go and gamble. 
RBL02 I often used my credit card to get more money so I could keep gambling. 
RBL03 I sometimes exceeded the amount of money I intended to spend in order to win back 
money I had lost. 
RBL04 I gambled at work or when I was supposed to be doing something else. 
RBL05 I have a strategy to improve my luck when I gamble. 
RBL06 I have gambled using money that I was supposed to spend on other things. 
RBL07 When gambling I usually played fast or made as many bets as quickly as I could. 
RBL08 I sometimes bet when I believe I can predict the outcome of an event. 
 
Impaired Control: Begin (ICB) 
ICB01 If I have the opportunity to gamble I can’t stop myself from taking it. 
ICB02 There have been times I started to gamble despite my desire not to. 
ICB03 I tried unsuccessfully to stop or reduce my gambling. 
ICB04 I gamble more often than I want to. 
 
Preoccupation: Obsession (POO) 
POO01  I plan my life around my gambling. 
POO02 I am obsessed with gambling thinking about when I will next gamble all the time. 
POO03 I spend a lot of my time thinking about gambling or how to get money to gamble. 
POO04 Thoughts of gambling or playing the games fill my mind day and night. 
 
Negative Consequences (NGC) 
NGC01 When I finished gambling, I sometimes did not have enough money for parking, food, a 
ride home or other things I was supposed to buy for myself. 
NGC02 Sometimes I had to juggle money and bills to cover the cost of my gambling. 
NGC03 My performance at work was negatively affected by my gambling. 
NGC04 My goals in life were jeopardized by my gambling. 
 
151 
NGC05 I sometimes had trouble sleeping thinking about gambling. 
NGC06 I missed social events with my friends and family because I was gambling. 
NGC07 I sometimes neglected family or friends in order to gamble. 
NGC08 My gambling caused problems for my relationship with my spouse or partner. 
NGC09 I have become somewhat of a loner because of my gambling. 
NGC10 My gambling caused me to have a falling out with people I used to hang out with. 
NGC11 Sometimes I felt depressed over my gambling. 
NGC12 I regret that I gambled as much as I did. 
NGC13 I have lied to others about my gambling. 
 
Persistence (PST) 
PST01 Regardless of negative consequences, I kept gambling whenever I had the opportunity. 
PST02 I have continued to gamble for some time despite the negative way gambling has affected 
my life. 
PST03 I kept gambling last year even though I knew it was causing major problems for me. 
 
 
A.2  The Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) 
 
[It is easy to confuse the acronyms of the PGSI and the CPGI. The PGSI is a scored 9-item 
component of the CPGI, which contains 12 items] 
 
 Some of the next 9 questions may not apply to you, but please try to be as accurate as possible. 
Think about your lifetime gambling experiences [OR: your gambling experiences in the last year]. 
 
Answer possibilities:  
 0 = Never 
-1 = Sometimes 
-2 = Most of the time 
-3 = Almost always 
-9 = Don’t know 
             
1. Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose? 
2. Have you needed to gamble with larger amounts of money to get the same feeling of 
excitement? 
3. When you gambled, did you go back on another day to try to win back the money you lost? 
4. Have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money to gamble? 
5. Have you felt that you might have a problem with gambling? 
6. Has gambling caused you any health problems, including stress or anxiety? 
7. Have people criticized your betting or told you that you had a gambling problem, regardless of 
whether or not you thought it was true? 
8. Has your gambling caused any financial problems for you or your household? 
9. Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble? 
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A.3  The Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders – Edition IV (DSM-IV) 
 
Some of the next 10 questions may not apply to you, but please try to be as accurate as possible. 
Think about your lifetime gambling experiences [OR: your gambling experiences in the last year]. 
  
Answer possibilities: 
 0 = No 
-1 = Once or twice 
-2 = Sometimes 
-3 = Often 
-4 = Don’t know 
 
1.  Have you found yourself thinking about gambling (e.g. reliving past gambling experiences, 
planning the next time you will play or thinking of ways to get money for gambling)?  
2. Have you needed to gamble with more and more money to get the amount of excitement you 
are looking for? 
3. Have you become restless or irritable when trying to cut down or stop gambling? 
4. Have you gambled to escape from problems or when you are feeling depressed, anxious or bad 
about yourself? 
5. After losing money gambling, have you returned another day in order to get even? 
6. Have you lied to your family, or others, to hide the extent of your gambling? 
7. Have you made repeated unsuccessful attempts to control, cut back or stop gambling? 
8. Have you been forced to go beyond what is strictly legal, in order to finance gambling or to 
pay gambling debts? 
9. Have you risked or lost a significant relationship, job, educational or career opportunity 
because of gambling? 
10. Have you sought help from others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation 
caused by gambling? 
 
 
A.4  The Gambling Craving Scale (GACS) 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements. 
 
Answer possibilities: 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = moderately disagree 
3 = mildly disagree 
4 = neither agree or disagree 
5 = mildly agree 
6 = moderately agree 
7 = strongly agree 
 
1 Gambling would be fun right now. 
2 If I had an opportunity to gamble right now, I probably would take it. 
3 If I were offered an opportunity to gamble right now, I would gamble. 
4 If it were possible, I probably would gamble now. 
5  I would not enjoy gambling right now. 
6  Gambling would be very satisfying now. 
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7  Gambling now would make things seem just perfect. 
8  All I want right now is to gamble. 
9  I crave gambling right now. 
10  My desire to gamble seems overpowering. 
11  I need to gamble now. 
12 I have an urge to gamble. 
13 I would do almost anything to gamble now. 
14 Nothing would be better than gambling now. 
15 If I were gambling now, I could think more clearly. 
16 I could control things better right now if I could gamble. 
17 Gambling would make me less depressed. 
18 I would be less irritable right now if I could gamble. 
 
 
A.5  The Gambling Related Cognition Scale (GRCS) 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements. 
 
Answer possibilities: 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = moderately disagree 
3 = mildly disagree       
4 = neither agree or disagree 
5 = mildly agree 
6 = moderately agree 
7 = strongly agree 
 
1 Gambling makes me happier. 
2 I can’t function without gambling. 
3 Praying helps me win. 
4  Losses when gambling, are bound to be followed by a series of wins. 
5  Relating my winnings to my skill and ability makes me continue gambling. 
6  Gambling makes things seem better. 
7  It is difficult to stop gambling as I am so out of control. 
8  Specific numbers and colours can help increase my chances of winning. 
9  A series of losses will provide me with a learning experience that will help me win later. 
10  Relating my losses to bad luck and bad circumstances makes me continue gambling. 
11  Gambling makes the future brighter. 
12  My desire to gamble is so overpowering. 
13  I collect specific objects that help increase my chances of winning. 
14  When I have a win once, I will definitely win again. 
15  Relating my losses to probability makes me continue gambling. 
16  Having a gamble helps reduce tension and stress. 
17  I’m not strong enough to stop gambling. 
18  I have specific rituals and behaviours that increase my chances of winning. 
19  There are times that I feel lucky and thus, gamble those times only. 
20  Remembering how much money I won last time makes me continue gambling. 
21  I will never be able to stop gambling. 
22  I have some control over predicting my gambling wins. 
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23  If I keep changing my numbers, I have less chances of winning than if I keep the same 
numbers every time. 
 
 
 
A.6  The Gambling Urge Screen (GUS) 
 
The next 8 questions have to do with your feelings and thoughts right now. Please indicate how 
much you agree or disagree with the statements. 
 
Answer possibilities:         
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = moderately disagree 
3 = mildly disagree 
4 = neither agree or disagree 
5 = mildly agree 
6 = moderately agree 
7 = strongly agree 
     
1 All I want to do now is to gamble. 
2 It would be difficult to turn down a gamble this minute. 
3 Having a gamble now would make things seem just perfect. 
4  I want to gamble so bad that I can almost feel it. 
5  Nothing would be better than having a gamble right now. 
6  I crave a gamble right now. 
7 I don’t need to have a gamble now. 
8 If I had the chance to have a gamble, I don’t think I would gamble. 
 
 
 
A.7  The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) 
 
Now I am going to ask you some questions about your use of alcoholic beverages during the past 
year. Because alcohol use can affect many areas of health, and may interfere with certain 
medications, it is important for us to know how much you usually drink and whether you have 
experienced any problems with your drinking. Please try to be as honest and as accurate as you can 
be. 
 
1  How often do you have a drink containing alcohol? 
 0 - Never 
 1 - Monthly or less 
 2 - 2-4 times a month 
 3 - 2-3 times a week 
 4 - 4 or more times a week 
 
2 How many drinks containing alcohol do you have on a typical day when you are drinking? 
 0 - 1 or 2       
 1 - 3 or 4 
 2 - 5 or 6 
 3 - 7 to 9 
 4 - 10 or more 
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 3 How often do you have six or more drinks on one occasion?   
 0 - Never 
 1 - Less than monthly 
 2 - Monthly 
 3 - Weekly 
 4 - Daily or almost daily 
 
 4 How often during the last year have you found that you were not able to stop drinking once 
you had started?   
 0 - Never 
 1 - Less than monthly 
 2 - Monthly 
 3 - Weekly 
 4 - Daily or almost daily 
 
 5 How often during the last year have you failed to do what was normally expected of you 
because of drinking?   
 0 - Never 
 1 - Less than monthly 
 2 - Monthly 
 3 - Weekly 
 4 - Daily or almost daily 
 
 6 How often during the last year have you needed a first drink in the morning to get yourself 
going after a heavy drinking session?   
 0 - Never 
 1 - Less than monthly 
 2 - Monthly 
 3 - Weekly 
 4 - Daily or almost daily 
 
 7 How often during the last year have you had a feeling of guilt or remorse after drinking?   
 0 - Never 
 1 - Less than monthly 
 2 - Monthly 
 3 - Weekly 
 4 - Daily or almost daily 
 
 8 How often during the last year have you been unable to remember what happened the night 
before because of your drinking?   
 0 - Never 
 1 - Less than monthly 
 2 - Monthly 
 3 - Weekly 
 4 - Daily or almost daily 
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 9 Have you or someone else been injured because of your drinking?   
 0 - No 
 2 - Yes, but not in the last year 
 4 - Yes, during the last year 
 
 10 Has a relative, friend, doctor, or other health care worker been concerned about your 
drinking or suggested you cut down?   
 0 - No 
 2 - Yes, but not in the last year 
 4 - Yes, during the last year 
 
 
A.8  Beck Anxiety Index (BAI) 
 
Over their entire life, some people have had a time in their life when they were a “worrier,” in the 
sense that they worried a lot more about things than other with the same problems. Some people 
have also had a time when they were much more nervous or anxious than most other people with 
the same problems. And some people have had a time lasting 6 months or longer when they were 
anxious and worried most days. The next block of statements are common symptoms of people 
having these experiences. Please indicate how much you have been bothered by that symptom 
during the worst of these experiences in your life. 
 
Answer possibilities:         
1 = Not at all 
2 = Mildly but it didn’t bother me much. 
3 = Moderately - it wasn’t pleasant at times. 
4 = Severely - it bothered me a lot. 
 
1 Numbness or tingling   
2 Feeling hot   
3 Wobbliness in legs   
4 Unable to relax   
5 Fear of worst happening   
6 Dizzy or lightheaded   
7 Heart pounding/racing   
8 Unsteady   
9 Terrified or afraid   
10 Nervous   
11 Feeling of choking        
12 Hands trembling   
13 Shaky / unsteady   
14 Fear of losing control   
15 Difficulty in breathing   
16 Fear of dying   
17 Scared   
18 Indigestion   
19 Faint / lightheaded   
20 Face flushed   
21 Hot/cold sweats   
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A.9  Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
 
Over their entire life, some people have had a time when they felt sad, blue, depressed or down 
most of the time for at least 2 weeks. Some people have also had a time over their entire life, lasting 
2 weeks or more, when they didn’t care about the things they usually cared about, or when they 
didn’t enjoy the things they usually enjoyed. The next block of statements are about experiences 
that you might have had during one of those times, when your mood was the lowest, or you 
enjoyed or cared the least about things. Please pick out the one statement that best describes the 
way you have been feeling during that period. If none of the statements apply, just select the first 
one.   
 
1  Sadness    
 0 - I do not feel sad. 
 1 - I feel sad much of the time. 
 2 - I am sad all the time. 
 3 - I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. 
 
 
2 Pessimism    
 0 - I am not discouraged about my future. 
 1 - I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be. 
 2 - I do not expect things to work out for me. 
 3 - I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse. 
 
3 Past Failure 
 0 - I do not feel like a failure. 
 1 - I have failed more than I should have. 
 2 - As I look back, I see a lot of failures. 
 3 - I feel I am a total failure as a person. 
 
4 Loss of Pleasure 
 0 - I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy. 
 1 - I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to. 
 2 - I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
 3 - I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy. 
 
5 Guilty Feelings 
 0 - I don’t feel particularly guilty. 
 1 - I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done. 
 2 - I feel quite guilty most of the time. 
 3 - I feel guilty all of the time. 
 
6 Punishment Feelings 
 0 - I don’t feel I am being punished. 
 1 - I feel I may be punished. 
 2 - I expect to be punished. 
 3 - I feel I am being punished. 
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7 Self-Dislike 
 0 - I feel the same about myself as ever. 
 1 - I have lost confidence in myself. 
 2 - I am disappointed in myself. 
 3 - I dislike myself. 
 
8 Self-Criticalness 
 0 - I don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual. 
 1 - I am more critical of myself than I used to be. 
 2 - I criticize myself for all of my faults. 
 3 - I blame myself for everything bad that happens. 
 
9 Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes 
 0 - I don’t have any thoughts of killing myself. 
 1 - I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out. 
 2 - I would like to kill myself. 
 3 - I would kill myself if I had the chance. 
 
10 Crying 
 0 - I don’t cry any more than I used to. 
 1 - I cry more than I used to. 
 2 - I cry over every little thing. 
 3 - I feel like crying, but I can’t. 
 
11 Agitation 
 0 - I am no more restless or wound up than usual. 
 1 - I feel more restless or wound up than ususal. 
 2 - I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still. 
 3 - I am so restless or agitated that have to keep moving or doing something. 
 
12 Loss of Interest 
 0 - I have not lost interest in other people or activities. 
 1 - I am less interested in other people or things than before. 
 2 - I have lost most of my interest in other people. 
 3 - It’s hard to get interested in anything. 
 
13 Indecisiveness 
 0 - I make decisions about as well as ever. 
 1 - I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual. 
 2 - I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to. 
 3 - I have trouble making any decisions. 
 
14 Worthlessness 
 0 - I do not feel I am worthless. 
 1 - I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to. 
 2 - I feel more worthless as compared to other people. 
 3 - I feel utterly worthless. 
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15 Loss of Energy 
 0 - I have as much energy as ever. 
 1 - I have less energy than I used to have. 
 2 - I don’t have enough energy to do very much. 
 3 - I don’t have enough energy to do anything. 
 
16 Changes in Sleeping Pattern 
 0 - I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern. 
 1a - I sleep somewhat more than usual. 
 1b - I sleep somewhat less than usual. 
 2a - I sleep a lot more than usual. 
 2b - I sleep a lot less than usual. 
 3a - I sleep most of the day. 
 3b - I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep. 
  
17 Irritability 
 0 - I am no more irritable than usual. 
 1 - I am more irritable than usual. 
 2 - I am much more irritable than usual. 
 3 - I am irritable all the time. 
 
18 Changes in Appetite 
 0 - I have not experienced any change in my appetite. 
 1a - My appetite is somewhat less than usual. 
 1b - My appetite is somewhat greater than usual. 
 2a - My appetite is much less than before. 
 2b - My appetite is much greater than before. 
 3a - I have no appetite at all. 
 3b - I crave food all the time. 
 
19 Concentration Difficulty 
 0 - I can concentrate as well as ever. 
 1 - I can’t concentrate as well as usual. 
 2 - It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long. 
 3 - I find I can’t concentrate on anything. 
 
20 Tiredness or Fatigue         
 0 - I am no more tired or fatigued than usual. 
 1 - I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual. 
 2 - I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do. 
 3 - I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do. 
 
21 Loss of Interest in Sex 
 0 - I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex. 
 1 - I am less interested in sex than I used to be. 
 2 - I am much less interested in sex now. 
 3 - I have lost interest in sex completely. 
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A.10  Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS) 
 
People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations. The next block of questions are 
designed to measure some of the ways in which you act and think. Read each statement and select 
the best answer. 
 
Answer possibilities:         
1 = Rarely / Never 
2 = Occasionally. 
3 = Often 
4 = Almost Always / Always 
 
1  I plan tasks carefully. 
2  I do things without thinking. 
3  I make-up my mind quickly. 
4  I am happy-go-lucky. 
5  I don’t “pay attention.” 
6  I have “racing” thoughts. 
7  I plan trips well ahead of time. 
8  I am self controlled. 
9  I concentrate easily. 
10  I save regularly. 
11  I “squirm” at plays or lectures. 
12  I am a careful thinker. 
13  I plan for job security. 
14  I say things without thinking. 
15  I like to think about complex problems. 
16  I change jobs. 
17  I act “on impulse.” 
18  I get easily bored when solving thought problems. 
19  I act on the spur of the moment. 
20  I am a steady thinker. 
21  I change residences. 
22  I buy things on impulse. 
23  I can only think about one thing at a time. 
24  I change hobbies. 
25  I spend or charge more than I earn. 
26  I often have extraneous thoughts when thinking. 
27  I am more interested in the present than the future. 
28  I am restless at the theater or lectures. 
29  I like puzzles. 
30  I am future oriented. 
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A.11  Additional Questions 
 
1. Have you experienced the death of an immediate family member (partner, child, parent or 
sibling) in the past 12 months? (Yes/No) 
 
2. Have you been hospitalized for a major medical problem during the past 12 months? 
(Yes/No)  
 
3a. In the past 12 months have you lost more than 40 kroner on gambling in a single day? 
(Yes/No) 
3b. Have you ever lost more than 40 kroner on gambling in a single day? (Yes/No) 
 
4a. In the past 12 months have you lost more than 500 kroner on gambling in a single day? 
(Yes/No) 
4b. Have you ever lost more than 500 kroner on gambling in a single day? (Yes/No) 
 
5. Do you currently smoke cigarettes? 
6. If yes, how much do you smoke in one day? 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in the survey. Your answers are valuable to us. 
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Appendix B 
Scoring the Survey Instruments 
 
In this appendix we document how we have scored each instrument. 
 
B.1  FLAGS 
 
We have 8,422 valid survey respondents that completed the survey, and of course everyone did 
FLAGS. The FLAGS documentation (Schellinck et al., 2011) explains the scoring: 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
 Here is the raw tabulation: 
 
  FLAGS Risk Level |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-------------------+----------------------------------- 
No Detectable Risk |      6,698       79.69       79.69 
        Early Risk |      1,010       12.02       91.71 
 Intermediate Risk |        328        3.90       95.61 
     Advanced Risk |        274        3.26       98.87 
   Problem Gambler |         95        1.13      100.00 
-------------------+----------------------------------- 
             Total |      8,405      100.00 
 
 
B.2  PGSI 
 
We have 1,757 valid survey respondents that completed the PGSI survey questions, and of course 
everyone in that 1,757 also did FLAGS. 
 
 The PGSI is directly scored from the responses, once we conservatively assign a Don’t Know 
response as a No. The classification is then to assign anyone with a score of 1 or 2 to Low Risk, a 
score between 3 and 7 to Moderate Risk, and a score of 8 or more to Problem Gambler. 
 
 Here is the raw tabulation: 
 
PGSI Risk Level |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------+----------------------------------- 
    Non-Gambler |      1,492       84.92       84.92 
       Low Risk |        183       10.42       95.33 
  Moderate Risk |         60        3.41       98.75 
Problem Gambler |         22        1.25      100.00 
----------------+----------------------------------- 
          Total |      1,757      100.00 
 
 
                |  Lifetime prevalence 
PGSI Risk Level |         0          1 |     Total 
----------------+----------------------+---------- 
    Non-Gambler |       650        842 |     1,492  
       Low Risk |        79        104 |       183  
  Moderate Risk |        29         31 |        60  
Problem Gambler |        11         11 |        22  
----------------+----------------------+---------- 
          Total |       769        988 |     1,757  
 
          Pearson chi2(3) =   0.9067   Pr = 0.824 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(3) =   0.9009   Pr = 0.825 
                    gamma =  -0.0303  ASE = 0.065 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0110  ASE = 0.024  
 
 
 
B.3  DSM 
 
 We have 1,671 valid survey respondents that completed the DSM-IV survey questions, and of 
course everyone in that 1,671 also did FLAGS. 
 
 One initial question is how we score these responses. Many of the applications of DSM just ask 
YES or NO questions (apart from a DON’T KNOW). But we asked the extended list: 
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     Have you | 
        found | 
     yourself | 
     thinking | 
        about | 
     gambling | 
        (e.g. | 
reliving past | 
 gambling exp |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
--------------+----------------------------------- 
   Don't know |         13        0.78        0.78 
        Often |         20        1.20        1.97 
    Sometimes |         98        5.86        7.84 
Once or twice |        101        6.04       13.88 
           No |      1,439       86.12      100.00 
--------------+----------------------------------- 
        Total |      1,671      100.00 
 
   Have you | 
      found | 
   yourself | 
   thinking | 
      about | 
   gambling | 
      (e.g. | 
   reliving | 
       past | 
   gambling | 
        exp |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
         -4 |         13        0.78        0.78 
         -3 |         20        1.20        1.97 
         -2 |         98        5.86        7.84 
         -1 |        101        6.04       13.88 
          0 |      1,439       86.12      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,671      100.00 
 
 
This comes from the MR (Multiple Response) version of the DSM screen developed by Susan 
Fisher, “Measuring the Prevalence of Sector-Specific Problem Gambling: A Study of Casino 
Patrons,” Journal of Gambling Studies, 16(1), 2000, 25-51. She argues these are easier for respondents 
to follow in a non-clinical setting where one is not face-to-face with the subject. She has also used a 
closely-related MR version in Sue Fisher, “Developing the DSM-IV-DSM-IV Criteria to Identify 
Adolescent Problem Gambling in Non-Clinical Populations,” Journal of Gambling Studies, 16(2/3), 
2000, 253-273. A MR version was also used in the British Gambling Prevalence Study of 2007 (p. 
135) and 2010 (p. 154), who also proposed a “continuous” scoring for each question rather than the 
mapping from MR categories to a “binary” YES or NO. 
 
 We follow the first Fisher paper and code the first 7 DSM question as YES if the respondent 
responded “Often” and code the last 3 DSM questions as YES if the respondent responded “Once 
or Twice,” “Sometimes” or “Often.” Using these binary classifications, she proposed that one 
define a subclinical Problem Gambler as someone that had between 1 and 4 positive DSM criteria 
responses, providing at least one of these was for the last 3 DSM questions. Following the DSM-IV, 
someone is declared to be a Pathological Gambler if they have 5 or more positive DSM responses. 
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 Using these criteria we have the following: 
 
  dsm_score |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,612       96.47       96.47 
          1 |         44        2.63       99.10 
          2 |          6        0.36       99.46 
          3 |          5        0.30       99.76 
          4 |          2        0.12       99.88 
          5 |          2        0.12      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,671      100.00  
 
 
      DSM Risk Level |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------------+----------------------------------- 
         Non-Gambler |      1,644       98.38       98.38 
     Problem Gambler |         25        1.50       99.88 
Pathological Gambler |          2        0.12      100.00 
---------------------+----------------------------------- 
               Total |      1,671      100.00 
 
 
                     |  Lifetime prevalence 
      DSM Risk Level |         0          1 |     Total 
---------------------+----------------------+---------- 
         Non-Gambler |       733        911 |     1,644  
     Problem Gambler |        13         12 |        25  
Pathological Gambler |         0          2 |         2  
---------------------+----------------------+---------- 
               Total |       746        925 |     1,671  
 
          Pearson chi2(2) =   2.1626   Pr = 0.339 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(2) =   2.9114   Pr = 0.233 
                    gamma =  -0.0703  ASE = 0.193 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0089  ASE = 0.025 
 
 
B.4  GACS 
 
We have 1,626 valid survey respondents that completed the GACS survey questions, and of course 
everyone in that 1,626 also did FLAGS. 
 
 Here is the Likert scale used for each question, with one (GACS_5) reverse-coded: 
 
   If it were possible, I | 
    probably would gamble | 
             now.         |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
--------------------------+----------------------------------- 
        strongly disagree |      1,152       70.85       70.85 
      moderately disagree |        145        8.92       79.77 
          mildly disagree |         70        4.31       84.07 
neither agree or disagree |        127        7.81       91.88 
             mildly agree |         75        4.61       96.49 
         moderately agree |         31        1.91       98.40 
           strongly agree |         26        1.60      100.00 
--------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                    Total |      1,626      100.00  
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 If it were    | 
possible, I    | 
probably would | 
gamble now.    |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
---------------+----------------------------------- 
          1    |      1,152       70.85       70.85 
          2    |        145        8.92       79.77 
          3    |         70        4.31       84.07 
          4    |        127        7.81       91.88 
          5    |         75        4.61       96.49 
          6    |         31        1.91       98.40 
          7    |         26        1.60      100.00 
---------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total    |      1,626      100.00  
 
So the usual way one generates a score from such things is just to average. They do discuss 3 
subscales from the 18 questions, but we do not want to presume factor loadings from their 
statistical analysis would apply to our analysis or population. 
 
 Here is the raw tabulation of the scale, rounded to the nearest 0.1 and 1 for ease of viewing: 
 
gacs_scoreR |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |        526       32.35       32.35 
        1.1 |        107        6.58       38.93 
        1.2 |        133        8.18       47.11 
        1.3 |        232       14.27       61.38 
        1.4 |         65        4.00       65.38 
        1.5 |         60        3.69       69.07 
        1.6 |         53        3.26       72.32 
        1.7 |         53        3.26       75.58 
        1.8 |         49        3.01       78.60 
        1.9 |         29        1.78       80.38 
          2 |         19        1.17       81.55 
        2.1 |         31        1.91       83.46 
        2.2 |         35        2.15       85.61 
        2.3 |         25        1.54       87.15 
        2.4 |         28        1.72       88.87 
        2.5 |         11        0.68       89.54 
        2.6 |         15        0.92       90.47 
        2.7 |         12        0.74       91.21 
        2.8 |         15        0.92       92.13 
        2.9 |         10        0.62       92.74 
          3 |          4        0.25       92.99 
        3.1 |          6        0.37       93.36 
        3.2 |         10        0.62       93.97 
        3.3 |          8        0.49       94.46 
        3.4 |          8        0.49       94.96 
        3.5 |          5        0.31       95.26 
        3.6 |          4        0.25       95.51 
        3.7 |          5        0.31       95.82 
        3.8 |          3        0.18       96.00 
        3.9 |          6        0.37       96.37 
          4 |         27        1.66       98.03 
        4.1 |          6        0.37       98.40 
        4.2 |          2        0.12       98.52 
        4.3 |          2        0.12       98.65 
        4.4 |          5        0.31       98.95 
        4.5 |          2        0.12       99.08 
        4.8 |          1        0.06       99.14 
        5.1 |          1        0.06       99.20 
        5.3 |          1        0.06       99.26 
        5.4 |          1        0.06       99.32 
        5.5 |          2        0.12       99.45 
        5.6 |          1        0.06       99.51 
        5.8 |          1        0.06       99.57 
        6.1 |          1        0.06       99.63 
        6.2 |          1        0.06       99.69 
        6.3 |          1        0.06       99.75 
        6.7 |          4        0.25      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,626      100.00 
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        RR |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         1 |       476        587 |     1,063  
         2 |       179        203 |       382  
         3 |        40         59 |        99  
         4 |        30         35 |        65  
         5 |         4          2 |         6  
         6 |         5          2 |         7  
         7 |         2          2 |         4  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       736        890 |     1,626  
 
          Pearson chi2(6) =   4.5373   Pr = 0.604 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) =   4.5755   Pr = 0.599 
                    gamma =  -0.0236  ASE = 0.047 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0119  ASE = 0.024 
 
 
B.5  GRCS 
 
We have 1,656 valid survey respondents that completed the GRCS survey questions, and of course 
everyone in that 1,656 also did FLAGS. 
 
 Here is the Likert scale used for each question: 
 
Gambling makes me happier. |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
 --------------------------+----------------------------------- 
         strongly disagree |        797       48.13       48.13 
       moderately disagree |        162        9.78       57.91 
           mildly disagree |         65        3.93       61.84 
 neither agree or disagree |        364       21.98       83.82 
              mildly agree |        190       11.47       95.29 
          moderately agree |         55        3.32       98.61 
            strongly agree |         23        1.39      100.00 
 --------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                     Total |      1,656      100.00 
 
   Gambling | 
   makes me | 
   happier. |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |        797       48.13       48.13 
          2 |        162        9.78       57.91 
          3 |         65        3.93       61.84 
          4 |        364       21.98       83.82 
          5 |        190       11.47       95.29 
          6 |         55        3.32       98.61 
          7 |         23        1.39      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,656      100.00 
 
Raylu & Oei (2004b) document clearly how to score this instrument. We generate the simple 
average subscale score and then the simple average of those for an overall score. 
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Here is the raw tabulation of the scale, rounded to the nearest 0.1 and 1 for ease of viewing: 
 
grcs_scoreR |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |        482       29.11       29.11 
        1.1 |        195       11.78       40.88 
        1.2 |         98        5.92       46.80 
        1.3 |        132        7.97       54.77 
        1.4 |         86        5.19       59.96 
        1.5 |         86        5.19       65.16 
        1.6 |         80        4.83       69.99 
        1.7 |         44        2.66       72.64 
        1.8 |         51        3.08       75.72 
        1.9 |         30        1.81       77.54 
          2 |         30        1.81       79.35 
        2.1 |         32        1.93       81.28 
        2.2 |         36        2.17       83.45 
        2.3 |         32        1.93       85.39 
        2.4 |         20        1.21       86.59 
        2.5 |         28        1.69       88.29 
        2.6 |         14        0.85       89.13 
        2.7 |         16        0.97       90.10 
        2.8 |         16        0.97       91.06 
        2.9 |          9        0.54       91.61 
          3 |          9        0.54       92.15 
        3.1 |          8        0.48       92.63 
        3.2 |         16        0.97       93.60 
        3.3 |          5        0.30       93.90 
        3.4 |         15        0.91       94.81 
        3.5 |          7        0.42       95.23 
        3.6 |          3        0.18       95.41 
        3.7 |         10        0.60       96.01 
        3.8 |          5        0.30       96.32 
        3.9 |          4        0.24       96.56 
          4 |         35        2.11       98.67 
        4.1 |          5        0.30       98.97 
        4.2 |          2        0.12       99.09 
        4.3 |          2        0.12       99.21 
        4.6 |          1        0.06       99.28 
        4.7 |          3        0.18       99.46 
        4.8 |          1        0.06       99.52 
        4.9 |          1        0.06       99.58 
        5.2 |          1        0.06       99.64 
        5.5 |          1        0.06       99.70 
          6 |          1        0.06       99.76 
        6.3 |          1        0.06       99.82 
        6.7 |          1        0.06       99.88 
        6.9 |          2        0.12      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,656      100.00 
  
  
grcs_score |  Lifetime prevalence 
        RR |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         1 |       472        562 |     1,034  
         2 |       179        239 |       418  
         3 |        56         64 |       120  
         4 |        34         37 |        71  
         5 |         6          1 |         7  
         6 |         3          0 |         3  
         7 |         1          2 |         3  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       751        905 |     1,656  
 
          Pearson chi2(6) =   9.7742   Pr = 0.134 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) =  11.2655   Pr = 0.081 
                    gamma =  -0.0028  ASE = 0.046 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0014  ASE = 0.024 
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B.6  GUS 
 
We have 1,695 valid survey respondents that completed the GUS survey questions, and of course 
everyone in that 1,695 also did FLAGS. 
 
 Here is the Likert scale used for each question: 
 
  All I want to do now is | 
               to gamble. |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
--------------------------+----------------------------------- 
        strongly disagree |      1,432       84.48       84.48 
      moderately disagree |         89        5.25       89.73 
          mildly disagree |         31        1.83       91.56 
neither agree or disagree |         86        5.07       96.64 
             mildly agree |         27        1.59       98.23 
         moderately agree |         16        0.94       99.17 
           strongly agree |         14        0.83      100.00 
--------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                    Total |      1,695      100.00 
 
 All I want | 
  to do now | 
      is to | 
    gamble. |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |      1,432       84.48       84.48 
          2 |         89        5.25       89.73 
          3 |         31        1.83       91.56 
          4 |         86        5.07       96.64 
          5 |         27        1.59       98.23 
          6 |         16        0.94       99.17 
          7 |         14        0.83      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,695      100.00 
 
Raylu & Oei (2004a) document clearly how to score this: they suggest the total score, since this is 
viewed as one factor, but the average score would do the same. They drop 2 of the 8 questions (the 
reverse-coded ones, GUS_7 and GUS_8). 
 
 Here is the raw tabulation of the scale, rounded to the nearest 0.1 and 1 for ease of viewing: 
 
 gus_scoreR |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |        996       58.76       58.76 
        1.1 |         70        4.13       62.89 
        1.3 |         50        2.95       65.84 
        1.4 |         66        3.89       69.73 
        1.5 |         42        2.48       72.21 
        1.6 |         40        2.36       74.57 
        1.8 |        126        7.43       82.01 
        1.9 |         30        1.77       83.78 
          2 |         23        1.36       85.13 
        2.1 |         16        0.94       86.08 
        2.3 |         18        1.06       87.14 
        2.4 |         12        0.71       87.85 
        2.5 |         63        3.72       91.56 
        2.6 |         15        0.88       92.45 
        2.8 |          6        0.35       92.80 
        2.9 |          7        0.41       93.22 
          3 |          6        0.35       93.57 
        3.1 |         10        0.59       94.16 
        3.3 |         10        0.59       94.75 
        3.4 |          5        0.29       95.04 
        3.5 |          3        0.18       95.22 
        3.6 |          8        0.47       95.69 
        3.8 |          9        0.53       96.22 
        3.9 |          6        0.35       96.58 
          4 |         23        1.36       97.94 
        4.1 |          3        0.18       98.11 
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        4.3 |          3        0.18       98.29 
        4.5 |          1        0.06       98.35 
        4.6 |          4        0.24       98.58 
        4.8 |          3        0.18       98.76 
        4.9 |          3        0.18       98.94 
          5 |          2        0.12       99.06 
        5.1 |          1        0.06       99.12 
        5.3 |          2        0.12       99.23 
        5.4 |          1        0.06       99.29 
        5.5 |          2        0.12       99.41 
        5.6 |          1        0.06       99.47 
        5.9 |          1        0.06       99.53 
          6 |          1        0.06       99.59 
        6.3 |          2        0.12       99.71 
        6.5 |          1        0.06       99.76 
        6.8 |          1        0.06       99.82 
          7 |          3        0.18      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,695      100.00 
 
 
gus_scoreRR |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |      1,182       69.73       69.73 
          2 |        307       18.11       87.85 
          3 |        122        7.20       95.04 
          4 |         55        3.24       98.29 
          5 |         17        1.00       99.29 
          6 |          7        0.41       99.71 
          7 |          5        0.29      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,695      100.00  
 
gus_scoreR |  Lifetime prevalence 
         R |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         1 |       505        677 |     1,182  
         2 |       136        171 |       307  
         3 |        59         63 |       122  
         4 |        30         25 |        55  
         5 |         9          8 |        17  
         6 |         5          2 |         7  
         7 |         5          0 |         5  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       749        946 |     1,695  
 
          Pearson chi2(6) =  13.2318   Pr = 0.039 
 likelihood-ratio chi2(6) =  15.0737   Pr = 0.020 
                    gamma =  -0.1055  ASE = 0.047 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0514  ASE = 0.023 
 
 
B.7  AUDIT 
 
 We have 6,661 valid survey respondents that completed the AUDIT survey questions, and of 
course everyone in that 6,661 also did FLAGS. 
 
 Here is the Likert scale used for each of the first 8 questions: 
 
How often during the | 
   last year have you | 
  found that you were | 
 not able to stop dri |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------+----------------------------------- 
                Never |      5,707       85.85       85.85 
    Less than monthly |        695       10.45       96.30 
              Monthly |        154        2.32       98.62 
               Weekly |         65        0.98       99.59 
Daily or almost daily |         27        0.41      100.00 
----------------------+----------------------------------- 
                Total |      6,648      100.00 
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  How often | 
 during the | 
  last year | 
   have you | 
 found that | 
   you were | 
not able to | 
   stop dri |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      5,707       85.85       85.85 
          1 |        695       10.45       96.30 
          2 |        154        2.32       98.62 
          3 |         65        0.98       99.59 
          4 |         27        0.41      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      6,648      100.00 
 
 
But the last 2 questions have different coding, with the numerical values shown: 
 
 
Have you or someone else been | 
      injured because of your | 
                  drinking?   |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                           No |      6,071       91.32       91.32 
Yes, but not in the last year |        467        7.02       98.35 
    Yes, during the last year |        110        1.65      100.00 
------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                        Total |      6,648      100.00 
 
 
Have you or | 
    someone | 
  else been | 
    injured | 
 because of | 
       your | 
drinking?   |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      6,071       91.32       91.32 
          2 |        467        7.02       98.35 
          4 |        110        1.65      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      6,648      100.00 
 
Bablor et al. (2001) document clearly how to score this: they suggest the total score, since this is 
viewed as one factor. While the average score would do the same, we want comparability to cutoff 
thresholds stated in terms of the score. For instance, here is the default categories based on the total 
score: 
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 Here is the raw tabulation of the scale, with extra lines between the above “zones”: 
 
 
audit_score |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        406        6.11        6.11 
          1 |        575        8.65       14.76 
          2 |        712       10.71       25.47 
          3 |        928       13.96       39.43 
          4 |        998       15.01       54.44 
          5 |        711       10.69       65.13 
          6 |        556        8.36       73.50 
          7 |        386        5.81       79.30 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          8 |        313        4.71       84.01 
          9 |        212        3.19       87.20 
         10 |        169        2.54       89.74 
         11 |        148        2.23       91.97 
         12 |         87        1.31       93.28 
         13 |        103        1.55       94.83 
         14 |         66        0.99       95.82 
         15 |         45        0.68       96.50 
------------+----------------------------------- 
         16 |         50        0.75       97.25 
         17 |         36        0.54       97.79 
         18 |         26        0.39       98.18 
         19 |         19        0.29       98.47 
------------+----------------------------------- 
         20 |         21        0.32       98.78 
         21 |         14        0.21       98.99 
         22 |         19        0.29       99.28 
         23 |          8        0.12       99.40 
         24 |          7        0.11       99.50 
         25 |          9        0.14       99.64 
         26 |          3        0.05       99.68 
         27 |          4        0.06       99.74 
         28 |          2        0.03       99.77 
         29 |          3        0.05       99.82 
         30 |          1        0.02       99.83 
         31 |          1        0.02       99.85 
         32 |          3        0.05       99.89 
         33 |          2        0.03       99.92 
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         34 |          3        0.05       99.97 
         35 |          1        0.02       99.98 
         40 |          1        0.02      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      6,648      100.00 
 
 Here are the evaluations of treatments: 
 
audit_scor |  Lifetime prevalence 
         e |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |       188        218 |       406  
         1 |       263        312 |       575  
         2 |       306        406 |       712  
         3 |       393        535 |       928  
         4 |       431        567 |       998  
         5 |       326        385 |       711  
         6 |       241        315 |       556  
         7 |       177        209 |       386  
         8 |       142        171 |       313  
         9 |       101        111 |       212  
        10 |        77         92 |       169  
        11 |        62         86 |       148  
        12 |        49         38 |        87  
        13 |        50         53 |       103  
        14 |        27         39 |        66  
        15 |        26         19 |        45  
        16 |        24         26 |        50  
        17 |        21         15 |        36  
        18 |        13         13 |        26  
        19 |         9         10 |        19  
        20 |        13          8 |        21  
        21 |        11          3 |        14  
        22 |        13          6 |        19  
        23 |         5          3 |         8  
        24 |         3          4 |         7  
        25 |         4          5 |         9  
        26 |         1          2 |         3  
        27 |         1          3 |         4  
        28 |         0          2 |         2  
        29 |         1          2 |         3  
        30 |         0          1 |         1  
        31 |         0          1 |         1  
        32 |         2          1 |         3  
        33 |         0          2 |         2  
        34 |         2          1 |         3  
        35 |         0          1 |         1  
        40 |         0          1 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     2,982      3,666 |     6,648  
 
         Pearson chi2(36) =  41.8557   Pr = 0.232 
likelihood-ratio chi2(36) =  45.1015   Pr = 0.142 
                    gamma =  -0.0288  ASE = 0.016 
          Kendall's tau-b =  -0.0193  ASE = 0.010 
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B.8  BAI 
 
We have 1,671 valid survey respondents that completed the BAI survey questions, and of course 
everyone in that 1,671 also did FLAGS. 
 
 Here is the Likert scale used for each question: 
 
                        Fear of dying   |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                             Not at all |      1,253       74.99       74.99 
   Mildly but it didn’t bother me much. |        267       15.98       90.96 
Moderately - it wasn’t pleasant at time |        112        6.70       97.67 
       Severely - it bothered me a lot. |         39        2.33      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  Total |      1,671      100.00 
 
    Fear of | 
    dying   |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |      1,253       74.99       74.99 
          2 |        267       15.98       90.96 
          3 |        112        6.70       97.67 
          4 |         39        2.33      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,671      100.00 
 
Beck and Steer (1990) document clearly how to score this: they suggest the total score, since this is 
viewed as one factor, but the average score would do the same. We have 21 BAI questions. Here 
is the raw tabulation of the scale, rounded to the nearest 0.1 for ease of viewing: 
 
 bai_scoreR |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |        537       32.14       32.14 
        1.1 |        159        9.52       41.65 
        1.2 |        139        8.32       49.97 
        1.3 |        130        7.78       57.75 
        1.4 |        105        6.28       64.03 
        1.5 |         90        5.39       69.42 
        1.6 |         88        5.27       74.69 
        1.7 |         58        3.47       78.16 
        1.8 |         50        2.99       81.15 
        1.9 |         47        2.81       83.96 
          2 |         51        3.05       87.01 
        2.1 |         41        2.45       89.47 
        2.2 |         40        2.39       91.86 
        2.3 |         16        0.96       92.82 
        2.4 |         22        1.32       94.14 
        2.5 |         12        0.72       94.85 
        2.6 |         14        0.84       95.69 
        2.7 |          9        0.54       96.23 
        2.8 |         10        0.60       96.83 
        2.9 |         10        0.60       97.43 
          3 |         14        0.84       98.26 
        3.1 |          8        0.48       98.74 
        3.2 |          2        0.12       98.86 
        3.3 |          1        0.06       98.92 
        3.4 |          7        0.42       99.34 
        3.5 |          4        0.24       99.58 
        3.6 |          2        0.12       99.70 
        3.7 |          1        0.06       99.76 
        3.8 |          1        0.06       99.82 
          4 |          3        0.18      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,671      100.00 
 
 
 Here are the evaluations of treatments: 
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           |  Lifetime prevalence 
bai_scoreR |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         1 |       245        292 |       537  
       1.1 |        72         87 |       159  
       1.2 |        60         79 |       139  
       1.3 |        53         77 |       130  
       1.4 |        58         47 |       105  
       1.5 |        33         57 |        90  
       1.6 |        45         43 |        88  
       1.7 |        28         30 |        58  
       1.8 |        18         32 |        50  
       1.9 |        22         25 |        47  
         2 |        22         29 |        51  
       2.1 |        17         24 |        41  
       2.2 |        16         24 |        40  
       2.3 |         6         10 |        16  
       2.4 |        11         11 |        22  
       2.5 |         5          7 |        12  
       2.6 |         5          9 |        14  
       2.7 |         4          5 |         9  
       2.8 |         3          7 |        10  
       2.9 |         5          5 |        10  
         3 |         7          7 |        14  
       3.1 |         5          3 |         8  
       3.2 |         1          1 |         2  
       3.3 |         0          1 |         1  
       3.4 |         2          5 |         7  
       3.5 |         2          2 |         4  
       3.6 |         0          2 |         2  
       3.7 |         0          1 |         1  
       3.8 |         0          1 |         1  
         4 |         1          2 |         3  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |       746        925 |     1,671  
 
         Pearson chi2(29) =  20.4571   Pr = 0.878 
likelihood-ratio chi2(29) =  22.4397   Pr = 0.802 
                    gamma =   0.0250  ASE = 0.032 
          Kendall's tau-b =   0.0163  ASE = 0.021 
 
 
 
B.9  BDI 
 
We have 1,695 valid survey respondents that completed the BDI survey questions, and of course 
everyone in that 1,695 also did FLAGS. 
 
 Here is the Likert scale used for each question: 
 
                Loss of Interest in Sex |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
       I have not noticed any recent ch |      1,159       68.38       68.38 
       I am less interested in sex than |        316       18.64       87.02 
       I am much less interested in sex |        117        6.90       93.92 
       I have lost interest in sex comp |        103        6.08      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  Total |      1,695      100.00 
 
    Loss of | 
Interest in | 
        Sex |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,159       68.38       68.38 
          1 |        316       18.64       87.02 
          2 |        117        6.90       93.92 
          3 |        103        6.08      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,695      100.00  
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Beck et al. (1961) document clearly how to score this: they suggest the total score, since this is 
viewed as one factor, but the average score would do the same. 
  
 Here is the raw tabulation of the scale, rounded to the nearest 0.1 for ease of viewing: 
 
 bdi_scoreR |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        631       37.23       37.23 
         .1 |        167        9.85       47.08 
         .2 |        110        6.49       53.57 
         .3 |         67        3.95       57.52 
         .4 |         52        3.07       60.59 
         .5 |         35        2.06       62.65 
         .6 |         44        2.60       65.25 
         .7 |         63        3.72       68.97 
         .8 |         51        3.01       71.98 
         .9 |         50        2.95       74.93 
          1 |         50        2.95       77.88 
        1.1 |         34        2.01       79.88 
        1.2 |         27        1.59       81.47 
        1.3 |         33        1.95       83.42 
        1.4 |         26        1.53       84.96 
        1.5 |         18        1.06       86.02 
        1.6 |         19        1.12       87.14 
        1.7 |         23        1.36       88.50 
        1.8 |         25        1.47       89.97 
        1.9 |         15        0.88       90.86 
          2 |         16        0.94       91.80 
        2.1 |         13        0.77       92.57 
        2.2 |         16        0.94       93.51 
        2.3 |         10        0.59       94.10 
        2.4 |         13        0.77       94.87 
        2.5 |          8        0.47       95.34 
        2.6 |          7        0.41       95.75 
        2.7 |         10        0.59       96.34 
        2.8 |          7        0.41       96.76 
        2.9 |          7        0.41       97.17 
          3 |          9        0.53       97.70 
        3.1 |          6        0.35       98.05 
        3.2 |          6        0.35       98.41 
        3.3 |          4        0.24       98.64 
        3.4 |          5        0.29       98.94 
        3.5 |          3        0.18       99.12 
        3.6 |          3        0.18       99.29 
        3.7 |          1        0.06       99.35 
        3.8 |          4        0.24       99.59 
        3.9 |          2        0.12       99.71 
          4 |          4        0.24       99.94 
        4.2 |          1        0.06      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,695      100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.10  BIS 
 
We have 1,761 valid survey respondents that completed the BIS survey questions, and of course 
everyone in that 1,761 also did FLAGS. 
 
 Here is the Likert scale used for each question: 
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          I plan tasks | 
    carefully.         |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-----------------------+----------------------------------- 
                 Never |         74        4.21        4.21 
          Occasionally |        494       28.12       32.33 
                 Often |        786       44.74       77.06 
Almost always / Always |        403       22.94      100.00 
-----------------------+----------------------------------- 
                 Total |      1,757      100.00 
 
     I plan | 
      tasks | 
 carefully. |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |         74        4.21        4.21 
          2 |        494       28.12       32.33 
          3 |        786       44.74       77.06 
          4 |        403       22.94      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,757      100.00 
 
Patton, Stanford and Barratt (1995) document clearly how to score this: they suggest the total score, 
since this is viewed as one factor, but the average score would do the same. We have 30 BIS 
questions. 
 
 Here is the raw tabulation of the scale, rounded to the nearest 0.1 for ease of viewing: 
 
bis_scoreR |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          1 |          3        0.17        0.17 
        1.1 |          2        0.11        0.28 
        1.2 |          3        0.17        0.46 
        1.3 |          1        0.06        0.51 
        1.4 |          3        0.17        0.68 
        1.5 |          3        0.17        0.85 
        1.6 |          6        0.34        1.20 
        1.7 |         52        2.96        4.15 
        1.8 |        116        6.60       10.76 
        1.9 |        214       12.18       22.94 
          2 |        291       16.56       39.50 
        2.1 |        366       20.83       60.33 
        2.2 |        309       17.59       77.92 
        2.3 |        209       11.90       89.81 
        2.4 |        102        5.81       95.62 
        2.5 |         53        3.02       98.63 
        2.6 |         17        0.97       99.60 
        2.7 |          3        0.17       99.77 
        2.8 |          3        0.17       99.94 
        2.9 |          1        0.06      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,757      100.00 
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Appendix C 
Summary Statistics 
 
Of the 65,592 Danes that were invited to participate in the survey, only 8,405 completed the entire 
survey, while 3,331 started but did not complete the survey. We here present the background 
information that is available for participants and non-participants. 
 
 We have background information for all participants and non-participants on gender, age, and 
region, but we have missing values for the other variables for several non-participants. We received 
background information on non-participants from the companies that administered the survey, and 
they could not provide complete information for all invited people.  
 
  Completed  Partially Completed  Non-Participants 
  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female 
 
8405 0.54 0.50 0 1 
 
3331 0.58 0.49 0 1 
 
53856 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Age 
 
8405 49.19 14.82 18 75 
 
3331 48.15 15.23 18 75 
 
53856 41.32 14.07 18 75 
Young (18-29) 8405 0.13 0.33 0 1 
 
3331 0.16 0.36 0 1 
 
53856 0.24 0.42 0 1 
Middle (30-39) 8405 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
3331 0.15 0.35 0 1 
 
53856 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Ripe Aged (40-49) 8405 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 
3331 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 
53856 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Older (50+) 8405 0.52 0.50 0 1 
 
3331 0.49 0.50 0 1 
 
53856 0.29 0.45 0 1 
                   Capital Region 8405 0.49 0.50 0 1
 
3331 0.55 0.50 0 1
 
53856 0.44 0.50 0 1
Central Denmark 8405 0.17 0.37 0 1 
 
3331 0.15 0.36 0 1 
 
53856 0.18 0.39 0 1 
North Denmark 8405 0.06 0.25 0 1 
 
3331 0.06 0.23 0 1 
 
53856 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Zealand 
 
8405 0.12 0.33 0 1 
 
3331 0.11 0.31 0 1 
 
53856 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Southern Denmark 8405 0.16 0.37 0 1 
 
3331 0.13 0.33 0 1 
 
53856 0.17 0.38 0 1 
                   Lives in a House 8405 0.56 0.50 0 1
 
3000 0.55 0.50 0 1
 
42699 0.55 0.50 0 1
Owns a House 8405 0.55 0.50 0 1 
 
3030 0.56 0.50 0 1 
 
43046 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Lives with a Partner 8405 0.64 0.48 0 1 
 
2991 0.64 0.48 0 1 
 
38373 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Children in Household 8405 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 
944 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 
9177 0.43 0.50 0 1 
                   Civil Servant 8405 0.39 0.49 0 1
 
3094 0.44 0.50 0 1
 
44428 0.43 0.49 0 1
Retired 
 
8405 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 
3094 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
44428 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Unskilled 
 
8405 0.05 0.22 0 1 
 
3094 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
44428 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Skilled 
 
8405 0.10 0.30 0 1 
 
3094 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 
44428 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Self Employed 8405 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 
3094 0.04 0.20 0 1 
 
44428 0.04 0.20 0 1 
                   Vocational Training 8405 0.23 0.42 0 1
 
2993 0.19 0.39 0 1
 
37716 0.19 0.39 0 1
Low Formal Education 8405 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 
2993 0.21 0.41 0 1 
 
37716 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Short Education (<3 Y. College) 8405 0.10 0.31 0 1 
 
2993 0.09 0.29 0 1 
 
37716 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Med. Education (3-4 Y. College) 8405 0.29 0.45 0 1 
 
2993 0.31 0.46 0 1 
 
37716 0.30 0.46 0 1 
High Education (5+ Y. College) 8405 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
2993 0.18 0.38 0 1 
 
37716 0.15 0.36 0 1 
                   Low Income (<300,000) 8405 0.37 0.48 0 1
 
3033 0.36 0.48 0 1
 
43021 0.42 0.49 0 1
Med. Income (300,000-500,000) 8405 0.34 0.47 0 1 
 
3033 0.33 0.47 0 1 
 
43021 0.32 0.47 0 1 
High Income (500,000-800,000) 8405 0.12 0.33 0 1 
 
3033 0.12 0.32 0 1 
 
43021 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Very High Income (>800,000) 8405 0.02 0.15 0 1 
 
3033 0.03 0.16 0 1 
 
43021 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Silent about Income 8405 0.14 0.35 0 1 
 
3033 0.16 0.37 0 1 
 
43021 0.14 0.34 0 1 
                   Q: Experienced Death  8405 0.12 0.33 0 1
 
33 0.12 0.33 0 1
 
0
    Q: Has been Hospitalized 8405 0.10 0.30 0 1 
 
33 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 
0 
    Q: Trigger 40 DKK 8405 0.38 0.49 0 1 
 
33 0.24 0.44 0 1 
 
0 
    Q: Trigger 500 DKK 8405 0.05 0.22 0 1 
 
33 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 
0 
    Q: Currently Smoker 8405 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 
32 0.34 0.48 0 1 
 
0 
     
Note: The last 5 variables are based on additional questions asked in the surveys (see Appendix A).  
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Appendix D 
The Ordered Probit Statistical Model 
 
We document here the statistical model developed for the primary analyses. The outcome of 
interest is the FLAGS risk level, which can take on any of the ordinal values h={1, 2, 3, 4, 5} 
corresponding to the five FLAGS risk categories, (1) no detectable risk; (2) early risk; (3) 
intermediate risk; (4) advanced risk; and (5) problem gambler. The statistical tool to analyze the 
ordinal outcome is the Ordered Probit model. The probability that outcome yj=h for a given 
individual j is defined by 
 Pr�yj = h� = Pr�κh−1 < xjβ + uj ≤ κh� = Φ�κh − xjβ� −  Φ�κh−1 − xjβ� 
 
where xj is a vector of k independent variables and β are the k corresponding coefficients. κi are the 
cut points between the various outcome possibilities, where κ0 = −∞ and κ5 = +∞. The error term uj is assumed to be normally distributed and Φ(∙) is the cumulative standard normal distribution 
function. The probability of observing outcome h for individual j is then defined by the probability 
that 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗β + 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 falls between the cut points 𝜅𝜅ℎ−1 and 𝜅𝜅ℎ. 
 
We estimate the cut points 𝜅𝜅1 to 𝜅𝜅4 and the vector of coefficients β using maximum likelihood. 
The log likelihood function is 
 ln𝐿𝐿(β, 𝜅𝜅ℎ) = ��𝐼𝐼ℎ�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = ℎ� ln �Φ�𝜅𝜅ℎ − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗β� −  Φ�𝜅𝜅ℎ−1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗β��𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=1
 
 
where 𝐼𝐼ℎ�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = ℎ� = 1 if 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = ℎ, and 0 otherwise. H is the highest outcome: in the case of a FLAGS 
risk level H=5. n is the number of respondents for whom we can calculate a valid FLAGS risk level. 
 
As independent variables, we include treatments (FLAGS first, randomized questions, lifetime 
frame), demographic characteristics (sex, age, and income), as well as an indicator for smoking and 
an indicator for subcontractor. To analyze the effects of scores in other gambling screens on 
FLAGS levels, we expand the model by adding the score in the other instrument as an independent 
variable. When other gambling screens are analyzed we simply replace the ordered outcome variable 
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 with the risk category from the other gambling screen.  
 
We make two extensions to the Ordered Probit model. First, we control for sample weights, 
and second, we correct for sample selection. Sample weights are constructed from administrative 
data at Statistics Denmark on the population size of men and women in various age groups and 
regions in Denmark, and we specify in the estimation that each observation in the data is weighted 
by the corresponding sample weight. 
 
 To correct for sample selection, we model the decision to participate in the survey as 
 
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1(𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾 + 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 > 0) 
 
where 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = 1 if an invited participant completes the survey, 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗 is a vector of independent variables 
that affect participation in the survey,  𝛾𝛾 is vector of coefficients, and 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 is a random error. We 
assume that 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 from the selection equation and uj from the ordered probit equation have a bivariate 
normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix  
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�
1 𝜌𝜌
𝜌𝜌 1� 
 
We jointly estimate the cut points 𝜅𝜅1 to 𝜅𝜅4, the vector of coefficients β from the ordered probit 
equation, the vector of coefficients 𝛾𝛾 from the selection equation, and the correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌 
using maximum likelihood. The log likelihood is 
 ln𝐿𝐿(β, 𝜅𝜅ℎ, 𝛾𝛾,𝜌𝜌) =    � ln �Φ�−𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾��𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑖𝑖∉S
 
    +��𝐼𝐼ℎ�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = ℎ� ln �Φ2�𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾, 𝜅𝜅ℎ − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗β,−𝜌𝜌� −  Φ2�𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾, 𝜅𝜅ℎ−1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗β,−𝜌𝜌��𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑖𝑖∈S
 
 
where S is the set of participants for whom the outcome 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 is observed. Φ2(∙) is the cumulative 
bivariate normal distribution function, and Φ(∙) is the standard normal distribution. 
 
 When the correlation coefficient 𝜌𝜌 of the bivariate normal distribution is equal to 0, the log 
likelihood becomes 
 ln𝐿𝐿(β, 𝜅𝜅ℎ, 𝛾𝛾) =    �𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗ln �Φ�−𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝛾𝛾��𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
 
    +��𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼ℎ�𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 = ℎ� ln �Φ�𝜅𝜅ℎ − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗β� −  Φ�𝜅𝜅ℎ−1 − 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗β��𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
𝑁𝑁
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑖𝑖∈S
 
 
which is simply the sum of two likelihood functions: the probit model on selection and the ordered 
probit model on FLAGS levels.  
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Appendix E 
Predicted FLAGS Levels 
 
We present predicted FLAGS levels for the sample and the population. We start with the Ordered 
Probit model and report the predicted prevalence rates for the sample below. The point estimates 
of each FLAGS level are presented in Table 3.  
 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  no_risk    |      8405    .7969066           0   .7969066   .7969066 
early_ris    |      8405    .1201666           0   .1201666   .1201666 
 int_risk    |      8405    .0390244           0   .0390244   .0390244 
 adv_risk    |      8405    .0325996           0   .0325996   .0325996 
       pg    |      8405    .0113028           0   .0113028   .0113028 
 
 
We now add sample weights in the Ordered Probit model and generate predicted prevalence 
rates for the adult Danish population. The results are presented below, and are also reported in 
Table 3.  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |             Linearized 
              |       Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+------------------------------------------------ 
   no_risk    |   .7596452   1.57e-16      .7596452    .7596452 
early_risk    |   .1327652   8.23e-19      .1327652    .1327652 
  int_risk    |   .0423434   1.44e-18      .0423434    .0423434 
  adv_risk    |   .0470056   4.73e-18      .0470056    .0470056 
        pg    |   .0182405   7.55e-19      .0182405    .0182405 
 
 
Finally, we estimate the Ordered Probit model with controls for sample selection and sample 
weights calculated for the sample frame. We can only predict the FLAGS level for the respondents 
because we do not observe some of the demographic variables or treatment variables for non-
participants. We therefore weight the predictions by the sample weights for the participants. 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |             Linearized 
              |       Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+------------------------------------------------ 
   no_risk    |   .9539403   .0009286      .9521201    .9557605 
early_risk    |   .0287174   .0004591      .0278175    .0296174 
  int_risk    |   .0082087   .0001816      .0078528    .0085647 
  adv_risk    |   .0070422   .0002048      .0066407    .0074437 
        pg    |   .0020914   .0000913      .0019124    .0022704 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix F 
Additional Figures on Marginal Effects of Demographic Characteristics 
 
We present additional figures that illustrate the marginal effects of demographic characteristics on 
FLAGS levels. The estimations are based on the Ordered Probit model with controls for sample 
selection and sample weights. 
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Figure F1: Marginal Effect of Being Young
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure F2: Marginal Effect of Being Ripe_Aged
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Ordered Probit Model, population weights, with sample selection correction
Point estimate of effect and 95% confidence interval
Figure F3: Marginal Effect of Being Older
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure F4: Marginal Effect of Having Medium Income
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure F5: Marginal Effect of Having High Income
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure F6: Marginal Effect of Having Very High Income
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure F7: Marginal Effect of Being Smoker
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Appendix G 
Marginal Effects of other Survey Instruments on FLAGS Level 
 
The figures below show the marginal effects of scores from other gambling screens on predicted 
FLAGS levels. The estimations are based on the Ordered Probit model with no controls for sample 
selection or survey weights.  
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Figure G1: Marginal Effect of DSM Level
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure G2: Marginal Effect of PGSI Level
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure G3: Marginal Effect of GACS Score
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure G4: Marginal Effect of GRCS Score
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure G5: Marginal Effect of GUS Score
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure G6: Marginal Effect of AUDIT Score
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure G7: Marginal Effect of BAI Score
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Figure G8: Marginal Effect of BDI Score
on Probability of FLAGS Gambling Risk Level
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Conclusion
The three chapters in the thesis study the elicitation of individual discount rates and
gambling prevalence rates in Denmark. The thesis contributes to our understanding of
individual decision making over time, the association between individual discount rates and
accumulated private saving, and the identification and measurement of problem gambling.
The first chapter is motivated by mixed results in the literature on the sensitivity of
elicited individual discount rates with respect to background consumption and consumption
smoothing. I use simulated choice data from standard decision tasks in time preference
experiments and show that individual discount rates are robust to time-invariant background
consumption and consumption smoothing if the utility function is elicited jointly. The main
contribution of the first chapter is the clarification of the mixed conclusions from previous
studies on the relevance of background consumption and consumption smoothing for the
identification of individual discount rates. The analysis also reveals new research possibilities
on time preferences. In particular, individual discount rates are highly sensitive to time-
variant background consumption and consumption smoothing. I also find that binary choices
over annuities may alleviate the need to control for utility curvature in the elicitation of
individual discount rates.
The second chapter contributes to the scarce empirical literature on the association
between individual discount rates and private saving behavior. We overcome the challenge of
obtaining reliable information on individual discount rates and financial wealth by combining
data from a field experiment in Denmark with administrative data from Statistics Denmark.
We find significantly lower discount rates for wealthy subjects than for poor subjects, but
we do not find any evidence of present bias and no significant association between present
bias and financial liquidity. The empirical evidence that we present on individual discount
rates and private wealth is consistent with predictions from life cycle models with exponential
discounting, but the empirical evidence that we present on present bias and financial liquidity
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is not consistent with predictions from life cycle models with quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
These findings contribute to our understanding of individual saving and investment decisions
in Denmark. The availability of unique administrative data and infrastructure to conduct
field experiments in Denmark offers many new research possibilities; one can for example
study the association between individual risk and time preferences and portfolio choice.
Finally, the third chapter estimates prevalence rates of problem gambling in Denmark.
We find that 95% of the population has no detectable risk, 2.9% has an early risk, 0.8%
has an intermediate risk, 0.7% has an advanced risk, and 0.2% can be classified as problem
gamblers. We identify several methodological issues that have not been addressed in previous
studies, such as the use of “trigger” questions and the effect of sample selection on estimated
prevalence rates. Our analysis shows significant effects of sample selection, and the results
suggest that previous estimates of gambling prevalence in Denmark (and elsewhere) may
be significantly upward biased. One can furthermore stratify the sample according to
indicators of gambling risk and characterize problem gamblers in terms of their risk and
time preferences. Indeed, the survey was designed with this research outlook in mind and
the results will contribute further to our understanding of gambling behavior.
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